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1Abstract
This thesis focuses on contests and conﬂicts with heterogeneous participants where the asymmetries
arise from players’ preferences, skills, or resource constraints. The work consists of two chapters.
Each section proposes a theoretical framework and provides an empirical justiﬁcation of the key
patterns discovered.
In the ﬁrst chapter, I develop a model where two players with asymmetric preferences engage in
a contest game. Prizes consist of two non-tradable divisible goods. I characterize the optimal prize
allocation that maximizes aggregate eﬀort of the contestants. When heterogeneity is severe, the
designer beneﬁts by giving a positive prize to the loser. This allocation eliminates the advantage
of the stronger competitor and makes the contest homogeneous. As a consequence, the opponent
has higher chances to win and exerts more eﬀort in equilibrium. This positive response increases
aggregate eﬀort.
The model mirrors the job promotion setting with monetary and non-monetary rewards.
Using data from ﬁrst-round matches of two professional tennis competitions where prizes include
money and the ATP ranking points (career concerns), I structurally estimate contestants’ skills
and preferences. Overlooking multi-dimensionality results in biased estimates of the prize
incentive eﬀects. Counterfactual experiments show that reallocating 5% of money and 2% of the
ATP ranking points from ﬁnal winning prizes to ﬁrst-round losing rewards could improve
expected aggregate eﬀort in relatively heterogeneous matches by more than 4.9%.
The second chapter, jointly written with Madina Kurmangaliyeva, adopts the contest setting to
study main determinants of “victim-defendant” settlements. This institute is widely used in both
civil and criminal legal practices. Understanding how the power imbalance aﬀects the negotiation
process is crucial for the optimal design of the justice system. We develop a theoretical model
where the victim (she) and the defendant (he) must exert costly eﬀort for the case to reach /
avoid the court. Before the game starts, the defendant can settle with the victim by making her
a “take-it-or-leave-it” oﬀer. Improving the defendant’s bargaining position reduces the settlement
amount. When the victim has strong preferences for revenge, the agreement may fail to happen
even if the defendant can aﬀord the optimal oﬀer.
Using the data on criminal traﬃc oﬀenses in Russia for 2013–2014 (56’000 complete cases),
we structurally estimate the model and recover individual preferences and ﬁghting abilities.
Overall, defendants are 10 times wealthier than their victims. Oﬀenders who manage to settle
face signiﬁcantly less disutility than their peers going to court (–.007 against –810.78 for “car vs.
pedestrian” accidents). Thus, “victim-defendant” settlements can rise the inequality before the
law. If Russia abandoned the given institute, the prison population could increase by 2’850
inmates, which would cost the state e2.3 million per year.
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1.1 Introduction
Many interactions can be characterized as bilateral contests with heterogeneous players and prizes
consisting of multiple goods. The most important example is job promotion. Managers, who care
about aggregate eﬀort, can use not only monetary but also symbolic awards to motivate workers.
The latter element of the prize schedule includes status or titles such as “Employee of The Month”.
Often companies allocate ﬁrm-speciﬁc rights and privileges in the contest setting. By deﬁnition,
there is no way to express non-monetary beneﬁts in monetary terms. Thus, contest managers
allocate bundles of prizes.
Workers can have heterogeneous preferences over reward dimensions. Some individuals may
hold stronger career concerns but value monetary beneﬁts less than their peers. As a result, the
same prize schedule can shape contestants’ incentives diﬀerently. Managers must take this aspect
into account when they allocate goods between bundles.
Overall, heterogeneity can worsen the contest performance signiﬁcantly.1 When the competition
is uneven, participants have fewer incentives to exert eﬀort. Disadvantaged contestants know that
most likely they will lose, and do not compete much. On the other hand, stronger opponents can
make less eﬀort than they would exert in the homogeneous contest, but still win. If the manager
is not able to pre-select competitors, he may end up with very uneven matches and, consequently,
low aggregate eﬀort. In this respect, it is important to ﬁnd a way to mitigate the detrimental
eﬀect heterogeneity has on players’ incentives.
Obviously, the contest needs suﬃcient winning prizes that provide enough stimuli to compete.
At the same time, however, positive rewards for the weakest performers are not rare. For example,
non-zero losing prizes are widespread in professional sports, which do not diﬀer much from the
job promotion setting. Each tournament of the Grand Slam series, a highly prestigious tennis
competition, spends more than 10% of its total budget (about $4.5 million in 2015) to reward
ﬁrst-round losers.2 Perhaps surprisingly, also in this case prizes consist of two goods: money and
the ATP ranking points (career concerns).
Based on these considerations, I study the optimal prize allocation in contests with
heterogeneous participants and multiple reward items. In particular, I propose a theoretical
model with two players characterized by asymmetric commonly known preferences. The designer
has endowments of two non-tradable divisible goods. He can allocate the items between winning
and losing bundles to maximize the total eﬀort.
1For example, see Lazear and Rosen (1981), Che and Gale (1998), Brown (2011).
2This series includes four competitions: the Australian Open, the French Open, the Wimbledon Championships,
and the U.S. Open. The amount spent for ﬁrst-round losing prizes exceeds the ﬁnal winning prize by more than
50%.
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When heterogeneity is strong, the optimal reward schedule prescribes a positive losing prize in
the dimension valued by the advantaged participant relatively more. This scheme equalizes players’
winning beneﬁts and makes the contest homogeneous. In other words, the designer reduces the
advantage of the strong player, and the chances of the weaker contestant winning increase. As a
result, the latter participant exerts more eﬀort than he would in case of the “Winner–Takes–All”
prize allocation. This positive eﬀect is indirect and works through the equilibrium interaction
(equilibrium eﬀect). If heterogeneity is severe, higher losing prizes reduce the winning beneﬁt
of the advantaged player signiﬁcantly, but do not aﬀect his opponent much. Then the positive
equilibrium eﬀect dominates eﬀort losses associated with lower winning beneﬁts. Consequently,
the total eﬀort increases. This result contrasts with the previous ﬁndings of the contest design
literature.
The described mechanism never works in the one-dimensional setting. To make the
competition homogeneous, the designer must assign identical single-item prizes for a winner and
a loser. The allocation, however, destroys the contest: both participants exert zero eﬀort. In the
two-dimensional case, the designer not only makes the competition even but also provides strictly
positive winning beneﬁts. The result is robust to heterogeneity in skills and asymmetric
information about players’ types.
To stress the relevance of multi-dimensional prizes in job promotion and other similar contest
settings, I collect data from ﬁrst-round matches of two professional tennis competitions, the
Australian Open and the French Open. The application is very close to the job promotion
context. In particular, the athletes have two-dimensional incentives shaped by monetary prizes
and career concerns (the ATP ranking points). At the same time, they show enough
heterogeneity in skills and preferences. First-round winning prizes are approximated as a
continuation value of being advanced in the tournament.3 I structurally estimate players’ skills
and valuations. Importantly, both prize items matter for individual eﬀort choices. When the
points dimension is neglected, the model overestimates incentive eﬀects of monetary prizes and
underestimates contestants’ heterogeneity. This ﬁnding reveals the direction to improve the
existing reduced-form tests of the contest theory that, to the best of my knowledge, always
overlook the multi-dimensionality aspect.4
Finally, I run counterfactual experiments and show how alternative reward schemes can improve
aggregate eﬀort in both tournaments. On average, the French Open features more heterogeneous
matches and would beneﬁt from larger than actual monetary losing prizes. However, the Australian
Open could achieve the highest mean expected aggregate eﬀort with zero monetary losing prizes.
The observed diﬀerence can be explained with the contest-speciﬁc matching policy. If the managers
3Grand Slam events are single-elimination tournaments consisting of seven stages: four rounds, a quarterﬁnal, a
semiﬁnal, and a ﬁnal.
4For example, see Maloney and McCormick (2000), Sunde (2009), Brown (2013), Berger and Nicken (2014).
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of analyzed tournaments could change the ranking points allocation, they would prefer zero losing
prizes in this good. At the match-speciﬁc level, when the competition is relatively heterogeneous,
reducing ﬁnal winning trophies in money and the ATP ranking points in favor of ﬁrst-round losing
rewards by 5% and 2%, respectively, could increase expected aggregate eﬀort by more than 4.9%.
Compared to the “Winner–Takes–All” allocation, the gain would exceed 5.6%. On the other hand,
relatively homogeneous matches never beneﬁt from positive losing prizes. This counterfactual
analysis is also relevant to a more general job promotion setting with ﬁxed prize budgets and
similar skill–valuation proﬁles.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 inspects the related literature
and stresses the contribution of this work. Section 1.3 characterizes the model and states main
theoretical results. Section 1.4 describes the data and the structural setup, provides estimation
results and counterfactual experiments. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
The paper contributes to several research ﬁelds. First, it is closely related to the contest design
literature that focuses on the optimal prize allocation in diﬀerent environments.5 Second, the
current paper also complements the empirical work testing the contest theory predictions. To the
best of my knowledge, both ﬁelds never looked at the setting with multi-dimensional prizes and
heterogeneous preferences over them.
My theoretical contribution can be summarized as follows. Lazear and Rosen (1981) analyzed a
tournament with two players and one-dimensional rewards. They showed that managers who want
to maximize aggregate eﬀort must always assign the highest feasible diﬀerence between winning
and losing prizes. On the contrary, this paper shows when large prize spreads in all reward
dimensions lower the total eﬀort. Barut and Kovenock (1998), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) analyzed
contests with more than two ex-ante symmetric participants and a single perfectly divisible good.
Both papers found it optimal to assign up to N − 1 positive prizes for N contestants if the cost
function is convex; otherwise, a winner must take all. This implicitly says that the designer who
wants to induce the highest total eﬀort in the single-good setting must never reward the weakest
performer. In my model with two-dimensional prizes and ex-ante asymmetric contestants, higher
losing beneﬁts increase expected aggregate eﬀort if heterogeneity in preferences and / or skills is
severe. Importantly, this result does not rely on convexity of the eﬀort cost function.
The models that investigate the eﬀect of monetary and status incentives in contests show some
similarities with the proposed multi-dimensional setting. Moldovanu et al. (2007) introduce a
framework where ex-ante symmetric agents engage in a contest game, and the designer allocates
5Sisak (2008) provides a profound overview of the existing literature.
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money or status in order to maximize expected aggregate eﬀort. Importantly, the two prize
dimensions are perfectly correlated. The authors show when it is optimal to implement a coarse
partition into status groups, i.e. lump weaker performers together and give them the same losing
prize. On the contrary, the top category must always include a single element to provide enough
incentives to exert eﬀort.
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2005) analyze contests where students with heterogeneous abilities
compete for the prizes consisting of exam grades and the status derived from them. In this setting,
coarse partitions result in more aggregate eﬀort than grading on a curve because the former policy
allows weaker participants to achieve top-ranks with a higher probability. The mechanism described
in the current paper also incentivizes disadvantaged contestants to compete more. However, my
setup, where no restriction on correlation is imposed, gives much more ﬂexibility in the design-
related aspects. For example, the schedules where a winner gets only one good and a loser takes
another item can be optimal. This could not be the case in the aforementioned models with
strongly correlated reward dimensions.
The paper also relates to the contest literature that focuses on the equilibrium characterization
in the presence of consolation prizes. Baye et al. (2012) analyze symmetric Nash equilibria in
all-pay auctions with two homogeneous players and diﬀerent types of externalities. The latter
feature allows a loser to obtain a positive payoﬀ, which depends on the eﬀort of his opponent,
and makes a set of symmetric equilibria much larger than in a standard setting. In a very similar
framework applied to a Tullock-type contest, Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011) solve for a unique
symmetric equilibrium. Both papers, however, do not address any design-related issues and take
the prize allocation as given. On the contrary, the present work proves when positive losing beneﬁts
become optimal from the contest organizer’s prospective. Importantly, this result does not rely on
externalities, but requires a suﬃcient degree of heterogeneity and multiple prize items.
Further, I highlight the contribution to the empirical literature on contests. Following standard
theoretical models, this ﬁeld does not address multi-dimensionality issues and consider only single-
item rewards. The experimental evidence on prize incentive eﬀects in contests is mixed. Most of
the laboratory tests support the prediction that higher prize spreads induce more aggregate eﬀort.6
At the same time, ﬁeld experiments ﬁnd conﬂicting evidence. For example, De Paola et al. (2016)
introduce some elements of bilateral rank-order contests to the high-school grading system. They
observe that growing prize spreads have no or a negative eﬀect on students’ performance, which
goes against the standard contest theory. However, the mechanism I describe in the current paper
could explain this ﬁnding as follows. If students have multi-dimensional preferences (for example,
they also care about status), but the designer is not aware of this, higher prize spreads in grades
can reduce eﬀort in relatively heterogeneous matches.
6See Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta (2015) for a review.
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Non-experimental tests of the contest theory mainly deal with professional sports data. This
setup is very close to the job promotion setting, but it has a clear advantage in terms of available
proxies for contestants’ heterogeneity and eﬀort choices. The vast majority of non-experimental
tests use the reduced-form approach and follow the standard contest theory by looking at single-
item prizes. Ehrenberg and Bagnano (1990), Maloney and McCormick (2000), Sunde (2003),
Azmat and Moller (2008) test incentive eﬀects of monetary rewards in running competitions and
at the ﬁnal stages of professional tennis tournaments. They ﬁnd that higher monetary prize spreads
increase eﬀort and improve contestants’ performance, which is in line with the standard theoretical
predictions. Sunde (2009), Brown (2011), Berger and Nicken (2014) conﬁrm that professional
athletes tend to exert less eﬀort when the contest becomes more heterogeneous.
The current paper also employs data from professional sports, namely tennis. In contrast to
the aforementioned reduced-form tests, I introduce two reward dimensions (i.e. money and the
ATP ranking points) and structurally recover contestants’ skills and preferences. Although this
estimation approach is neglected in the empirical contest literature, it has obvious advantages
when one must restore utility parameters and run policy experiments.7 Importantly, overlooking
the non-monetary dimension results in overestimated incentive eﬀects of monetary prizes and
underestimated heterogeneity. Similar to the reduced-form tests, I provide evidence that
contestants tend to exert less eﬀort in more uneven matches. Higher prize spreads, however,
reduce expected aggregate eﬀort in relatively heterogeneous competitions, and this contrasts with
the previous empirical tests of the contest theory.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Model Setup
I analyze a complete information contest with two heterogeneous participants.8 This setting
characterizes many interactions. Often job promotion contests for top positions or lobbying
games do not have more than two participants. In professional sports such as tennis, football,
basketball etc. only two players or teams compete in a particular tournament round. Other
reasons I restrict the model in this way are tractability and exposition clarity.
7Structural estimation is widely used in the applied auction and industrial organization literature. To the best of
my knowledge, however, this is the ﬁrst empirical test of the contest theory that structurally estimates the incentive
eﬀects of prize schedules.
8In this section, I do not introduce private information to keep the analysis as simple as possible but relax this
assumption later on. Moreover, in many contest-type settings participants know each other’s characteristics. Often
workers willing to be promoted are colleagues who have enough information about the opponent. In professional
tennis, players observe competitors rankings, have some information about their training conditions, injuries etc.
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The designer has two non-tradable perfectly divisible goods, A and B, and there is no market
to exchange the items.9 Without loss of generality, I assume equal endowments of goods and
normalize them to a unity: Aˆ = Bˆ = 1. Let W =
(
AW
BW
)
and L =
(
AL
BL
)
be winning and
losing bundles, respectively.
Contestant i attaches valuation αi (βi) to good A (B). Players’ preferences are characterized
by risk-neutrality and perfect additive separability:
Ui
(
Ak, Bk
)
= αiA
k + βiB
k ≡ Uki , i = {1, 2} , k = {W, L}
Competitors choose non-negative eﬀort, ei, simultaneously and pay a cost γi (ei) = ei.10 Player i
wins if he exerts more eﬀort than the opponent, and ties are broken randomly. Then, if contestant
i obtains prize k, his payoﬀ looks as follows:
πi
(
Ak, Bk, ei
)
= Ui
(
Ak, Bk
)− ei ≡ πki
Given the reward schedule and the competitor’s strategy, player i chooses his eﬀort in order to
maximize the expected payoﬀ:
max
ei
{
P{ei>e−i}Ui
(
AW , BW
)
+
(
1− P{ei>e−i}
)
Ui
(
AL, BL
)− ei}
where P{ei>e−i} ∈ [0, 1] is a probability that player i wins. Here I allow for both pure and mixed
strategy equilibria in the game between contestants.
The designer observes only players’ relative standing and chooses the prize allocation that
maximizes contestants’ aggregate eﬀort. The game proceeds as follows:
1. The designer assigns W and L and commits to this reward schedule.
2. Contestants select ei, i = {1, 2} taking the prize allocation as given.
1.3.2 Contestants’ Equilibrium Behavior
Further, I analyzing contestants’ equilibrium behavior. Let A = AW − AL and B = BW −
BL be prize spreads in corresponding reward dimensions. To avoid confusions with the case of
heterogeneous abilities, I do not label players as “strong” and “weak”. Instead, contestants’ types
are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1.1. Let ti (A, B) = UWi − ULi ≡ ti be contestant i’s winning beneﬁt, and deﬁne
tg = max {t1, t2}, tn = min {t1, t2}. Then, i is the “greediest-to-win” (g = i) if and only if ti = tg;
otherwise, i is not the “greediest-to-win” (n = i).
9If this is not the case, one goes back to a standard contest model with one-dimensional prizes.
10For now, I impose no heterogeneity in contestants’ abilities but relax this assumption later on.
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With this formulation, players’ types depend on the prize allocation. Then, the optimization
problem of contestant i can be rewritten in terms of his type:
max
ei
{
P{ei>e−i}ti + U
L
i − ei
}
Since tg and tn are functions of contestants’ valuations and the reward schedule, types can be
either positive or negative, and this will aﬀect a structure of the equilibrium played.
Deﬁnition 1.2. The equilibrium is trivial if and only if at least one player chooses e = 0 with
probability 1. Otherwise, the equilibrium is non-trivial.
Proposition 1.1 shows when there exists a non-trivial equilibrium and characterizes contestants’
strategies for diﬀerent realizations of tn:
Proposition 1.1. For tn ≤ 0 the equilibrium is always trivial. For tn > 0 the equilibrium is unique
and non-trivial:
• Contestant g randomizes uniformly on [0, tn], and his equilibrium payoﬀ is πg = tg−tn+ULg ≥
ULg .
• Contestant n randomizes uniformly on (0, tn], places the atom of size p0n =
tg−tn
tg
at e = 0,
and his equilibrium payoﬀ is πn = ULn ≤ πg.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The non-trivial equilibrium from Proposition 1.1 is similar to the one Baye et al. (1996)
derive for asymmetric all-pay auctions with two bidders and complete information. However,
their characterization does not extend to the case of perfectly divisible goods and heterogeneous
losing beneﬁts.11 Also, Baye et al. (1996) cannot accommodate prize-dependent types. Hence,
Proposition 1.1 provides a more general characterization than the aforementioned work.12
As Proposition 1.1 states, two equilibrium conﬁgurations can emerge. When there is no strictly
positive winning beneﬁt for type n (tn ≤ 0), this player always prefers to stay inactive, i.e. en = 0.
If type n deviates towards en > 0 and wins, his payoﬀ becomes πn (en) = tn + ULn − en. However,
πn (en) is strictly dominated by πn (0) = ULn for any en > 0. This equilibrium corresponds to the
worst possible scenario from the designer’s prospective. On one hand, type n never exerts positive
eﬀort. On the other hand, the lack of competition makes winning easier for player g and drives eg
down. As a result, the trivial equilibrium leads to the lowest aggregate eﬀort possible.
11In a single-object auction setting, players with lower bids always get nothing
12The Baye et al. (1996) case is nested in the current equilibrium characterization. If one takes a one-dimensional
reward schedule and ﬁxes a winning prize at a unity, he gets exactly the same setup as Baye et al. (1996).
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On the contrary, if type n has incentives to compete (tn > 0), both players choose e > 0 with
a strictly positive probability. Then, contestants use mixed strategies, and ties happen with a
zero probability. Importantly, type n can never get higher equilibrium payoﬀ than his advantaged
competitor. Since player n does not exert eﬀort that exceeds his type, the greediest participant
can always choose eg ∈ [tn, tg) and win with certainty.13 Contestants’ equilibrium payoﬀs are equal
if and only if the types coincide (tn = tg) and no positive losing prizes are assigned.
One could also interpret the atom contestant n places at zero (p0n) as a relative power of
player g. When p0n → 1, the greediest type is extremely strong, and this destroys his opponent’s
incentives to compete. If type g has zero relative power, i.e. p0n = 0, the contest is equivalent to
the homogeneous one.
Using Proposition 1.1, I can write down contestants’ expected eﬀort in a closed form :
Eg =
tn
2
, En =
(
1− p0n
) tn
2
To emphasize the diﬀerence between one- and two-dimensional prizes, assume good A is not
available. In this case, type g’s relative power looks as follows:
p0n =
βg − βn
βg
∀B
and this value is constant. In other words, no matter how high stakes are, type n stays inactive
with the same probability. Thus, the only element of the expected eﬀort that depends on B is tn,
the winning beneﬁt of contestant n. Since ∂tn
∂B = βn > 0, lower prize spreads decrease expected
eﬀort of both contestants. Hence, one can already anticipate that with one-dimensional rewards
the designer will always implement the “Winner–Takes–All” allocation. This result is well-known
in the contest design literature.
Now suppose both dimensions become available. Then, the relative power of player g depends
on prize spreads, A and B:
∂p0n
∂A = − (αnβg − αgβn)
B
t2g
∂p0n
∂B = (αnβg − αgβn)
A
t2g
When contestants have unequal marginal rates of substitution (αn
βn
	= αg
βg
), these derivatives are
typically of diﬀerent signs.14 For example, take the “Winner–Takes–All” prize allocation (A =
B = 1). If contestant g is more sensitive to incentives in dimension A than the opponent, his
relative power must decrease (increase) in B (A) :
A = 1, αn
βn
>
αg
βg
⇒ ∂p
0
n
∂A > 0,
∂p0n
∂B < 0
13If type n chooses en = tn + ε, ε > 0 and wins, he gets πn (en) = ULn − ε, and this is dominated by en = tn.
14If the latter condition is violated, type g’s relative power does not respond to changes in the prize allocation.
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Next, suppose the designer reduces the prize spread in dimension A. First of all, this policy drives
winning beneﬁts of both players (tg and tn) down, and they have less incentives to exert eﬀort
(direct eﬀect). On the other hand, lower prize spreads in dimension A undermine type g’s relative
power and make the contest more even. As a result, player n is incentivized to exert higher eﬀort
(equilibrium eﬀect). When the latter positive eﬀect dominates the negative one induced by the
reduction of winning beneﬁts, expected aggregate eﬀort raises.15 I derive necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for this to hold when characterize the optimal prize allocation.
1.3.3 The Optimal Prize Allocation
The designer chooses the prize allocation that maximizes expected aggregate eﬀort and does not
violate feasibility constraints:
J = maxAW , AL, BW , BL [Eg + En]
s.t. Ak, Bk ≥ 0, k = {W, L}
AW + AL ≤ 1, BW +BL ≤ 1
where Eg = αnA+βnB2 and En =
(
αnA+βnB
αgA+βgB
)
αnA+βnB
2
are contestants’ expected eﬀort.
1.3.3.1 Fixed Prize Allocation in One Dimension
I start from the case when prizes in one dimension are ﬁxed, i.e. the designer optimizes only
over a particular good. Often contest managers act under similar constraints. Executives in
organizations can decide about monetary rewards but must take the hierarchical structure of the
company (workers’ status concerns) as given. In professional tennis, where money and ranking
points are distributed, managers have no power to change prizes in the latter dimension because
they are ﬁxed by the ATP. Also, this restricted case is easier to analyze, and I use it as a building
block for the main theoretical result later on.
Without loss of generality, assume that prizes in dimension B are ﬁxed:
BW = BˆW , BL = BˆL ⇒ ˆB = BˆW − BˆL
and the designer optimizes only over dimension A including a possibility to leave good B out. Let
r = {αg, αn, βg, βn} be contestants’ valuation proﬁle, and R denotes a set of all feasible r’s:
R = {r : αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0, i = {g, n}}
15Formally, Eg has only one term, tn, depending positively on the prize spreads. Hence, type g’s eﬀort never
grows when A becomes lower. However, player n’s expected eﬀort includes two elements,
(
1− p0n
)
and tn, that
change in opposite directions when A decreases. If growth in
(
1− p0n
)
over-compensates losses in expected eﬀort
caused by lower winning beneﬁts, En increases.
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The optimal prize allocation depends on contestants’ preferences. Proposition 1.2 characterizes all
possible choices the designer can make given the valuation proﬁle:
Proposition 1.2. For any ˆB ∈ [−1, 1] and valuation proﬁle r ∈ R the designer
• Uses both goods and leaves a positive losing prize in dimension A, or
• Uses both goods and gives the endowment of A to a winner, or
• Does not use dimension B and gives the endowment of A to a winner.
Proof. See Appendix E.16
In the proof, I study properties of the designer’s objective function, J (·), that can be expressed
in terms of A and ˆB.17 First, J (·) is strictly convex in A, and the derivative of J (·) with
respect to A is discontinuous at ˜A = βn−βgαg−αn ˆB.18 When the prize spread in dimension A is
equal to ˜A, both contestants get identical winning beneﬁts (namely, tg = tn). Let ¯iA, i = {1, 2}
denote the allocation of item A that results in zero winning beneﬁts for player i:
¯iA =
{
A : αiA + βiˆB = 0
}
Choosing A ≤ max
{¯1A, ¯2A} (A > max{¯1A, ¯2A}), the designer induces zero (positive)
expected aggregate eﬀort (see Proposition 1.1). If ˜A ≤ max
{¯1A, ¯2A}, the objective function
J (·) is strictly increasing in A ∈
[
max
{¯1A, ¯2A} , 1]. In this case, the designer must give
the endowment of good A to a winner. Under ˜A > max
{¯1A, ¯2A}, expected aggregate eﬀort
is strictly increasing in A for any A ∈
[
max
{¯1A, ¯2A} , ˜A), but can be non-monotone on
the interval A ∈
[
˜A, 1
]
. Given that J (·) is strictly convex, there is no interior maximum
in A ∈
(
˜A, 1
)
. Thus, the two candidate prize bundles:
(
˜A, ˆB
)
and
(
1, ˆB
)
– must
be compared directly. In the proof of Proposition 1.2, I characterize valuation proﬁles for which(
˜A, ˆB
)
is preferred to
(
1, ˆB
)
, i.e. when giving a positive prize to a loser improves expected
aggregate eﬀort. Finally, since the designer cannot change the allocation of item B but is allowed
to leave it out, he must directly compare expected aggregate eﬀort induced by the best bundle
and its counterpart in a single-good contest over dimension A. Importantly, there exist valuation
proﬁles such that the designer prefers the latter option.
16When rewards in dimension A are ﬁxed, the sets of valuation proﬁles and the optimal prize allocation look
exactly the same if one replaces α with β and A with B in the proof.
17When prizes are fully ﬂexible, I use Proposition 1.2 to ﬁnd the best reward schedule in dimension A given the
optimal allocation of item B.
18The designer’s objective function has a kink at ˜A = βn−βgαg−αn ˆB , and this point can be either feasible or
infeasible.
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Proposition 1.2 partitions a set of valuation proﬁles (R) into three subsets:
R = RˆL ∪ RˆWTA ∪ RˆSG
where RˆL (RˆWTA) corresponds to optimal bundles with positive (zero) losing prize, RˆSG stands for
contests with single-item rewards in dimension A. More precisely, the designer’s choice is driven
by the degree of heterogeneity in players’ valuations. In the beginning, I summarize these ﬁndings
with a simple diagram and then explain the intuition. Let Hα = αg − αn (Hβ = βg − βn) be the
degree of heterogeneity between contestants in dimension A (B). Also, assume that type g values
both goods more than his competitor (αg > αn, βg > βn). Figure 1.3.1 shows how the designer’s
choice depends on Hα and Hβ in case of ˆB ≥ 0. I keep αg (βg) constant and attribute all changes
in Hα (Hβ) to αn (βn).
Figure 1.3.1: Optimal Prize Allocation as a Function of Contestants’ Heterogeneity: ˆB ≥ 0
Note: Hα = αg − αn (Hβ = βg − βn) corresponds to the degree of heterogeneity between contestants in dimension
A (B); αg (βg) is kept constant, αg > αn and βg > βn; values with asterisks denote thresholds imposed on the
degree of contestants’ heterogeneity in diﬀerent dimensions.
Although the prizes in good B are ﬁxed, heterogeneity in both dimensions aﬀects the designer’s
choice. The “Winner–Takes–All” allocation is optimal when contestants have similar preferences
over reward items. If heterogeneity in dimension A is severe, the designer prefers to leave a positive
losing prize in good A. Finally, when preferences over item A but not B are relatively homogeneous,
neglecting the latter dimension results in the highest expected aggregate eﬀort.
Optimal positive losing prizes in dimension A require enough asymmetry in contestants’
valuations. Importantly, player g must be more sensitive to incentives shaped by good A than his
competitor:
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βg
> αn
βn
A suﬃcient condition to make AL > 0 optimal is strong heterogeneity in dimension A.
Since contestants’ expected eﬀort depends on the prize spreads, one can think about the
equivalence of the following alternatives:
1. Use the endowment of good A completely and increase the losing prize at the cost of the
winning reward (A = ˜A < 1 and AW + AL = 1), or
2. Waste some endowment of good A, assign zero losing (winning) beneﬁt in this item and
give the winner (the loser) AW = ˜A < 1 in case of ˜A ≥ 0 (AL = −˜A < 1 in case of
˜A ∈ (−1, 0)).
The designer, however, prefers option 1 (no waste) and does not destroy the endowment of item A.
Remarkably, when type g values both goods more and players’ preferences in dimension A diﬀer a
lot, the designer beneﬁts by assigning A < 0, i.e. the prize spread becomes negative.19 The latter
observation makes the result robust to the introduction of costly prizes: even then the designer
will be willing to reward the weakest performer in case of severe heterogeneity.
Overall, positive losing prizes aﬀect the eﬀort players exert in two ways:
1. Since winning beneﬁts decrease, both contestants have less incentives to ﬁght. I call this
direct eﬀect.
2. When player i reduces his eﬀort, the opponent is willing to compete more and, consequently,
wins with a higher probability. I label this indirect response to growing losing prizes as
equilibrium eﬀect.
Suppose ˜A = βn−βgαg−αn ˆB is feasible.20 If the designer implements the
(
˜A, ˆB
)
allocation,
players’ winning beneﬁts (i.e. their types) look as follows:
tg = tn =
αgβn − αnβg
αg − αn ˆB ≡ t˜
and the contest becomes homogeneous. When type g prefers good A relatively more than his
opponent (αg > αn combined with
αg
βg
> αn
βn
) and ˆB > 0, the value of t˜ is positive. Importantly,
the increase in losing beneﬁts does not destroy contestants’ incentives to compete. Moreover, the(
˜A, ˆB
)
allocation redistributes the relative power in favor of type n:
19In case of extreme heterogeneity in dimension A, the designer prefers to give the endowment of this good to a
loser.
20When ˜A = βn−βgαg−αn ˆB is infeasible, the designer assigns the lowest possible prize spread in dimension A (i.e.
A = −1).
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p˜0n = 1−
t˜
t˜
= 0
Then, player n is more likely to succeed, and his incentives to compete increase compared to the
“Winner–Takes–All” schedule. Thus, higher losing prizes reinforce the positive equilibrium eﬀect.
In the one-dimensional setting, the designer can never make the contest homogeneous and at
the same time provide suﬃcient stimuli to exert eﬀort. Assume good B is not available:
tg = αgA, tn = αnA
To equalize contestants’ types, the designer must assign identical winning and losing prizes (i.e.
A = 0). This, however, destroys incentives completely, and in equilibrium, both participants
exert zero eﬀort. In the two-dimensional case, the designer not only makes the match even but
also preserves strictly positive winning beneﬁts. This mechanism still works when one introduces
heterogeneity in skills and asymmetric information about players’ types to the model.21
Another key ingredient that allows the designer to aﬀect the relative power of type g is
asymmetry in contestants’ valuations (i.e. αg
βg
	= αn
βn
). The winning beneﬁt of player g must
decline faster than the one of his opponent when losing prizes grow.22 On the contrary, collinear
preferences (αg
βg
= αn
βn
) will make the designer unable to redistribute the relative power without
destroying incentives to compete (in this case, t˜ = 0 holds). The latter setting has same
qualitative properties as the one-dimensional model where the “Winner–Takes–All” schedule
maximizes expected aggregate eﬀort.
Now, I characterize how heterogeneity aﬀects the optimal prize allocation (see Figure 1.3.2).
When contestants have similar preferences, player g does not have a signiﬁcant advantage over
the opponent. Further, winning beneﬁts of both types (namely, g and n) decline more or less
symmetrically when losing rewards grow (see Figure 1.3.2). In this case, the positive equilibrium
eﬀect will never compensate losses associated with the winning prize reduction (direct eﬀect). As
a result, the designer implements the “Winner–Takes–All” allocation and does not redistribute the
relative power between competitors if heterogeneity is weak.
When the advantage of type g is strong, the opponent does not have enough incentives to
compete. As a consequence, the “Winner–Takes–All” scheme cannot support the highest
expected aggregate eﬀort. On the contrary, positive losing prizes make players’ types more
balanced (ideally, tn = tg), and the contest becomes homogeneous. Since preferences are
asymmetric, the policy reduces winning beneﬁts of the advantaged competitor signiﬁcantly but
does not aﬀect the opponent much (see Figure 1.3.2). Thus, the positive equilibrium eﬀect
dominates the direct one, and higher losing prizes increase expected aggregate eﬀort.
21See Subsection 1.3.4 and Appendix A, respectively.
22Since the reward structure in dimension B is ﬁxed, all changes in winning beneﬁts are driven by shifts in A.
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Figure 1.3.2: Optimal Losing Prizes and Contestants’ Heterogeneity
Weak Heterogeneity in Dimension A

 
	
      
Contestants’ Expected Effort:      





  
	
Losses 
in 
	
Losses 
in 



  
   

Strong Heterogeneity in Dimension A
 
 	  	 	  	
 
 
Losses 
in 
Losses 
in 

Finally, I comment on the preference proﬁles entering RˆSG. When the positive losing prize
in item A is optimal (i.e. A = ˜A), the designer never ignores dimension B. Given that the(
˜A, ˆB
)
allocation requires strong heterogeneity in preferences over good A, a single-item reward
schedule in this dimension does not result in suﬃcient eﬀort. However, with the second good at
place, the designer can balance players’ incentives to compete and make the contest homogeneous.
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If preferences over item A are similar, the endowment of this good must be assigned to a
winner (A = 1). Given ˆB and contestants’ valuations in dimension B, the designer must decide
whether to use item B or leave it out. In particular, for ˆB ≥ 0 he prefers to run a single-good
contest in dimension A under following conditions:
1. Players respond to incentives in dimension A the most (αi  βi);
2. Contestant g values both goods more than the opponent (αg ≥ αn, βg > βn);
3. Heterogeneity in dimension B (A) is suﬃciently strong (weak), and contestant g is more
sensitive to changes in BW and BL, i.e. βg
αg
> βn
αn
.
To highlight the intuition, take the case of relatively homogeneous preferences in dimension A
(αg ≈ αn). When the designer uses item B, winning beneﬁts grow (direct eﬀect). At the same
time, the competition becomes more heterogeneous: since βg > βn, the advantage of type g rises.
As a result, in equilibrium, player n has less incentives to exert eﬀort (namely, the atom type
n places at e = 0 increases). If heterogeneity in dimension B is strong, the gap in contestants’
winning beneﬁts increases signiﬁcantly when item B is at place, and the negative equilibrium eﬀect
prevails. If the designer could adjust the prizes in good B, he would prefer to assign higher losing
beneﬁts and make the two-dimensional competition even. Since it is not feasible, the designer uses
only good A and runs a homogeneous single-item contest. In this case, players still exert enough
eﬀort because they are mainly motivated by item A and heterogeneity in this dimension is weak.
If contestant g values only good A more than the opponent (αg ≥ αn combined with βg < βn),
the bundle is always optimal. The presence of item B helps the designer to reduce the advantage
of player g in dimension A and provide stronger incentives to compete (both in terms of direct and
equilibrium eﬀects).
1.3.3.2 Flexible Prize Allocation in Both Dimensions
In this subsection, I analyze the most general case when the designer can change the reward
schedule in both dimensions. To characterize the optimal prize allocation, I use the results of
Proposition 1.2. As before, R denotes a set of all feasible valuation proﬁles. Theorem 1.1
characterizes the designer’s optimal choice given contestants’ preferences:
Theorem 1.1. For any valuation proﬁle r ∈ R the designer uses goods’ endowments completely
and either leaves a positive losing prize at least in one dimension or gives both items to a winner.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Theorem 1.1 employs the proof of Proposition 1.2 as a building block. I deﬁne the designer’s
objective function, J (·), in terms of A and B. Now, J (·) has kinks at ˜A = βn−βgαg−αnB and
CHAPTER 1. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PRIZES 23
˜B = αn−αgβg−βnA. Also, J (·) is strictly convex, and the designer’s problem has no interior solution.
Then, ﬁx the prize allocation in dimension B, i.e. B = ˆB. Proposition 1.2 implies that for any
ˆB there exists a non-empty set of valuation proﬁles such that the designer prefers to assign a
positive losing prize in item A. Then, the statement must hold for ˆB = 1 as well, and for some
valuation proﬁles the “Winner–Takes–All” allocation is not optimal.
Using the result of Theorem 1.1, one can partition a set of valuation proﬁles (R) into two
subsets:
R = RL ∪RWTA
where RL (RWTA) corresponds to bundles with positive (zero) losing prizes. Overall, properties of
RL and RWTA are very similar to those of RˆL and RˆWTA from Proposition 1.2. However, with the
fully ﬂexible reward schedule, there do not exist valuation proﬁles such that it is optimal to ignore
one good (recall RˆSG from Proposition 1.2). This fact is not surprising given that the corresponding
result in Proposition 1.2 was driven by impossibility to adjust the rewards in dimension B.
Figure 1.3.3 depicts the optimal prize allocation as a function of players’ heterogeneity. When
the contest is relatively even, the “Winner–Takes–All” bundle induces the highest expected
aggregate eﬀort. If players show strong heterogeneity in the dimension where type g’s incentives
are more sensitive (good A for αg
βg
> αn
βn
and B, otherwise), it is optimal to assign a positive losing
prize in the corresponding item.23
Figure 1.3.3: Optimal Prize Allocation as a Function of Contestants’ Heterogeneity: Flexible
Rewards in Two Dimensions
Note: Hα = αg − αn (Hβ = βg − βn) corresponds to the degree of heterogeneity between contestants in dimension
A (B); αg (βg) is kept constant, αg > αn and βg > βn; values with asterisks denote thresholds imposed on the
degree of contestants’ heterogeneity in diﬀerent dimensions.
23There also exist valuation structures such that it is optimal to give positive losing prizes in both items. Then
the lowest prize spread must correspond to the dimension in which type g’s incentives are more sensitive.
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The mechanism driving the results was described in Subsection 1.3.3.1. On one hand, the
positive losing prize reduces winning beneﬁts and, consequently, incentives to compete (direct
eﬀect). At the same time, it destroys the relative advantage of the “greediest” player (g) that
motivates the opponent to exert more eﬀort (equilibrium eﬀect). When contestants’ preferences
are very heterogeneous, the latter eﬀect dominates, and expected aggregate eﬀort increases. To
illustrate all the points made, I provide a simple numerical example:
Example. Suppose
(
α1
β1
)
=
(
10
8
)
and
(
α2
β2
)
=
(
9
6
)
. The “Winner–Takes–All” schedule
results in J (1, 0, 1, 0) ≈ 14. Player 1 is the “greediest-to-win” (g = 1) because his winning beneﬁt
exceeds the one of the opponent. For given αg and αn, it is always optimal to assign the highest
prize spread in dimension A (see the proof of Theorem 1.1). Contestant g is more sensitive to
incentives in dimension B (αg
βg
< αn
βn
). Hence, optimal positive losing prizes may appear only in the
second good.
Now assume the designer implements another reward schedule in dimension B: BW = 1
4
,
BL = 3
4
, and B = ˜B = −12 . This results in J(1, 0, 14 , 34) = 6, and the “Winner–Takes–All”
scheme dominates the latter allocation. In this case, the positive equilibrium eﬀect is relatively
small because contestants do not show enough heterogeneity in preferences over good B.
Next, take the same
(
α1
β1
)
combined with
(
α2
β2
)
=
(
9
1
)
. The “Winner–Takes–All”
allocation results in J (1, 0, 1, 0) ≈ 7.8. As before, player 1 is the “greediest-to-win”, and positive
losing prizes may appear only in dimension B. The alternative reward scheme with BW = 3
7
,
BL = 4
7
, and B = ˜B = −17 induces J(1, 0, 37 , 47) ≈ 9. As a result, the designer beneﬁts from
the positive losing prize in dimension B. This is the case because contestants’ preferences over
good B diﬀer a lot, and the equilibrium eﬀect prevails.
1.3.4 Heterogeneity in Skills
Before I assumed that contestants have identical eﬀort costs, and the only source of heterogeneity
stems from preferences. However, in most empirical applications, players diﬀer in abilities,
experience, and other characteristics that can shape their skills. To account for this fact, I
introduce player-speciﬁc cost functions. This setup is used in Section 1.4 to estimate contestants’
skills and preferences.
Reformulate the model slightly. Assume contestant i has the following cost function:
γi (e) =
e
ci
, ci > 0
where ci is a skill parameter, i = {1, 2}. Higher ci makes eﬀort exertion less costly. The expected
payoﬀ of player i looks as follows:
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P (ei > ej)U
W
i + (1− P (ei > ej))ULi −
e
ci
Applying a monotone transformation, one can rewrite the problem contestant i solves:
max
ei
{
ci
[
P (ei > ej)U
W
i + (1− P (ei > ej))ULi
]− ei} , i 	= j
Now, winning beneﬁts of both players depend on valuations and skills. Deﬁne U˜Wi = ciUWi ,
U˜Li = ciU
L
i , and t˜i = ci
(
UWi − ULi
)
. Replacing ti with t˜i brings us back to the original model.
The equilibrium characterization can be reformulated in terms of skill-valuation proﬁles, r˜ ={
α˜g, α˜n, β˜g, β˜n
}
, where α˜i = ciαi, β˜i = ciβi. Let R˜ be a set of all feasible r˜’s:
R˜ =
{
r˜ : α˜i ≥ 0, β˜i ≥ 0, i = {g, n}
}
Proposition 1.3 characterizes the optimal prize allocation for given skill-valuation proﬁles:
Proposition 1.3. For any skill-valuation proﬁle r˜ ∈ R˜ the designer uses goods’ endowments
completely and either leaves a positive losing prize at least in one dimension or gives both items to
a winner.
Proof. The new optimization problem is a rescaled version of the original program. The proof
follows immediately when one replaces the elements of R with those of R˜ in Theorem 1.1.
Proposition 1.3 mirrors Theorem 1.1 applied to the case of heterogeneous skills. As before,
optimal positive losing prizes require asymmetry in contestants’ valuations and strong
heterogeneity in the dimension preferred by player g relatively more. The mechanism driving this
result was described in Subsection 1.3.3.1.
Skills can contribute to players’ heterogeneity in diﬀerent ways. Let HA (H˜A) be a degree of
heterogeneity over dimension A in the original model (the setup with diﬀerent skills):
HA = αg − αn, H˜A = cgαg − cnαn
Depending on cg and cn, heterogeneous skills can mitigate or amplify asymmetries in contestants’
preferences.
This relatively simple model with no private information already helps in explaining a co-
existence of positive winning and losing prizes. The results derived above could never be obtained
in a standard single-item framework. Remarkably, optimality of non-zero losing beneﬁts does
not rely on convexity of the cost function as a traditional argument in favor of multiple positive
prizes.24 However, even then it would never be optimal to reward the weakest performer in case
of single-item rewards.
In Appendix A, I extend the original model in two ways. First, I allow the designer to run
separate competitions over both reward dimensions instead of making the prize bundle. With this
24For instance, see Moldovanu and Sela (2001), Barut and Kovenock (1998).
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setting, players exert eﬀort in contests A and B and get single-item rewards in corresponding items.
Since prizes are costless for the designer, he can always unbundle goods unless speciﬁc constraints
are imposed. If aggregate eﬀort taken over two separate contests always dominates the one induce
by bundling schemes, the results of Theorem 1.1 cannot be generalized and break down easily.
Theorem 1.1 shows that there exist preference proﬁles for which bundles (including those with
positive losing prizes) generate strictly more expected aggregate eﬀort than two simultaneous
single-item contests. The intuition is as follows. Bundles with positive losing prizes become
optimal when players’ preferences display strong heterogeneity. This also means that corresponding
single-item contests are very uneven and result in low expected aggregate eﬀort. Hence, the two-
dimensional allocation with positive losing beneﬁts helps the designer to mitigate a negative eﬀect
heterogeneity has on players’ incentives to exert eﬀort.
Another extension introduces asymmetric information about contestants’ types. This
modiﬁcation is important for two reasons. First, players can have unobservable characteristics
that aﬀect their eﬀort choices. Second, often the designer must commit to the prize allocation
before he learns the exact matching. For example, tournament organizers in professional tennis
announce monetary reward schedules before the ﬁnal draw is known.
Suppose that contestants’ preferences over dimension A (αi) constitute their private
information. For simplicity, I assume that αi has only two realizations: αi = {αi, α¯i} with
P (αi = α¯i) = k – and α1, α2 are drawn independently. I ﬁnd that there exist
probability-valuation proﬁles, deﬁned over k and contestants’ preferences, for which it is optimal
to make a bundle with a positive losing prize. The underlying intuition is the same as described
in Subsection 1.3.3.1.
1.4 The Empirical Application
This section estimates the model and introduces policy experiments. The most important
application of the proposed theoretical framework is job promotion with monetary and
non-monetary rewards. Unfortunately, there do not exist suﬃcient ﬁrm-level data that
approximate contestants’ heterogeneity and their eﬀort choices. Nevertheless, this information
can be restored if one analyzes professional sport competitions. The setup does not diﬀer much
from the job promotion context. Athletes often have two-dimensional incentives shaped by
monetary prizes and career concerns (their position in the ranking). At the same time, they show
enough heterogeneity in skills. Thus, the results obtained with the sports data generalize to the
job promotion and other similar settings.
To estimate the model, I use a sample of ﬁrst-round games from two highly prestigious tennis
tournaments, the Australian Open and the French Open. These contests display the key features of
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the theoretical model. Importantly, players care about two goods: prize money and their position
in the ranking. Regarding the latter dimension, each year tennis players participate in a sequence
of tournaments and earn points. The rankings for males and females are updated and released
every week.
Obviously, the indicated prize dimensions display positive correlation. However, there is no
market to exchange the two goods of interest. One can argue the ATP ranking points matter for
contestants’ eﬀort exertion. In fact, this prize dimension maps into career concerns. Being the
top player gives an easier access to other tournaments, media coverage, recognition, contracts for
participation in advertising campaigns etc. Further, in the end of every game season top–8 male
athletes are nominated to play in the ATP World Tour Finals, an extremely prestigious
competition.25 Another argument stressing the relevance of the ranking is the existence of
well-recognized tournaments with no money at stake. For instance, in 2009–2015 the Davis Cup
allocated only the ATP points.26 Nevertheless, top–athletes such as Novak Djokovic, Andy
Murray, Stan Wawrinka participated in the competition. Later on, I provide more evidence that
the ATP ranking points matter for contestants’ eﬀort exertion (see Subsection 1.4.2.2).
Tennis players show enough variation in skills. Moreover, their preferences over prize
dimensions can diﬀer too. Given the empirical distribution of ranking points (see Figure 1.5.1),
10 additional units of the good can never change positions of top–10 players. However, the same
amount may move athletes ranked 90–100 up to 9 positions (keeping points of their closest peers
constant). Finally, tennis players are professionals who perfectly know the rules of the game and
act strategically.27 Thus, one should expect them to behave rationally in the given environment.
Importantly, contest organizers in professional tennis cannot change the allocation of ranking
points between tournament stages. This element of the prize schedule is ﬁxed by the ATP and
the WTA for males and females, respectively. However, tournament managers have a power to
vary monetary rewards. Very often, they leave positive prizes for ﬁrst-round losers. For example,
in 2013, the Australian Open increased this element of the reward schedule signiﬁcantly. At the
same time, other prizes did not evolve as much (see Tables 1.6 and 1.7). Both contest managers
and the players expected this policy to induce more competition at earlier stages of the
tournament.28 However, one could come with alternative explanations of the changes observed.
The ﬁrst argument in favor of relatively high losing stakes in ﬁrst-round games would be a
25The same scheme exists for females.
26Starting from 2016, no points are assigned for Davis Cup ties.
As a rule, players get paid for their participation. This amount covers traveling costs and other supplementary
expenses. However, the payment cannot be counted as a prize because it does not generate incentives to compete.
27In this respect the proposed application has a clear advantage over experimental tests one can run in the lab
where participants need time to learn rules of the game.
28See http://www.espn.com/tennis/aus13/story/_/id/8843972/players-say-prize-money-increase-australian-
open-positive-step.
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participation story. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be a single driving force in case of highly
prestigious contests:
1. Four Grand Slam tournaments do not overlap in time. As a result, they do not need to
compete for players.29 Moreover, the contests have very similar sets of participants and
comparable prize schedules. In particular, the allocation of points is identical for all Grand
Slams.
2. Top–players who are likely to advance in the contest are always willing to participate. First,
winning the Grand Slam gives 2,000 ranking points when other tournaments pay at most
1,000. Second, signiﬁcant monetary rewards allocated in the ﬁnals induce both participation
and eﬀort exertion. Since best athletes win with a higher probability, they always prefer
entering the competition to abstention.
3. Weaker athletes must compete in qualifying games to get one out of 16 places in the main
draw of the Grand Slam. Thus, participation is competitive.
4. The Australian Open compensates traveling and living costs of the participants.30 Thus,
positive monetary prizes for ﬁrst-round losers cannot be seen as a way to reimburse these
expenses.
Although the participation story is potentially important, it cannot completely explain how higher
losing prizes aﬀect eﬀort choices.
1.4.1 The Data
I analyze the Australian Open and the French Open in 2009–2015.31 Only ﬁrst–round matches for
male players are taken into account. There are several reasons to restrict the dataset in such a way.
I do not look at later stages of the contests because one can treat losing rewards assigned there
as the prize for being advanced. However, I account for these prizes when compute ﬁrst-round
winning beneﬁts (more details will follow). Second, in 2009 the ATP changed the ranking points
allocation between stages of the Grand Slams. Thus, years before 2009 are excluded as an attempt
to isolate possible structural breaks. Also, a relatively short horizon (2009–2015) allows me to
assume stable preferences over time.
29In fact, the time interval between the Australian Open and the nearest Grand Slam is about 3 months. This
gives players enough time to recover and prepare for the next big competition.
30See http://www.espn.com/tennis/aus13/story/_/id/8843972/players-say-prize-money-increase-australian-
open-positive-step.
31The data are available online at https://matchstat.com/.
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As mentioned before, in 2013, the Australian Open increased ﬁrst-round monetary losing prizes
signiﬁcantly (up to 40% compared to the previous year).32 The policy might have shifted players’
preferences or made them contest-speciﬁc. Given that the Australian Open and the French Open
have similar sets of participants, I use the latter competition as a control group for the former one.
Also adding another comparable tournament makes a set of observed prizes and players’ responses
richer.
Another argument in favor of choosing the French Open but not another Grand Slam as a
control group is the contest’s position in the annual tournament schedule. In fact, the French
Open (end of May) follows the Australian Open (mid-January). Thus, both competitions take
place in the ﬁrst half of the game season. Given that the ATP World Tour Finals played by top–8
athletes are held in November, contestants’ preferences may change when the end of the season
is approaching. If one takes the Wimbledon (late June) or the US Open (late August), stronger
players willing to qualify as top–8 can shift their preferences in favor of non-monetary prizes. As
a result, contestants’ behavior might evolve once the game season proceeds. In this respect, the
French Open is the best control group to avoid inconsistencies in preference estimates.
I exclude female players from the sample for two reasons:
1. In 2014, the WTA changed the ranking points allocation between stages of the Grand Slams.
The policy targeted only females.33 The event could shift players’ preferences, and for now
I prefer to isolate this source of variation.
2. In Grand Slam events, females play according to the “best–of–3” scheme, but males follow the
“best–of–5” rule.34 The two settings may shape the athletes’ behavior diﬀerently. Moreover,
with the “best–of–3” scenario, the eﬀect of luck or other random factors on the contest
outcome might be stronger. Hence, it is potentially problematic to get consistent estimates
of skills and preferences in the econometric model where females and males are analyzed
together.
Further, one have to ﬁnd a good proxy for contestants’ eﬀort. Most statistics reported in tennis
matches are relative.35 However, to estimate the model, absolute eﬀort must be approximated. I
solve this issue by constructing a measure based on a number of unforced errors:
“An unforced error is when the player has time to prepare and position himself or herself to get
the ball back in play and makes an error. This is a shot that the player would normally get back
into play.” 36
32See Tables 1.6 and 1.7.
33Male and female professional tennis players belong to diﬀerent associations. These two entities ﬁx the points’
allocation over annual tournaments and calculate athletes’ rankings independently.
34In Grand Slams, females and males play at most 3 and 5 sets per match, respectively.
35For example, a number of points won in a particular match depends on the actions of both players.
36See http://tt.tennis-warehouse.com/.
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By deﬁnition, the unforced error is not the outcome of a direct strategic interaction between
competitors.37 Timothy W. Gallwey, a professional tennis coach, says in one of his books, “When
I was playing tournament tennis and made an unforced error, I understood that the actual cause
of my error was a momentary lapse in focus. I let the error be a wake-up call to come back to the
present moment.”38 The claim relates unforced errors to lower eﬀort exertion. One may argue such
mistakes are driven by risk-taking or characterize a player-speciﬁc game style. These concerns are
potentially important, and I will address this point later.
Let uij be a number of unforced errors player i makes in match j (see Table 1.8 for summary
statistics). Since longer games are likely to show more unforced errors, I weight uij by a number
of sets played (nsj) and deﬁne u˜ij =
uij
nsj
. Finally, assume there exists a continuous function
h (identical for all contestants) that transforms individual eﬀort (eij) into u˜ij,
∂h(eij)
eij
< 0. In
other words, higher eij translates into less unforced errors per set played. For simplicity, take
h (eij) = uˆ− e˜ij where uˆ = maxi, j u˜ij.39
In Appendix B, I show that the proposed measure is a good proxy for eﬀort. Standard contest
models with one-dimensional prizes deliver two predictions:
1. Eﬀort must increase in the prize spread.
2. Eﬀort must decrease in contestants’ heterogeneity.
Reduced-form non-experimental tests of the contest theory conducted with diﬀerent eﬀort measures
strongly support these hypotheses.40 The same holds for the proxy based on a number of unforced
errors per set. This allows me to conclude that the current measure performs at least as good as
the alternatives used in the previous work. Further, I investigate if the proxy includes a risk-taking
component. To perform the test, I assume that contestants who choose riskier strategies tend to
serve with a higher speed. Then, if the number of unforced errors per set also includes risk-taking,
the two variables must be positively correlated. Table 1.17 shows that this hypothesis must be
rejected.
Next, I check the properties of the points’ empirical distribution (see Figure 1.5.1). Only 1%
of players hold more than 10,000 ranking points. At the same time, around 70% have 1,000 points
or less. In fact, the distribution is very skewed towards the left. To capture this feature, players
37Paserman (2010) also looks at a number of unforced errors to measure the performance of tennis players. He
claims this approach makes an improvement over previous empirical studies on tennis that approximated eﬀort as
the number of games or sets won.
38Gallwey, W.T. (1981). “The Inner Game of Golf.” 1st ed. New York: Random House.
39In principle, one could come with more complicated speciﬁcations of h. However, given unobservability of eﬀort,
there would be no way to achieve identiﬁcation. For this reason I stick to the simplest possible functional form that
supports ∂h(eijk)eijk < 0.
40For example, see Maloney and McCormick (2000), Sunde (2003), Sunde (2009), Brown (2011), Berger and
Nicken (2014).
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are divided into groups based on their ranking points. Namely, I introduce variable q that shows
which quantile of the points’ empirical distribution a contestant belongs to. This classiﬁcation is
important because various groups may attach diﬀerent valuations to the points dimension.41
Deﬁnition 1.3. Let D be a strictly ordered set of threshold values (d) with at least two elements
(#D ≥ 2). Player i belongs to group k (qi = k) if and only if
pointsi ∈ [d#D−k, d#D−k+1)
where pointsi denotes a number of ranking points player i holds, k = {1, ..., #D − 1}.42
Other relevant variables include:43
1. Tournament-speciﬁc controls: dummies for years 2009–2015, ﬁxed eﬀects of the two contests,
reward schedules, and the total prize money.
2. Players’ characteristics: age, the body mass index (BMI), home bias, a number of ranking
points, and whether a contestant was seeded or not.
3. Match-speciﬁc features: approximated heterogeneity between players, a binary variable that
indicates if a game took place on Day 1 or Day 2.44
Finally, I calculate the following empirical moments and use them to evaluate the predicting power
of the structural model:
• Average winning probabilities for two contestant types (i.e. g and n) and seeded players;
• Average winning probabilities for diﬀerent age and ranking groups.
In the theoretical model, I deﬁned the “greediest-to-win” (g) and not the “greediest-to-win” (n)
types based on players’ skill-valuation proﬁles. Obviously, this cannot be directly observed in the
data. Nevertheless, I propose two ways to approximate contestants’ identities:
41One additional point can be of higher importance for players with lower ranks.
42In the structural model I use the following speciﬁcation of D:
D = {0, q (.15) , q (.4) , q (.6) , q (.75) , q (.85) , q (.92) , q (.97) , q (.99) , q (1)}
where q (p) corresponds to a p-quantile of the points’ empirical distribution. Coarser partitions worsen the
goodness–of-ﬁt. This happens because they lump very heterogeneous players together.
43Summary statistics can be found in Table 1.8.
44All ﬁrst-round matches are scheduled for ﬁrst two days of Grand Slam tournament.
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1. Player i is treated as the “greediest-to-win” in match j (gj = i) if he holds more ranking
points than the competitor:
gj = i ⇔ pointsi, j > points−i, j
The ATP rankings include all tournaments where players performed in last 52 weeks. Thus,
the previous success must map into stronger preferences over winning and / or better skills.
2. Player i is treated as the “greediest-to-win” in match j (gj = i) if his winning probability
derived from betting odds (pBi, j) exceeds the one of the opponent:
gj = i ⇔ pBi, j > pB−i, j
Betting odds can aggregate more information than just ranking points. As a consequence,
this approach may identify contestants’ types better than the previous one.
The partition based on contestants’ age looks as follows:
dagek ∈ Dage, Dage = {mini (agei) , 20, 25, 30, maxi (agei)}
i ∈ k ⇔ agei ∈
[
dagek , d
age
k+1
)
, k = {1, ..., 4}
where k is the group. Variable q deﬁnes the partition driven by ranking points.
1.4.2 Structural Estimation
1.4.2.1 The Model Setup
To recover contestants’ skill-valuation proﬁles, I explore the variation in monetary prize schedules
across tournaments / years, observed eﬀort choices, and player-speciﬁc controls. The proposed
theoretical model delivers clear predictions that can be validated empirically. I formulate three
results that map underlying skills and preferences into realized eﬀort and match outcomes given
the observed variation in a prize scheme.45 Suppose the winning beneﬁt in dimension A grows at
the cost of the losing reward, i.e. the corresponding prize spread (A) gets larger.
Result 1. For any match j, a skill-valuation proﬁle is such that expected aggregate eﬀort
decreases in A (given B) if and only if
1. The expected eﬀort of player g (n) increases (decreases) in A, and the latter eﬀect dominates:
∂Eg (·)
∂A > 0,
∂En (·)
∂A < 0 and
∣∣∣∣∂Eg (·)∂A
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣∂En (·)∂A
∣∣∣∣
45See Section 1.3 for technical details.
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2. The expected probability that player g (n) wins increases (decreases) in A:
∂Pwing (·)
∂A > 0,
∂Pwinn (·)
∂A < 0
Result 2. For any match j, a skill-valuation proﬁle is such that expected aggregate eﬀort
increases in A (given B) if and only if
1. It is either the expected eﬀort of both players increases in A
∂Ei (·)
∂A > 0, i = {g, n}
or the expected eﬀort of player g (n) increases (decreases) in A, and the former eﬀect
dominates:
∂Eg (·)
∂A > 0,
∂En (·)
∂A < 0 and
∣∣∣∣∂Eg (·)∂A
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂En (·)∂A
∣∣∣∣
2. The expected probability that player g wins either (weakly) increases or decreases in A:
∂Pwing (·)
∂A ≥ 0 ⇔
αg
βg
≥ αn
βn
or
∂Pwing (·)
∂A < 0 ⇔
αg
βg
<
αn
βn
Result 3. For any match j, a skill-valuation proﬁle is such that contestants are not sensitive
to incentives in dimension B if and only if46
1. The expected eﬀort of both players increases in A:
∂Ei (·)
∂A > 0, i = {g, n}
2. The expected probability that player g wins stays constant when A grows:
∂Pwing (·)
∂A = 0
The proposed identiﬁcation strategy employs these theoretical results, the variation in prize
schedules, approximated contestants’ eﬀort / types, and the information about winning players to
restore diﬀerent skill-valuation proﬁles (other identiﬁcation assumptions will be discussed later).
Let money and ranking points (career concerns) be labeled as goods A and B, respectively.
To bring the theoretical framework to the data, I introduce a setup similar to a random utility
46The opposite holds when players do not respond to incentives in dimension A.
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model.47 Suppose contestants get additional individual-speciﬁc utility (or disutility) when lose:48
ULi
(
AL, BL, εi
)
= ci
(
αiA
L + βiB
L
)
+ εi, εi ∼ Fi (ε) , ε ∈ [εi, ε¯i]
where Fi (ε) is a truncation of a mean zero normal distribution with a standard deviation σε:49
fi (ε) =
1
σε
φ
(
ε
σε
)
Φ
(
ε¯i
σε
)
− Φ
(
εi
σε
) , ε ∈ [εi, ε¯i]
I assume the shocks are independently drawn from the underlying player-speciﬁc distributions.
Suppose both competitors, but not an econometrician, observe εi.50 All Grand Slams match players
at random in ﬁrst-round games. Then, one can treat idiosyncratic εi as the utility (or disutility)
of losing against a particular opponent.51 With this approach, contestants’ types become random:
t˜i = ciαiA + ciβiB − εi = ti − εi
where A and B specify the diﬀerence between winning and losing prizes in corresponding
dimensions. In particular, t˜i is drawn from a truncated normal distribution (a linear transformation
of Fi (ε)) and has the following characteristics: 52
E
(
t˜i
)
= ti − E (εi) , V ar
(
t˜i
)
= V ar (ti − εi)
Player i is the “greediest-to-win” (t˜i = t˜g) if and only if t˜i > t˜−i:
t˜i > t˜−i ⇔ εi − ε−i < ti − t−i
The proposed theoretical model restricts the support of contestants’ strategies (see Section 1.3).
Speciﬁcally, their eﬀort levels cannot exceed min
{
t˜i, t˜−i
}
:
ei ≤ min
{
t˜i, t˜−i
}
= min {ti − εi, t−i − εi} ≡ t˜n
47One can ﬁnd similar settings in applied studies of auctions or industrial organization. Bajari et al. (2010)
provide the profound overview of modern approaches one can use to recover underlying parameters of static and
dynamic games with diﬀerent information structures. Authors indicate that often structural inference involves
conditioning on reduced forms. As a result, the estimation becomes equivalent to a single-agent problem. Donald
and Paarsch (1996), Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) work with the auction setting and formulate a parametric likelihood
estimator based on players’ winning probabilities. Degan (2007), Degan and Merlo (2011) provide coherent examples
of the likelihood construction in the individual choice setting where player-speciﬁc characteristics (age, education
etc.) matter.
48The additive separable noise must be introduced in an asymmetric way. If it has the same eﬀect on winning and
losing utility, εi cancels out when one deﬁnes contestants’ types (ti). Since winning probabilities used to construct
the likelihood function depend on ti, the symmetric noise setting becomes deterministic.
49See Appendix C for the discussion of the player-speciﬁc noise distribution.
50I justify non-observability of εi for the econometrician as follows. Contestants have much more information
about idiosyncrasies aﬀecting their opponents (training regime, health- and career-related concerns, other speciﬁc
circumstances etc.). Moreover, they can see each other’s play in diﬀerent competitions and draw conclusions about
the game style and tactical steps a particular individual uses. All these things may shape contestants’ perception
of losing. However, they are hard to observe and aggregate for the econometrician.
51For example, take the contestant ranked 100 who can lose against either one of top–5 athletes or a player with
similar characteristics. In the former case, he may feel less discouraged and even perceive this event as a valuable
experience.
52As Appendix C shows, E
(
t˜i
)
and V ar
(
t˜i
)
depend on player- and competitor-speciﬁc controls.
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The latter inequality deﬁnes a player-speciﬁc upper bound on εi (ε¯i) that depends on the parameters
of interest (namely, contestants’ skills and preferences). Appendix C speciﬁes other conditions the
distribution of εi must satisfy to match the theoretical framework. Thus, the econometric model
is characterized by parameter-dependent support. This feature has important implications for the
estimation procedure, and I discuss them later.53
Let π and x denote the sets of parameters and controls, respectively. Given that players’ skills
(c) interact with their preferences (α and β) in a multiplicative way, one cannot identify these
values separately without imposing additional restrictions. Deﬁne a joint eﬀect of c and α (β) as
α˜ (β˜) and express it as a function of π and x:
α˜ (πα˜, xα˜) ≡ c (πc, xc)α (πα, xβ)
β˜
(
πβ˜, xβ˜
) ≡ c (πc, xc) β (πβ, xβ)
where πl and xl reﬂect subsets of π and x, respectively, that shape a value of l,
l =
{
c, α, β, α˜, β˜
}
. Estimating α˜ (·) and β˜ (·) is suﬃcient to capture the relative importance of
diﬀerent prize dimensions for player i (i.e.
α˜(πα˜, xiα˜)
β˜
(
πβ˜ , x
i
β˜
)) and measure the degree of heterogeneity
between the competitors.
To identify α˜ and β˜, I exploit the variation in player- and tournament-speciﬁc characteristics.
The main challenge is to ﬁnd the instruments to isolate the eﬀects of α˜ and β˜. I impose the
following functional assumptions: 54
c (πc, x
ijt
c ) = exp (π
c
1pointsi + π
c
2agei + π
c
3age
2
i + π
c
4BMIi + π
c
5hbiasi + π
c
6Tour + π
c
ZZjt)
α˜
(
πα˜, x
ijt
α˜
)
= c (πc, x
ijt
c ) exp
(
πα˜1 + π
α˜
2 seedi
)
β˜
(
πβ˜, x
ijt
β˜
)
= c (πc, x
ijt
c ) exp
(
πβ˜1 + π
β˜
2 qi
)
where:
• pointsi is a number of ranking points contestant i holds;
• BMIi reﬂects the body mass index;
• hbiasi = 1 if i plays in his home country and hbiasi = 0, otherwise;
• Tour = 1 for the Australian Open and Tour = 0 for the French Open;
• Zjt represents a set of dummy variables that includes:
53For example, see Hirano and Porter (2003).
54The exponents guarantees non-negativeness of skills and preference parameters.
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– A day when match j took place (dj = 1 if match j was schedules for Day 1; otherwise,
dj = 0);55
– A year-speciﬁc eﬀect (t);
– Interaction terms Tour × dj and dj × t.56
• seedi = 1 if i was seeded in the tournament draw and seedi = 0, otherwise;57
• qi reﬂects to which quantile of the points’ empirical distribution player i belongs to (see
Subsection 1.4.1).
Obviously, a number of ranking points (pointsi) conveys the information about players’ skills.
Intuitively, top-athletes have more experience and display better game statistics than their
lower-ranked peers. Generally, players perform worse in the beginning and closer to the end of
their career. To capture this U -shaped pattern, I include agei and age2i into the c (πc, xic)
speciﬁcation. Since tennis is a physically intensive game, athletes with bigger BMIi values may
have an advantage in serve speed and win more often. On the other hand, higher BMIi can
result in slower running. Thus, the eﬀect of BMIi on athletes’ performance is not ex-ante clear.
Contestants playing in their home countries may know the courts better, feel more support, avoid
acclimatization. These factors will work in their favor and improve the skills. Variables Tour and
Zjt are included to account for contest- and time-speciﬁc shocks all players face (a type of the
surface, geographical location, weather conditions etc.).
It is assumed that individual preferences over prize items (namely, α˜ (·) and β˜ (·)) are
imperfectly correlated with contestants’ rankings. Top–32 seeded players (seedi = 1) have
already advanced in their career and earned a signiﬁcant amount of prize money. Consequently,
their preferences over this good can diﬀer from those lower-ranked competitors display.58 Hence,
seedi must aﬀect α˜ (·). Next, β˜ (·) (a valuation attached to a non-monetary dimension) has to
depend on contestant i’s position in the points’ empirical distribution captured by the qi variable.
For example, one additional point can be more important for players with lower ranks because it
grants them access to better contests and improves career prospectives.59 The observed variation
in monetary prize schedules across tournaments and years, coupled with ﬁxed rewards in the
non-monetary dimension, also helps in isolating the eﬀect of α˜ (·) from β˜ (·).
55All ﬁrst-round matches take place on ﬁrst two days of the tournaments.
56I do not include Tour× t into Zjt because it perfectly correlates with contest-speciﬁc monetary prize schedules.
57Every Grand Slam has 32 seeded contestants (25% of all players) who never meet each other in the ﬁrst round.
These are top-ranked athletes with enough experience and a high probability of being advanced in the tournament.
58For example, a marginal value of money can be higher for non-seeded players who, in case of winning the prize,
get a chance to invest in their training and perform better in the future.
59On the contrary, top-players may be more career-concerned, which corresponds to higher values of β’s.
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The way Grand Slams match players and the modeling assumptions imposed on α˜ (·) and β˜ (·)
make it possible to identify the σε parameter (the variance of the underlying noise distribution).
First, the fact that players are randomly paired excludes any kind of selection bias driven by
the strategic choice of an opponent. Second, adding the Tour variable and a set of time- and
tournament-speciﬁc dummies, together with their interaction terms (Zjt), allows me to isolate
common shocks contestants face. Hence, all the variance left can be attributed to a random noise
term.
I characterize ﬁrst-round winning prizes as a continuation value of being advanced in the
contest. Suppose success and failure at later stages of the tournament are equally probable. Also,
assume that identities of potential future opponents do not matter.60 With this approach, prize
spreads are equal for all players. As a result, heterogeneity in ﬁrst-round games stems only from
diﬀerent skills and asymmetric preferences.
To estimate the model, I treat matches as independent and formulate the likelihood in terms
of players’ winning and losing probabilities. Let Pgj (Pnj) denote a probability that type g (n)
wins match j. Since player n stays inactive with probability p0n ∈ (0, 1), Pij must include two
components – P 1ij and P 2ij (see Proposition 1.1):
1. With probability p0n, type g certainly wins:
P ∗gj (π, εgj, εnj) = p
0
n, P
∗
nj (π, εgj, εnj) = 0
2. Otherwise, type g (n) wins with probability
{
egj
t˜nj
}
(
{
enj
t˜nj
}
):
P ∗∗gj (π, εgj, εnj, egj) =
(
1− p0n
) egj
t˜nj
, P ∗∗nj (π, εgj, εnj, enj) =
(
1− p0n
) enj
t˜nj
where egj (enj ) corresponds to observed eﬀort exerted by type g (n) in match j.
Then, contestant i’s winning probability can be calculated as a sum of the two components, P ∗ij (·)
and P ∗∗ij (·):
Pij
(
π, εgj, εnj, e
i
j
)
= P ∗ij (π, εgj, εnj) + P
∗∗
ij
(
π, εgj, εnj, e
i
j
)
and a complete data likelihood for match j looks as follows:61
Lcj (π |W1j, e1j, e2j, x1, x2, ε1j, ε2j) =
I {1 = g}
[[
P 1gj ·
(
1− P 2nj
)]I{W1j=1} [(1− P 1gj) · P 2nj]1−I{W1j=1}]+
(1− I {1 = g})
[[
P 1nj ·
(
1− P 2gj
)]I{W1j=1} [(1− P 1nj) · P 2gj]1−I{W1j=1}]
60This strategy was used in several empirical papers (for instance, see Silverman and Seidel (2011), Ivankovic
(2007)) with the following argument: winning and losing probabilities of heterogeneous players average to “1/2–1/2”.
61This formulation is similar to a standard probit / logit model.
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where
• P igj ≡ Pgj
(
π, ε1j, ε2j, e
i
j
)
and P inj ≡ Pnj
(
π, ε1j, ε2j, e
i
j
)
for l = {1, 2};
• W1j = 1 if player 1 wins match j;
• I {1 = g} = 1 if player 1 is of type g;
• x1 and (x2) reﬂect individual characteristics of players 1 and 2, respectively.
With this likelihood speciﬁcation, I use the information on both realized eﬀort levels, e1j and e2j,
that are generally not equal.62 Exploiting the variation in e1j and e2j helps me to recover supports
of the contestants’ strategies, which depend on t˜nj, and identify the parameters shaping α˜ (x) and
β˜ (x).
Since ε1j and ε2j are unobservable, one must calculate a probability that contestant 1 is the
“greediest-to-win” in match j:
P g1j (π, x1, x2) ≡ P (1 = g) =
ˆ t1−t2
uj
f
j
(u) du, uj = ε1j − ε¯2j
where uj = ε1j − ε2j and ti = α˜ (xi)A + β˜ (xi)B, i = {1, 2}. Replacing I {1 = g} with
P g1j (π, x1, x2) and taking conditional expectations over ε1j and ε2j, I formulate an expected
likelihood:
Lej (π |W1j, e1j, e2j, x1, x2) =
P g1j (π, x1, x2)Eεnj , εgj
[[
P 1gj ·
(
1− P 2nj
)]{W1j=1} [(1− P 1gj) · P 2nj]1−I{W1j=1} | 1 = g]+[
1− P g1j (π, x1, x2)
]
Eεnj , εgj
[[
P 1nj ·
(
1− P 2gj
)]I{W1j=1} [(1− P 1nj) · P 2gj]1−I{W1j=1} | 1 = n]
When one takes a logarithm of Lej (π |W1j, e1j, e2j, x1, x2) and aggregates over K matches, the
objective function to maximize becomes:
logLe (π |W, e, x) =
K∑
j=1
log
[
Lej (π |W1j, e1j, e2j, x1, x2)
]
Finally, I can write down a complete optimization program with a single constraint:
logLe (π |W, e, x) → maxπ
s.t. max {e1j, e2j} ≤ min
{
UWgj , U
W
nj
} ∀ j = {1...K}
where the inequality guarantees well-deﬁned supports for player-speciﬁc noise distributions (see
Appendix C). Since the constructed econometric model features parameter-dependent support, it
62If eij = e
−i
j , it must be Pgj (·) = (1− Pnj (·)). The same holds if one focuses on expected winning probabilities
and does not use the information on realized eﬀort for both players.
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violates a standard regularity condition of the maximum likelihood estimation. Speciﬁcally, the
solution of the optimization program does not need to be interior. On top of this, the estimator is
not necessarily asymptotically normal. To address these issues, I develop the following approach.
First, a derivative-free numerical optimization routine that allows for corner solutions is employed
to solve the program. Second, to avoid any results that rely on the assumption of asymptotic
normality, I compute bootstrap standard errors. To study the properties of the estimator in
more detail, I run simulations.63 Despite the indicated non-regularity, the estimator is consistent.
However, as Hirano and Porter (2003) point out, it can be asymptotically ineﬃcient and must be
improved later on.64
1.4.2.2 Results and the Goodness–of–Fit
In the beginning, I follow the baseline and estimate the distribution of contestants’ types for the
two-dimensional model (see Table 1.1, column 1). Most of the variables are statistically
signiﬁcant. As expected, more ranking points map into better skills. Importantly, non-monetary
incentives matter for eﬀort provision: the respective regression coeﬃcients, πβ˜1 and πβ˜2 , are
statistically signiﬁcant (see Table 1.1, column 1). Higher ranks aﬀect contestants’ preferences
over two prize dimensions in the following way. Being seeded (seedi = 1) decreases the marginal
utility of money. At the same time, top-players (those with lower values of qi) tend to value the
non-monetary dimension more and display stronger career concerns.
The presence of home bias has a positive eﬀect on athletes’ performance. This ﬁnding is in line
with the previous empirical tests of the contest theory. On average, individuals play better when
the body mass index declines. Skills indeed turn to be non-linear in contestants’ age: both agei
and age2i are statistically signiﬁcant (see Table 1.1, column 1). Given that the coeﬃcient in front
of age2i is negative, one can approximate when the skills achieve their maximum over age (keeping
other player-speciﬁc characteristics constant):
age∗ = argmaxagei
[
ln
{
c
(
πc, x
ijt
c
)}] ≈ 27.5
Finally, contestants tend to perform better in the Australian Open. This eﬀect can be explained
as follows. The French open is played on clay courts, while the Australian Open uses hard ones.
On average, the athletes ﬁnd it easier to compete on the latter surface. As a result, one can expect
stronger skills in the Australian Open.
Estimated heterogeneity is summarized in Table 1.9. On average, the Australian Open
features more uneven matches than the French Open. However, this pattern can be driven by the
aforementioned contest-speciﬁc eﬀect. For example, take a match from the French Open with
63Simulation results are available by request
64The lack of asymptotic eﬃciency is the least problematic property that generally results in bigger standard
errors.
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heterogeneity HFO. If the same couple plays in the Australian Open, HFO must be multiplied by
eπ
c
6 ≈ 1.08, and HAO > HFO (see Table 1.1 for the estimates). Thus, ceteris paribus,
heterogeneity is stronger in the latter competition.
Table 1.1: Structural Estimation: Results
Parameter Both
Goods
Only A
πα˜1 –25.709***
(3.939)
.662***
(.157)
seedi –18.899***
(2.311)
–.483***
(.158)
πβ˜1 .784***
(.152)
–
qi –2.895***
(.079)
–
pointsi 1.994**
(.906)
6.988***
(1.528)
agei 4.473***
(.219)
–3.345***
(.136)
age2i –4.502***
(.851)
2.007***
(.328)
BMIi –.389**
(.155)
–.837***
(.132)
hbiasi .112**
(.045)
.126
(.203)
Tour .074
(.051)
.087
(.194)
σε 213.078***
(3.632)
195.143***
(6.498)
Time- and
Tournament-Speciﬁc
Controls
Yes
logL –969.27 –1343.54
LR–test LR = 748.6 > χ2 (2)
K = 821
Note: individual eﬀort is measured as e˜ij = uˆ − u˜ij where u˜ij is a number of unforced errors per set played,
uˆ = maxi, j, u˜ij . Variables pointsi, BMIi, agei are rescaled:
w˜i =
wi −min (w)
max (w)−min (w)
where wi (w˜i) denotes the original (rescaled) value of the variable for player i, w is a vector of wi. Time- and
tournament-speciﬁc controls correspond to Zjt speciﬁed in Subsection 1.4.2.1. K denotes a number of matches.
Bootstrap standard errors are reported in brackets. Values with *, **, and *** correspond to 90%, 95%, and 99%
signiﬁcance.
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As an attempt to isolate this channel, I re-calculate heterogeneity assuming no contest-speciﬁc
eﬀect (see Table 1.10). In this case, matches become more uneven in the French Open. Additionally,
a range of estimated heterogeneity in this competition is bigger than in the Australian Open (the
pattern also holds with the contest-speciﬁc eﬀect). One could explain these observations with
matching policies used in the two tournaments. Ideally, players must be paired randomly. However,
this does not seem to be the case in some Grand Slams. For instance, in the US Open, top-players
systematically get weaker opponents than predicted by random matching.65 As a result, average
heterogeneity may increase. If the French Open (but not the Australian Open) adopts similar
practices, this might explain the pattern discovered in the data.
Next, the model is simulated 1’000 times. To evaluate the goodness-of-ﬁt, I calculate moments
speciﬁed in Subsection 1.4.1 and match them against empirical counterparts. In the beginning,
consider simulated and actual winning probabilities for two contestant types (namely, g and n) and
seeded players (see Table 1.2). Overall, the model replicates type-speciﬁc winning probabilities
well. It is successful in explaining the diﬀerence in contestants’ behavior and captures the gap
between PWg and PWn . Also, the model accounts for the fact that seeded players win more often
than non-seeded g-types (PW > PWg ).
Table 1.2: Simulated vs. Actual Type-Speciﬁc Winning Probabilities: Two-Dimensional Model
The Model The Data
Points–Based
Classiﬁcation
Bets–Based
Classiﬁcation(
PWg , P
W
n
)
(.721, .279) (.726, .276) (.763, .244)
Seed–Based Classiﬁcation
PW .824 .844
Further, I implement the division based on contestants’ age and ranking points (see Subsection
1.4.1). Figure 1.4.1 plots simulated and actual winning probabilities for all relevant groups. The
age-driven classiﬁcation manages to match empirical patterns: the two curves are very close to
each other. The model predicts the highest winning probability for contestants between 25 and
30. This pattern is in line with the data. The model also replicates an empirical curve under
the points-based classiﬁcation. Actual and predicted winning probabilities are very close in upper
quantiles of the points’ distribution. The model shows a slight tendency towards overestimating
(underestimating) winning probabilities for lower-ranked (middle-ranked) contestants. However,
these patterns oﬀset each other.
65For example, see http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/6850893/espn-analysis-ﬁnds-top-seeds-tennis-us-
open-had-easier-draw-statistically-likely.
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Figure 1.4.1: Goodness–of–Fit: Age- and Points-Based Groups
Groups
Agei ≤ 20 Agei in (20; 25] Agei in (25; 30] Agei ≥ 20
PW
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1
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Data
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(q(.99);q(1)] (q(.92);q(.97)] (q(.75);q(.85)] (q(.4);q(.6)] [q(0);q(.15)]
PW
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Groups by Points
In Appendix D, I also check if the structural setup replicates stylized facts observed in players’
eﬀort. As before, contestants are divided into age- and points-based groups. In addition, I split
the matches by the degree of heterogeneity between competitors. Overall, the model is successful
in reproducing shapes of the respective empirical curves (see Figure 1.5.8 and Appendix D for the
discussion).
To evaluate the consequences of neglecting one good, I also estimate a speciﬁcation with
monetary prizes only, as always done in the empirical contest literature (see Table 1.1, column 2).
The two-dimensional model shows the highest log-likelihood. On top of this, the LR-test rejects
a null hypothesis that the baseline speciﬁcation is equivalent to the single-item alternative.66
Table 1.3 shows how well the one-dimensional model replicates type-speciﬁc winning
probabilities. Overall, it ﬁts the empirical diﬀerence in PWg and PWn much worse than the
baseline with two prizes (see Table 1.2). In particular, the model underestimates (overestimates)
a probability that type g (n) wins. Also, the one-dimensional setting cannot replicate empirical
moments for ﬁner partitions (see Figure 1.5.2). It predicts systematically higher winning
probabilities for all age groups and does not distinguish between diﬀerent elements of the
points-based classiﬁcation.
66The testing statistic looks as follows:
LR = 2
(
logLcomplete − logLrestricted)
where logLcomplete (logLrestricted) is taken from the two-dimensional model (single-item speciﬁcation). Given
that both restricted models have two parameters less, the statistic must be distributed as χ2 (2).
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Table 1.3: Simulated vs. Actual Type-Speciﬁc Winning Probabilities: Only Monetary Prizes
The Model The Data
Points–Based
Classiﬁcation
Bets–Based
Classiﬁcation(
PWg , P
W
n
)
(.608, .392) (.726, .276) (.763, .244)
Seed–Based Classiﬁcation
PW .644 .844
To understand what drives these eﬀects, I compare the average estimated value of money (α˜)
and the corresponding degree of heterogeneity (Hα˜) for one- and two-dimensional models (see
Table 1.4). First, the single-item setting underestimates heterogeneity in the monetary
dimension. This fact explains why the setup generates type-speciﬁc winning probabilities that
are closer to “1/2–1/2” than observed. Second, it predicts higher valuations attached to money
and, consequently, overestimates the incentive eﬀect of this prize. Thus, if one reward component
is disregarded, the estimates become biased, and this may lead to incorrect policy
recommendations.
Overall, the structural analysis shows that contestants, indeed, respond to multi-dimensional
incentives. This ﬁnding reveals the directions to improve the existing reduced-form tests of the
contest theory that always deal with single-item prizes.
Table 1.4: One vs. Two Dimensions: Estimated Heterogeneity
Two-Dimensional
Model
One-Dimensional
Model
Mean predicted valuations in dimension A
.12 1.84
Ratio of mean predicted Hα˜ (rescaled):
H2α˜
H1α˜
20.7
Ratio of predicted V ar (Hα˜) (rescaled):
V ar(H2α˜)
V ar(H1α˜)
6.51
Note: H1α˜, j =
∣∣α˜1 (xij)− α˜1 (x−ij)∣∣ (H2α˜, j = ∣∣α˜2 (xij)− α˜2 (x−ij)∣∣) is heterogeneity between contestants in match
j in the single-item (two-dimensional) model; to calculate comparable means and standard deviations for the two
series, Hα˜ is rescaled as follows:
hα˜, j =
Hα˜, j −min (Hα˜)
max (Hα˜)−min (Hα˜)
where Hα˜ is a vector of Hα˜, j .
CHAPTER 1. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PRIZES 44
1.4.2.3 Policy Experiments
In this section, I ask if there exist alternative prize schemes that induce more aggregate eﬀort for
estimated skill-valuation proﬁles and the given budget of the contest organizer. In principle, one
can abstract from the tennis-speciﬁc setting and think about the job promotion context. As it was
discussed earlier, ranking points map into career concerns. Thus, the proposed policy experiments
have a suﬃcient degree of generality.
As before, I assume that the designer seeks to maximize expected aggregate eﬀort.67 In every
match j, he can allocate endowments of money and ranking points (Aˆ and Bˆ, respectively) between
winning and losing bundles. Since winners obtain a continuation value of being advanced in the
contest, I assume that losing prizes (AL and BL) increase (decrease) at cost (beneﬁt) of the ﬁnal
trophy. Then, one can restore the “Winner–Takes–All” schedule as follows:
Aˆ ≡ AW0 = AWa + pfinalALa
Bˆ ≡ BW0 = BWa + pfinalBLa
where:
•
(
AWa , B
W
a
)
and
(
ALa , B
L
a
)
correspond to actual winning and losing prizes;
• pfinal is a probability to get to the ﬁnal.68
To run the experiments, I construct grids A¯L and B¯L including actual losing prizes:
A¯L =
[
0, u¯ALa
]
, B¯L =
[
0, u¯BLa
]
, u¯ > 1
For every match j and prize scheme k, I simulate the model 1,000 times, calculate expected eﬀort
and take the median. At the contest level, a mean over all games is taken.
First, assume prizes in dimension B (career concerns) are ﬁxed, i.e. the designer can
shape only monetary incentives. Moreover, suppose the reward schedules are not
match–speciﬁc. This setting mirrors the tennis example. As there exists a ﬁxed tournament
eﬀect, I analyze the Australian Open and the French Open separately. Importantly, contest
organizers never leave good B (ranking points) out because this reduces aggregate eﬀort
signiﬁcantly (see Table 1.11). For this reason, I analyze only two-dimensional prize structures.
Figures 1.5.3 and 1.5.4 display how expected eﬀort changes when monetary losing prizes (AL)
grow in both contests. On average, the Australian Open would gain from zero losing beneﬁts in
the ﬁrst round. This eﬀect is driven by responses of relatively strong players whose expected
eﬀort decreases in AL. However, weaker competitors behave diﬀerently. Their expected eﬀort
67In principle, the designer can have more objectives, especially in the dynamic contest setting. For instance, he
may want relatively strong players to advance in the competition with a higher probability.
68pfinal =
1
26 under non-speciﬁc prize spreads (the “1/2–1/2” assumption).
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increases up to 2.9% (2.7%) with respect to zero (actual) losing prizes when AL grows (see Figure
1.5.3).
The French Open shows the opposite pattern. On average, the contest would beneﬁt from
higher losing prizes in ﬁrst-round matches. Reallocating 5% of ﬁnal winning beneﬁts in favor of
ﬁrst-round losing rewards could improve mean expected aggregate eﬀort up to .41% with respect
to the actual schedule. Not surprisingly, the eﬀect is relatively small when one must take the
average over heterogeneous matches. Nevertheless, the pattern is stable and driven by responses
of disadvantaged (type n) contestants (see Figure 1.5.4). In particular, these players improve
their eﬀort by more than 3.7% (3.2%) when AL grows relative to zero (actual) losing beneﬁts.
The diﬀerence between the Australian Open and the French Open can be explained by more
heterogeneous matches in the latter contest (see Subsection 1.4.2.2 for the discussion).
Next, I investigate how players’ responses to higher losing prizes depend on the degree of
heterogeneity in a particular game. All matches are divided into groups based on the absolute
diﬀerence in contestants’ ranking points (Hpj ):69
Hpj = |pointsij − points−ij |
dhet, pk ∈ Dhet, p, Dhet, p =
{
0, 200, 500, 1000, 1600, 3000, maxj
(
Hpj
)}
j ∈ k ⇔ Hpj ∈
[
dhet, pk , d
het, p
k+1
)
, k =
{
1, ..., #Dhet, p − 1}
where k is the group, and #Dhet, p denotes cardinality of Dhet, p. Figures 1.5.5 and 1.5.6 depict
match-speciﬁc responses to growing monetary losing prizes for the two contests. The Australian
Open and the French Open show very similar patterns summarized in Table 1.5. Not surprisingly,
stronger players (g types) always decrease expected eﬀort when monetary losing prizes grow. On
the contrary, the response of their opponents depends on the degree of heterogeneity. In relatively
even matches (Hpj < 500), higher losing beneﬁts reduce the expected eﬀort of disadvantaged
players. If heterogeneity is strong (Hj ≥ 500), the pattern changes. Increasing losing prizes
improves expected eﬀort of weaker contestants by more than 10% compared to the case of AL =
0 and actual schedules (see Figure 1.5.6). This growth compensates losses caused by negative
responses of advantaged players. In particular, reducing ﬁnal winning prizes by 5% for the beneﬁt of
ﬁrst-round losing rewards increases expected aggregate eﬀort up to 3% in relatively heterogeneous
matches (see Hpj ∈ [1000, 3, 000) in Figures 1.5.5 and 1.5.6).
All observed patterns are in line with the theoretical predictions. Under relatively weak
heterogeneity, dominant players do not have a big advantage over their opponents. As a result,
the designer faces no need to redistribute a relative power between competitors. Moreover,
69I use ranking points but not estimated skill–valuation proﬁles to approximate heterogeneity because the former
is perfectly observable. Also this measure is easier to understand and interpret for contest managers in the real-life
setting.
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Table 1.5: The Eﬀect of Higher Monetary Losing Prizes and Contestants’ Heterogeneity
Hpj < 500
(44% of matches)
Hpj ≥ 500
(56% of matches)
Eﬀect of higher AL on
mean exp. agg. eﬀort
“–” “+”
winning beneﬁts of both contestant types decline more or less symmetrically when higher losing
prizes are introduced. In this case, the positive equilibrium eﬀect will never compensate losses
caused by the prize stake reduction. Thus, the “Winner–Takes–All” allocation induces the highest
aggregate eﬀort when players have similar skills and preferences.
If one contestant has a very strong advantage in skills or at least in one prize dimension,
the opponent feels discouraged. Then, the “Winner–Takes–All” schedule does not induce enough
aggregate eﬀort. However, the designer handles this heterogeneity issue by introducing positive
losing prizes. The policy makes players’ types more balanced (ideally, tn = tg), and the contest
becomes homogeneous. Now, the competitor who used to be disadvantaged has higher chances to
win and increases his eﬀort. In case of pronounced heterogeneity, this positive equilibrium eﬀect
exceeds losses associated with lower winning beneﬁts. Eventually, the total eﬀort grows.
Next, suppose the designer can change prizes in both dimensions. Although this is
not the case in the tennis application, the experiment becomes important in a more general job
promotion setting. As before, the designer is constrained by ﬁxed endowments of goods (Aˆ and
Bˆ) and uniform reward schedules. Figure 1.5.7 shows how mean expected aggregate eﬀort changes
with losing prizes in both contests. Overall, the Australian Open (the French Open) can improve
up to .25% (.24%). Key patterns in the monetary dimension are identical to those found in the
previous case. On average, the Australian Open beneﬁts from the “Winner–Takes–All” schedule.
Alternatively, higher monetary losing prizes (AL > ALa ) improve mean expected aggregate eﬀort
in the French Open. However, both contests would prefer to allocate ranking points only to ﬁrst-
round winners (BL = 0). As a result, the aforementioned diﬀerence between the Australian Open
and the French Open aﬀects the designers’ choices only in the monetary dimension.70
Further, I use the partition introduced above and trace group-speciﬁc responses to higher losing
rewards. As expected, in relatively homogeneous matches (Hpj < 500) the “Winner–Takes–All”
schedule provides the strongest incentives to compete. When heterogeneity increases (Hpj ≥ 500),
positive losing prizes in both dimensions (AL > 0 and BL > 0) improve expected aggregate eﬀort.
In this case, the contest becomes more homogeneous, and weaker players get stimuli to compete
70In Subsection 1.4.2.2, I explained more heterogeneity in the French Open with the contest-speciﬁc seeding
policy. Recall that variable seedi shapes only players’ valuations in the monetary dimension (see Subsection 1.4.2.1
for identiﬁcation restrictions). Thus, experimental ﬁndings provide supportive evidence in favor of the matching-
based explanation of excessive heterogeneity in the French open.
CHAPTER 1. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PRIZES 47
more aggressively. Tables 1.12 and 1.13 characterize group-speciﬁc reward schedules supporting
the highest aggregate eﬀort in the Australian Open and the French Open. Surprisingly, actual prize
schemes (Wa =
(
AWa , B
W
a
)
and La =
(
ALa , B
L
a
)
) never induce the strongest competition. As before,
relatively even pairs (Hpj < 500) perform the best when the “Winner–Takes–All” allocation is
implemented. Matches that feature stronger heterogeneity (Hpj ≥ 500) require more losing beneﬁts
in both dimensions to support the highest expected aggregate eﬀort. In this case, reallocating 5%
of money and 2% of ranking points from ﬁnal winning prizes to ﬁrst-round losing rewards could
improve expected aggregate eﬀort in the French Open (the Australian Open) by more than 4.9%
(3.4%). The gain would be 5.6% (3.7%) for the French Open (the Australian Open) compared to the
“Winner–Takes–All” schedule. Thus, higher losing rewards improve the contestants’ performance
in heterogeneous matches.
All experiments conducted in this section can be applied to the job promotion setting directly.
When managers decide how to allocate monetary and non-monetary rewards (status, other career-
related stimuli etc.) between heterogeneous participants, they may want to assign positive losing
prizes. However, if competing workers have similar skills and preferences, the “Winner–Takes–All”
scheme induces the highest aggregate eﬀort. In case of multiple bilateral contests with uniform
prizes (for example, professional sports), the optimal allocation depends on the pool of potential
competitors and the matching policy.
1.5 Conclusion
Job promotion, professional sports and other similar interactions can be seen as bilateral contests
with heterogeneous players and rewards including multiple goods. I propose a theoretical
framework to model this setting and characterize the optimal prize allocation that maximizes
players’ aggregate eﬀort. When heterogeneity in preferences and / or skills is strong, the designer
must leave a positive prize for a loser. On the one hand, this schedule reduces winning beneﬁts
and, consequently, incentives to exert eﬀort (direct eﬀect). On another hand, higher losing prizes
eliminate the advantage of a stronger player and make the contest more balanced. As a result,
the previously disadvantaged opponent can win with a higher probability and gets more stimuli
to compete. If heterogeneity is severe, this positive equilibrium eﬀect dominates the direct one.
Thus, expected aggregate eﬀort increases.
If contestants’ preferences and / or skills are similar, a stronger participant has no signiﬁcant
advantage. In addition, higher losing rewards cause a comparable reduction in winning beneﬁts
of both players. Then, the positive equilibrium eﬀect can never compensate losses in contestants’
eﬀort induced by cutting the prize spread. As a result, the “Winner–Takes–All” allocation supports
the highest expected aggregate eﬀort.
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Notably, positive losing rewards could never beneﬁt the designer in a single-item case. In this
setting, contestants’ types become aligned if and only if winning and losing prizes are identical.
The allocation, however, gives no incentives to compete and is never optimal. On the contrary,
in the two-dimensional setup it is possible to provide strictly positive winning beneﬁts for both
participants and at the same time make the contest even by increasing the losing prize. The
result does not require convexity of the cost function as a traditional argument in favor of multiple
positive rewards.71 The key ingredient is asymmetry in contestants’ valuations.
To highlight the importance of multi-dimensional prizes in job promotion and other similar
settings, I structurally estimate the model using data from ﬁrst-round matches of two
professional tennis tournaments, the Australian Open and the French Open. Relevant prize
dimensions are money and the ATP ranking points (career concerns). The analysis shows that
both reward components shape players’ incentives to compete. If one neglects the points
(non-monetary) dimension, the model underestimates heterogeneity and overestimates the
incentive eﬀect of monetary prizes. This result highlights the direction to improve reduced-form
tests of the contest theory that always overlook the multi-dimensionality aspect.
Counterfactual experiments illustrate the existence of alternative prize allocations that can
improve aggregate eﬀort. On average, the French Open (the Australian Open) would beneﬁt from
increasing (decreasing) monetary rewards for ﬁrst-round losers. If the managers of both contests
were allowed to change the ranking points allocation, they would prefer zero losing prizes in this
good. The diﬀerence stems from the fact that the French Open tends to couple more heterogeneous
players. This pattern can be explained with contest-speciﬁc matching policies.
Redistributing 5% of money and 2% of ranking points from ﬁnal winning rewards to
ﬁrst-round losing prizes could improve expected aggregate eﬀort in matches with strong
heterogeneity by more than 4.9% (3.4%) for the French Open (the Australian Open). Compared
to the “Winner–Takes–All” allocation, the gain would be 5.6% (3.7%) in the French Open (the
Australian Open). On the contrary, relatively even matches never beneﬁt from positive losing
prizes. These ﬁndings go in line with the theory and can be used in the job promotion setting.
For example, when managers must distribute monetary and non-monetary prizes between
heterogeneous workers, they may gain if assign positive losing beneﬁts. If competitors have
similar skills and / or preferences, it is optimal to give everything to the winner.
To conclude, the paper highlights the importance of multi-dimensional incentives in asymmetric
contests, both in theoretical and empirical terms. The presence of additional reward items helps
the designer to mitigate the negative eﬀect of strong heterogeneity on eﬀort exertion, if the prize
for a loser increases. The structural analysis has conﬁrmed that at least two goods (namely,
71Though, even with the convex cost speciﬁcation it would never be possible to support the optimality of non-zero
beneﬁts for the last loser under single-item rewards.
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money and career concerns) shape the incentives of workers (professional athletes) in job promotion
(professional tennis competitions). These ﬁndings indicate that multi-dimensional preferences can
aﬀect the contestants’ behavior and, as a consequence, the optimal prize allocation signiﬁcantly.
In the end, I indicate how this work could foster future research. First, one can introduce
more than two players and prize items. This modiﬁed version would characterize a wider range of
job promotion interactions and other contest-type settings. Another way to extend the
framework is to look at multi-stage bilateral elimination contests with heterogeneous
participants. In this case, the designer may want to maximize not only the total eﬀort but also
the winning probabilities of stronger players, and this results in a trade-oﬀ. To solve the problem,
the designer can use two instruments: the prize allocation and the matching policy. The current
empirical application highlights the importance of these two aspects to the contest setting.72
Finally, in terms of structural estimation, it would be interesting to analyze female players whose
preferences may diﬀer from those of males and discover if there are any gender-speciﬁc patterns.
72At the earlier stages of professional tennis tournaments managers care not only about aggregate eﬀort. They
also want stronger players to be advanced in the contest with a higher probability. This is the reason why seeding
policies exist.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1.5.1: Empirical Distribution of Contestants’ Ranking Points
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Table 1.6: The Australian Open Monetary Reward Schedules (A$1,000, CPI Adjusted), 2009–2015
Contest Stage 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
1 Round 29.2 23.2 24.1 17.4 17.8 18.4 18.5
2 Round 50.8 38.7 39.7 28.9 28.4 29.7 29.5
3 Round 82.5 58.1 61.9 47.6 48.4 49.1 48.6
4 Round 148 104.4 109.1 95.1 82.6 83.9 83.9
1/4 Final 287.6 209 218.1 190.2 186.6 188.7 173.7
1/2 Final 549.8 418.1 436.2 380.5 373.2 377.4 347.9
Runner-Up 1,311.1 1,025.4 1,059.9 1,001.3 977.4 990.7 953.1
Winner 2,622.2 2,049.9 2,119.9 2,002.5 1,954.9 1,981.4 1,906.1
Total Prize Money 33,834.6 28,388.1 26,172.2 21,766.7 22,214.2 22,733.7 22,053.6
Prize Spread 131.9 97.9 101.8 91.6 88 89.3 85.3
Note: prize spreads are calculated as the diﬀerence between the continuation value of winning round 1 and the
losing prize at that stage.
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Table 1.7: Growth Rates in Monetary Rewards for the Australian Open (%), 2009–2015
Contest Stage 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
1 Round 25.64 –3.54 38.28 –2.01 –3.41 –.49
2 Round 31.10 –2.48 36.91 1.97 –4.33 .60
3 Round 42.03 –6.25 30.24 –1.79 –1.30 .94
4 Round 41.74 –4.23 14.65 15.11 –1.59 .13
1/4 Final 37.58 –4.15 14.65 1.95 –1.12 8.64
1/2 Final 31.51 –4.15 14.65 1.95 –1.12 8.50
Runner-Up 27.86 –3.26 5.86 2.44 –1.34 3.95
Winner 27.91 –3.30 5.86 2.44 –1.34 3.95
Total Prize Money 19.19 8.47 20.24 –2.01 –2.29 3.08
Prize Spread 22.92 5.12 16.95 –0.52 –1.84 3.62
Note: prize spreads are calculated as the diﬀerence between the continuation value of winning round 1 and the
losing prize at that stage.
Table 1.9: Estimated Heterogeneity: Contest-Speciﬁc Eﬀect
The Australian Open
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Money .109 .087 1E–11 .53
Points .23 .69 4.2E–05 .7
The French Open
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Money .096 .077 1E–11 .58
Points .2 .64 1.7E–05 .77
Note: for every match j heterogeneity is measured as the absolute diﬀerence in contestants’ skills and valuations:
hetAj = |α˜ (xij)− α˜ (x−ij)| , hetBj =
∣∣∣β˜ (xij)− β˜ (x−ij)∣∣∣
where α˜ (·) = c (·)α (·) and β˜ (·) = c (·)β (·).
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Table 1.8: Summary Statistics: Both Contests in 2009–2015
N Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Monetary Losing Prize
(A$1,000)
1680 25.94 61.79 19.4 38.25
Monetary Winning Prize
(A$1,000)
1680 2,171.5 396.55 1,605.38 3,100
Prize Spread (A$1,000) 1680 110.79 23.22 85.31 155.97
Total Prize Money (A$
1,000)
1680 2.65E+04 4,752.56 2.18E+04 3.57E+04
Number of Unforced
Errors per Set Played
1680 8.26 5.54 0 31
Age 1680 27.22 3.66 17 38
Body Mass Index (BMI) 1680 23.13 1.29 19.24 26.85
Ranking Points 1680 1249.29 1694.6 10 14,960
hetpj 840 1342.54 2150.17 0 14,162
Betting Odd 1680 3.67 5.14 1 61
hetBj 840 4.63 6.62 0 59.99
Dummy Variables
N Frequency of
1’s
Seedi = 1 if player i is
seeded
1680 .25
Hbiasi = 1 if player i has
a home bias
1680 .18
Tour = 1 for the
Australian Open
1680 .5
Note: hetpj = |pointsij − points−ij | (hetBj = |Betij −Bet−ij |) approximates heterogeneity in match j as the
absolute diﬀerence in contestants’ ranking points (betting odds).
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Figure 1.5.2: Goodness–of–Fit: Age- and Points-Based Groups & One-Dimensional Prizes
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Table 1.10: Estimated Heterogeneity: No Contest Speciﬁc Eﬀect
The Australian Open
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Money .091 .073 1.4E–11 .44
Points .17 .53 1.7E–05 .58
The French Open
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Money .096 .077 1E–11 .58
Points .2 .64 1.7E–05 .77
Note: for every match j heterogeneity is measured as the absolute diﬀerence in contestants’ skills and valuations:
hetAj = |α˜ (x1j)− α˜ (x2j)| , hetBj =
∣∣∣β˜ (x1j)− β˜ (x2j)∣∣∣
where α˜ (·) = c (·)α (·) and β˜ (·) = c (·)β (·).
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Figure 1.5.5: Group-Speciﬁc Improvement in Mean Expected Eﬀort with respect to AL = 0 (%):
the Australian Open and Fixed Prizes in Dimension B
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Note: Hpj = |pointsij − points−ij | for every match j; K = 821; the total number of simulations is 1,000; solid lines
with bubbles correspond to a 0.5–quantile of mean expected eﬀort simulated distributions; the grid for monetary
losing prizes is A¯L =
[
0, u¯ALa
]
with u¯ = 6 and 21 steps.
Table 1.11: Expected Aggregate Eﬀort with One- and Two-Dimensional Rewards: Actual Prize
Allocation
The Australian
Open
The French
Open
No Prizes in
Ranking Points
24.96 23.49
Two-Dimensional
Prizes
48.02 42.12
Note: total number of simulations is 1,000; lower and upper conﬁdence bounds reﬂect 0.16– and 0.84–quantiles of
mean expected aggregate eﬀort simulated distribution.
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Figure 1.5.6: Group-Speciﬁc Improvement in Mean Expected Eﬀort with respect to AL = 0 (%):
the French Open and Fixed Prizes in Dimension B
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Note: Hpj = |pointsij − points−ij | for every match j; K = 821; the total number of simulations is 1,000; solid lines
with bubbles correspond to a 0.5–quantile of mean expected eﬀort simulated distributions; the grid for monetary
losing prizes is A¯L =
[
0, u¯ALa
]
with u¯ = 5 and 21 steps.
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Figure 1.5.7: Contest-Speciﬁc Mean Expected Aggregate Eﬀort: Flexible Reward Schedules
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Note: K = 821; the total number of simulations is 1,000; solid lines with bubbles correspond to a 0.5–quantile of
mean expected eﬀort simulated distributions; lower and upper conﬁdence bounds reﬂect 0.16– and 0.84–quantiles
of mean expected eﬀort simulated distributions; the grids for monetary and non-monetary losing prizes are A¯L =[
0, u¯ALa
]
and B¯L =
[
0, u¯BLa
]
with u¯ = 5 and 21 steps.
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Table 1.12: Best Group-Speciﬁc Prize Schedules: The Australian Open
Group
(
AL, BL
)
in
The Best
Prize Scheme
Highest
Exp. Agg.
Eﬀort
Improvement
in Exp. Agg.
Eﬀort w.r.t.
(0, 0)
Improvement
in Exp. Agg.
Eﬀort w.r.t.(
ALa , B
L
a
)
Hpj ∈ [0, 200] (0, 0) 44.2 0% 1.2%
Hpj ∈ (200, 500] (0, 0) 44.8 0% .8%
Hpj ∈ (500, 1000] (116.4, 3) 39.6 1.1% .9%
Hpj ∈ (1000, 1600] (116.4, 42) 37.3 3.7% 3.4%
Hpj ∈ (1600, 3000] (116.4, 60) 36.9 1.9% 1.8%
Hpj > 3000 (0, 0) 34.8 0% .5%
Note: Hpj = |pointsij − points−ij | for every match j; AL is measured in A$1,000; BL is measured in points;
total number of simulations is 1,000; lower and upper conﬁdence bounds reﬂect 0.16– and 0.84–quantiles of mean
expected eﬀort simulated distributions; the grids for monetary and non-monetary losing prizes are A¯L =
[
0, u¯ALa
]
and B¯L =
[
0, u¯BLa
]
with u¯ = 6 and 21 steps.
Table 1.13: Best Group-Speciﬁc Prize Schedules: The French Open
Group
(
AL, BL
)
in
The Best
Prize Scheme
Highest
Exp. Agg.
Eﬀort
Improvement
in Exp. Agg.
Eﬀort w.r.t.
(0, 0)
Improvement
in Exp. Agg.
Eﬀort w.r.t.(
ALa , B
L
a
)
Hpj ∈ [0, 200] (0, 0) 45.1 0% .5%
Hpj ∈ (200, 500] (0, 0) 45.2 0% .6%
Hpj ∈ (500, 1000] (100.5, 32.5) 41.2 1.8% 1.6%
Hpj ∈ (1000, 1600] (100.5, 32.5) 39.1 5.3% 4.8%
Hpj ∈ (1600, 3000] (100.5, 50) 37.4 5.6% 4.9%
Hpj > 3000 (100.5, 47.5) 35.1 .4% .5%
Note: Hpj = |pointsij − points−ij | for every match j; AL is measured in A$1,000; BL is measured in points;
total number of simulations is 1,000; lower and upper conﬁdence bounds reﬂect 0.16– and 0.84–quantiles of mean
expected eﬀort simulated distributions; the grids for monetary and non-monetary losing prizes are A¯L =
[
0, u¯ALa
]
and B¯L =
[
0, u¯BLa
]
with u¯ = 5 and 21 steps.
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Appendix A. Theoretical Model: Extensions
Bundling vs. Two Simultaneous Contests
Suppose there exists an alternative way to use both goods. The designer can run two separate
contests with one-dimensional rewards instead of a single competition with bundled prizes. If
expected aggregate eﬀort taken over former contests always exceeds the one induced in the latter
case, results of Theorem 1.1 break down easily.
Assume the designer has two possibilities:73
1. Scheme b: run one contest, allocate prize bundles and induce expected aggregate eﬀort
Jb
(
AW , AL, BW , BL
)
.
2. Scheme ub: run two separate competitions with single-item prizes and take a sum of expected
aggregate eﬀort over them:
Jub
(
AW , AL, BW , BL
)
= J
(
AW , AL, 0, 0
)
+ J
(
0, 0, BW , BL
)
where function J (·) was deﬁned in the original model.
Let W b =
(
AWb
BWb
)
and Lb =
(
ALb
BLb
)
(W ub =
(
AWub
BWub
)
and Lub =
(
ALub
BLub
)
) be optimal prizes
for scheme b (ub). In a single-item contest, the designer always assigns the highest possible prize
spread (see the proof of Proposition 1.2, Lemma 5 ):
W ub =
(
1
1
)
, Lub =
(
0
0
)
Theorem 1.1 characterizes optimal reward schedules for scheme b. Abusing notations, I introduce
J l
(
W l, Ll
) ≡ J l (AWl , ALl , BWl , BLl ), l = {b, ub}. When optimal prize schedules are known, the
designer faces the following problem:
max
{
J b
(
W b, Lb
)
, Jub
(
W ub, Lub
)}
As before, R deﬁnes a set of all feasible valuation proﬁles:
R = {r : αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0, i = {g, n}}
Theorem 1.1 states the existence of valuation proﬁles such that scheme b (with or without positive
losing prizes) induces higher expected aggregate eﬀort:
73Labels b and ub denote bundled and unbundled prize schedules, respectively.
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Theorem 1.1. There exists a non-empty subset of R, Rb, such that for any {αg, αn, βg, βn} ∈ Rb
the designer prefers one contest with bundled prizes to two separate contests with unbundled prizes.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Set Rb contains two types of valuation proﬁles. The ﬁrst type supports optimal bundles where
a winner takes all. These proﬁles must be such that the greediest player values only one good more
than the opponent (αg > αn, βg < βn or vise versa). The result has the following interpretation.
Suppose player g likes both items more (αg > αn and βg > βn). The “Winner–Takes–All” bundle
is optimal when contestants have relatively homogeneous preferences over both dimensions. Since
player g values goods more, his relative power is higher in the competition with bundled prizes
than in two separate contests. As a result, the opponent has less incentives to exert eﬀort in the
former case. Formally, for αg > αn, βg > βn player n chooses e > 0 with a lower probability when
the designer runs a single contest and allocates the “Winner–Takes–All” bundle:74
P (en > 0| b, WTA) < P (en > 0| ub) if αg > αn, βg > βn
If contestant g likes only one good more, the inequality can change its sign. Then, player n exerts
strictly positive eﬀort with a higher probability when the designer allocates the
“Winner–Takes–All” bundle. Given that participants have relatively homogeneous preferences,
two separate competitions with one-dimensional prizes induce suﬃcient expected aggregate
eﬀort. Thus, the designer prefers scheme ub over b when player g values both goods more.
Otherwise, he can run one contest and allocate the “Winner–Takes–All” bundle.
Another type of valuation proﬁles entering Rb supports optimal bundles with positive losing
prizes. A suﬃcient condition to make this reward schedule optimal is strong heterogeneity in
players’ preferences. This also means that single-item contests are very uneven and result in low
expected aggregate eﬀort. Two-dimensional prizes with positive losing beneﬁts help the designer
to mitigate a negative eﬀect players’ heterogeneity has on eﬀort exertion.75 To illustrate this point,
I provide a numerical example.
74I use Proposition 1.1 to calculate these probabilities:
P (en > 0| b, WTA) = αn+βnαg+βg
P (en > 0|ub) = αnβnαgβg + αnαg
(
1− βnβg
)
+ βnβg
(
1− αnαg
)
where the latter is a probability that player n exerts positive eﬀort at least in one contest with single-item prizes.
Then:
P (en > 0| b, WTA) < P (en > 0|ub) ⇔ −αnβg (βg − βn)− βnαg (αg − αn) < 0
and the inequality always holds for αg > αn, βg > βn.
75For more details on this mechanism, see Subsection 1.3.3.1.
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Example. Assume
(
α1
β1
)
=
(
10
8
)
and
(
α2
β2
)
=
(
9
1
)
. I start from scheme b. The
“Winner–Takes–All” schedule results in J b(1, 0, 1, 0) = 7.8. Player 1 is the “greediest-to-win”
(g = 1). For given αg and αn, it is always optimal to assign the highest prize spread in good A (see
the proof of Theorem 1.1). Type g is more sensitive to incentives in dimension B (αg
βg
< αn
βn
). Then,
positive losing beneﬁts can appear only in dimension B. In fact, the optimal allocation of item
B for speciﬁed preferences is BW = 3
7
, BL = 4
7
(see the proof of Theorem 1.1). This alternative
prize schedule induces J b(1, 0, 3
7
, 4
7
) = 8.9 and dominates the “Winner–Takes–All” scheme. If the
designer runs two separate single-item contests, he gets Jub(1, 0, 1, 0) = 9.1. Thus, scheme ub
must be chosen. This is the case because heterogeneity in dimension B is not strong enough,
and the corresponding contest with single-item prizes generates enough eﬀort to make scheme ub
beneﬁcial.
Next, take the same
(
α1
β1
)
combined with
(
α2
β2
)
=
(
9
0.1
)
. Now the diﬀerence between
β1 and β2 increases. Again, player 1 is of type g, and his incentives show relatively more sensitivity
in dimension B (αg
βg
< αn
βn
). Consider scheme b. The “Winner–Takes–All” allocation induces
J b(1, 0, 1, 0) = 6.9. The optimal prize schedule for given preferences requires BW ≈ 11
25
, BL ≈ 14
25
,
and expected aggregate eﬀort is J b(1, 0, 11
25
, 14
25
) ≈ 9. When the designer implements scheme ub,
he gets Jub(1, 0, 1, 0) = 8.6. As a result, when heterogeneity in dimension B is very strong, the
designer does not beneﬁt from two contests with single-item rewards and prefers to create a bundle
with a positive losing prize.
Overall, Theorem 1.1 strengthens the results of the original model: bundling with positive
losing prizes can be beneﬁcial even if the designer has a freedom to run separate contests over two
dimensions.
Asymmetric Information about Contestants’ Types
In this section, I introduce asymmetric information about contestants’ types. This extension is
important for two reasons. First, players often have unobservable characteristics that can aﬀect
their eﬀort choices. Second, in many real-life contests the designer must commit to the prize
allocation before he learns exact matching. For example, contest organizers in professional tennis
announce monetary reward schedules before the ﬁnal draw is known.
Suppose all key assumptions of the original model hold. However, now αi is private information
of player i:
αi = {αi, α¯i} , 0 < αi < α¯i, i = {1, 2}
where realizations of α1 and α2 are independent, P (αi = α¯i) = k ∀ i = {1, 2}. For tractability
CHAPTER 1. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PRIZES 67
reasons, β1 and β2 are assumed to be common knowledge. This allows me to restrict a number
of types every contestant has by two and avoid excessive parametrization.76 Without loss of
generality, I ﬁx β1 > β2.
Deﬁne U¯ki = α¯iAk + βiBk and U
k
i = αiA
k + βiB
k if player i wins prize k. As every contestant
has two types, I introduce the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1.4. Let t¯i (A, B) = U¯Wi − U¯Li ≡ t¯i and ti (A, B) = UWi − ULi ≡ ti be winning
beneﬁts of contestant i with realized valuations α¯i and αi, respectively. Deﬁne t
g
i = max {t¯i, ti} and
tni = min {t¯i, ti}. Then t¯i is the “greediest-to-win” type of contestant i (g = i) if and only if
t¯i = t
g
i ; otherwise, t¯i is not the “greediest-to-win” type of contestant i (n = i).
I do not compare types between contestants but identify two states the same player can face.
As before, every participant chooses his eﬀort taking into account announced prizes and the
competitor’s action. When I analyze the game between contestants, I look at a particular class of
equilibria.
Deﬁnition 1.5. Let e∗
(
tji
)
be eﬀort type j of contestant i exerts in equilibrium. The equilibrium
is in monotonically increasing strategies if and only if e∗ (tgi ) ≥ e∗ (tni ) for any i = {1, 2}.
The deﬁnition says that in equilibrium g-types associated with higher winning beneﬁts must
never exert less eﬀort than n-types. Also, I require non-triviality of equilibria:
Deﬁnition 1.6. The equilibrium is trivial if and only if at least one g-type chooses e = 0 with
probability 1. Otherwise, the equilibrium is non-trivial.
Let Gi
(
tji , e
)
be a probability that type j of contestant i chooses at most e, and sji denotes a
support of Gi
(
tji , e
)
. Proposition 1.4 characterizes contestants’ equilibrium behavior:
Proposition 1.4. For min {tg1, tg2} > 0 there exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium in
monotonically increasing strategies such that:
• At least one type places an atom at zero: ∃ i = {1, 2} , j = {g, n} : Gi
(
tji , 0
)
> 0;
• There is no e > 0 played with a positive probability;
76Equivalently, one could assume private information about βi but state that two random variables are perfectly
correlated:
βi =
{
β
i
, β¯i
}
, 0 < β
i
< β¯i
P
(
βi = β¯i| α¯i
)
= 1, P
(
βi = βi|αi
)
= 1
P
(
βi = β¯i
)
= P (αi = α¯i) = k ∀ i = {1, 2}
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• Supports of Gi (tgi , e), i = {1, 2} have the same supremum: sup (sg1) = sup (sg2);
• Supports of Gi (tni , e), i = {1, 2} have the same inﬁmum, and it is equal to zero: inf (sn1 ) =
inf (sn2 ) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.
To construct this equilibrium, I use an algorithm developed by Siegel (2014) for asymmetric
all–pay auctions with two participants, private information and discrete types. I extend this
characterization to the case of perfectly divisible multiple goods and introduce prize-dependent
types.
When the second strongest type has a non-positive winning beneﬁt (min {tg1, tg2} ≤ 0), the
equilibrium becomes trivial.77 Otherwise, g-types of both contestants choose e > 0 with a strictly
positive probability. As before, the equilibrium features mixed strategies. All eﬀort choices must
belong to s = [0, min {tg1, tg2}]. The equilibrium partitions s into intervals of diﬀerent length. On
every interval, particular types of contestants 1 and 2 compete by randomizing uniformly. The
equilibrium partition depends on the prize structure (W and L), the probability distribution (k)
and includes up to 3 intervals. One can ﬁnd the greediest competitor for every element of the
equilibrium partition:
Deﬁnition 1.7. Deﬁne order Q over elements of the equilibrium partition where q = 1 corresponds
to e = 0. Let ti, q be a type of contestant i playing on interval q ∈ Q. Then, ti, q is the “greediest-
to-win” on interval q ∈ Q (gq = i) if and only if ti, q = max {t1, q, t2, q}.
Using these notations, I deﬁne a relative power of type gq in this setting:
Deﬁnition 1.8. A relative power of contestant gq on interval q ∈ Q, q > 1 is a probability that
his competitor plays on interval q − 1 ∈ Q.
This notion of the relative power is very similar to one introduced for the case of symmetric
information. In the lowest interval of the equilibrium partition (q = 2), the relative power of player
gq is just a probability that the opponent chooses e = 0. As in the original model, two-dimensional
prizes allow the designer to aﬀect the equilibrium partition by changing winning and losing prizes.78
The mechanism driving this result was described in Subsection 1.3.2.
The designer chooses the prize allocation that maximizes expected aggregate eﬀort, Jk (·), given
feasibility constraints. Let rk be a probability–valuation proﬁle, and Rk denotes a set of all feasible
rk’s:
Rk = {rk : αi ≥ 0, α¯i ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0, k ∈ [0, 1]}
77The argument is exactly the same as the one provided for the case of tn ≤ 0 in Proposition 1.1.
78In case of single-item rewards, this value is constant.
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To simplify the analysis, I ﬁx two patterns in players’ preferences. First, I assume that contestant
1 has stronger willingness to win for both realizations of α1 and α2 when the “Winner–Takes–All”
schedule is implemented:
tj1 (1, 1) > t
j
2 (1, 1) ∀ j = {g, n} ⇔ α1 > α¯2 + β1 − β2
Second, I look at symmetric proﬁles:
Deﬁnition 1.9. Probability–valuation proﬁle rk is symmetric if and only if min {α1, α2} > β1 or
max {α¯1, α¯2} < β2, β1 > β2. Otherwise, probability–valuation proﬁle is asymmetric. Rsk ⊂ Rk is a
set of all symmetric probability–valuation proﬁles.
With symmetric proﬁles, both contestants enjoy the same good more for all realizations of α1
and α2. Proposition 1.5 states the existence of probability–valuation structures that satisfy all
imposed constraints and make positive losing prizes optimal:79
Proposition 1.5. For β1 > β2 and α1 > α¯2+β1−β2 there exists a non-empty subset of Rsk, RL, sk ,
such that for any probability–valuation proﬁle in RL, sk the designer uses both goods completely and
assigns a positive losing prize in dimension A.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Mechanisms driving the optimality of positive losing prizes are exactly the same as described
in Subsection 1.3.3.1. Higher losing rewards lower winning beneﬁts and, consequently, incentives
to exert eﬀort (direct eﬀect). At the same time, it reduces the advantage of the greediest player on
every interval of the equilibrium partition and, consequently, incentivizes the opponent to compete
more (equilibrium eﬀect). When contestants’ preferences are very heterogeneous, the latter eﬀect
dominates, and expected aggregate eﬀort goes up.
Overall, key results of the baseline model hold even when asymmetric information is introduced,
and it makes the proposed framework robust in this respect.
79Since the result concerning the optimality of positive losing prizes is the most striking one, I concentrate on
proving only this case and show that similar mechanisms work under asymmetric information. I do not analyze
the optimality of the “Winner–Takes–All” bundle separately although there exist probability–valuation proﬁles
supporting it.
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Appendix B. The Eﬀort Proxy Performance in the Reduced-
Form Tests
This section shows that the proposed measure based on a number of unforced errors per set played
can approximate contestants’ eﬀort well. I use the unbalanced panel of 320 players participated
either in the Australian Open or the French Open in 2009–2015. Following the discussion in Section
1.4, I do not address selection issues here.
Since skills and preferences cannot be recovered in the reduced-form setting, one must
approximate players’ heterogeneity. Following methodology developed in other empirical tests of
the contest theory, I measure heterogeneity by taking the absolute diﬀerence in ranking points of
the competitors (variable hetPj for game j ). 80
Let A and B denote money and ranking points (career concerns), respectively. I characterize
ﬁrst-round winning prizes as a continuation value of being advanced in the contest. Suppose
success and failure at later stages of the tournament are equally probable. Also, assume identities
of potential future opponents do not matter.81 With this approach, prize spreads are the same
for all players. As a result, heterogeneity in ﬁrst-round games stems only from diﬀerent skills and
asymmetric preferences.
Following previous reduced-form tests of the contest theory, in this section I consider only
monetary incentives. Standard tournament models predict that good eﬀort proxies must reﬂect
the following patterns:
1. Eﬀort increases in the prize spread (A = AW − AL) (Hypothesis 1, or H1);
2. Eﬀort decreases in contestants’ heterogeneity (hetpj) (Hypothesis 2, or H2).
In addition, I want to see how monetary losing prizes aﬀect eﬀort choices. However, with the
player-invariant spread speciﬁcation this is not possible because the two values are strongly
correlated (corr
(
AL, A
)
= 0.92). Table 1.15 contains estimation results. H1 and H2 cannot be
rejected in all speciﬁcations: individual eﬀort increases (decreases) when monetary prize spreads
(heterogeneity) grow. In this respect, the proposed measure behaves as a good proxy for players’
eﬀort.
To capture the diﬀerence in contestants’ preferences, I introduce another speciﬁcation of the
prize spread. Players are divided into six groups based on their ranking. For each of them,
I calculate empirical frequencies of being advanced to a particular contest level (see Table 1.14).
80For instance, see Sunde (2009).
81This strategy was used in several empirical papers (for instance, see Silverman and Seidel (2011), Ivankovic
(2007)) with the following argument: winning and losing probabilities of diﬀerent players average to “1/2–1/2”.
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The algorithm generates non-parametric group-speciﬁc continuation values and prize spreads (GA).
Now, monetary losing beneﬁts can also be used as an explanatory variable (corr
(
AL, GA
)
= 0.07).
When I analyze all matches together, H1 cannot be rejected (see Table 1.16, speciﬁcations
(1)–(3)), and the candidate eﬀort measure performs well. However, there are some interesting
features to be emphasized. First, monetary losing prizes matter for contestants’ eﬀort exertion,
and the eﬀect is positive. Second, there exists the group of participants whose eﬀort decreases in
prize spreads but grows in losing beneﬁts (see speciﬁcation (4) in Table 1.16). H2 ﬁnds support in
all speciﬁcations.
Finally, one can argue more unforced errors stem from risk-taking behavior but not lower
eﬀort.82 To address this point, I suggest the following approach. I assume that contestants taking
more risk hit the ball stronger. As a result, their serving speed increases. Then if the number of
unforced errors per set also includes risk-taking, it must be positively correlated with the latter
variable. Table 1.17 shows that relevant regression coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant. As a result, the
proposed proxy does not reveal evidence of risk-taking.
Table 1.14: Round–Speciﬁc Empirical Frequencies of Winning for Diﬀerent Contestants’ Groups
l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
Round 2 1 1 0.95 0.62 0.32 0.14
Round 3 1 0.93 0.92 0.41 0.17 0.38
Round 4 1 0.85 0.68 0.22 0.2 0
1/4Final 0.73 0.73 0.39 0.33 0 0
1/2Final 0.88 0.5 0.33 0 0 0
Final 0.71 0.25 0.33 0 0 0
Note:
1. Cells of the table contain empirical frequencies of group l (column) winning round j (row) in the Australian
Open or the French Open in 2009–2015, i = {1, ..., 6} j = {2, 3, 4, 1/4 final, 1/2 final, final}.
2. Groups based on ranking points look as follows:
i ∈ l ⇔ pointsi ∈ [G7−l, G7−l+1) , l = {1, ..., 6}
Gk ∈ G, G = {0, 500, 1000, 3000, 6000, 10000, max (pointsi)}
3. One can calculate group–speciﬁc prize spreads using empirical frequencies of winning and reward schedules.
82Since the theoretical setup assumes risk-neutrality, I prefer to isolate this channel.
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Table 1.15: Individual Eﬀort: Fixed–Eﬀect Speciﬁcation and Constant Prize Spreads
(1)
No Other
Controls
(2)
Game and
Tournament
Controls–I
(3)
Game and
Tournament
Controls–II
A, t,
A$1000
0.048***
(0.017)
0.052***
(0.017)
0.05***
(0.017)
hetpj –0.4E–03***
(0.7E–0.4)
–0.5E–03***
(0.8E–0.4)
–0.5E–03***
(0.8E–0.4)
ALt
A, t No No –5.21
(15.14)
Match-Spec.
Controls
No Yes Yes
Contest-Spec.
Controls
No Yes Yes
Time Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Contest-Spec.
Trend
Yes Yes Yes
N = 1647
F (9, 532) =
8.42
N = 1642
F (14, 531) =
7.33
N = 1642
F (15, 531) =
6.84
Note: dependent variable – individual eﬀort measured as e˜ij = uˆ− u˜ij where u˜ij is a number of unforced errors per set player i made
in match j, uˆ = maxi, j u˜ij ; standard errors are clustered over players; *, **, and *** correspond to 90%, 95%, and 99% signiﬁcance;
other controls include seeding policies of the contests, players’ and their competitors’ individual characteristics, betting odds, growth
rates of ALt and A, t, total prize money.
Table 1.16: Individual Eﬀort: Fixed–Eﬀect Speciﬁcation and Flexible Prize Spreads
(1)
No Other
Controls
(2)
Game and
Tournament
Controls–I
(3)
Game and
Tournament
Controls–II
(4)
Restricted Set
of Players
GA, t,
A$1000
0.004***
(0.001)
0.0035**
(0.001)
0.0036**
(0.001)
–0.24**
(0.001)
hetpj –0.5E–03***
(0.8E–0.4)
–0.5E–03***
(0.8E–0.4)
–0.5E–03***
(0.9E–0.4)
–0.45E–03***
(0.13E–0.4)
ALt No 0.18**
(0.083)
0.19**
(0.08)
0.716***
(0.023)
Match-Spec.
Controls
No No Yes Yes
Contest-Spec.
Controls
No No Yes Yes
Time Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contest-Spec.
Trend
Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 1647
F (9, 532) =
7.66
N = 1647
F (10, 532) =
7.53
N = 1642
F (14, 531) =
6.45
N = 649
F (14, 397) =
3.99
Note: dependent variable – individual eﬀort measured as e˜ij = uˆ− u˜ij where u˜ij is a number of unforced errors per set player i made
in match j, uˆ = maxi, j u˜ij ; standard errors are clustered over players; *, **, and *** correspond to 90%, 95%, and 99% signiﬁcance;
other controls include seeding policies of the contests, players’ and their competitors’ individual characteristics, betting odds, growth
rates of ALt and GA, t, total prize money; speciﬁcation (4) includes only contestants holding at most 1,000 ranking points and playing
in matches with hetpj > 300.
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Table 1.17: Number of Unforced Errors and Risk-Taking Behavior
Model I Model II Model III
Fastest Serve
Speed, km/h
0.03
(0.04)
No No
Average 1st
Serve Speed,
km/h
No –0.9E–03
(0.035)
No
Average 2nd
Serve Speed,
km/h
No No 0.02
(0.03)
N = 813
F (12, 367) =
3.3
N = 813
F (12, 367) =
3.4
N = 813
F (12, 367) =
3.39
Note: dependent variable – number of unforced errors a player made per set; standard errors are clustered over players; *, **, and ***
correspond to 90%, 95%, and 99% signiﬁcance; other controls include time controls, contest-speciﬁc trends, seeding policies, players’
and their competitors’ individual characteristics.
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Appendix C. Structural Modeling: Assumptions on the
Player-Speciﬁc Noise Distribution
In the structural setup, I assume that contestants get additional individual-speciﬁc utility (or
disutility) when lose:
ULi
(
AL, BL, εi
)
= ci
(
αiA
L + βiB
L
)
+ εi, εi ∼ iidFi (ε) , ε ∈ [εi, ε¯i]
where Fi (ε) is a truncation of a mean zero normal distribution with standard deviation σε:
fi (ε) =
1
σε
φ
(
ε
σε
)
Φ
(
ε¯i
σε
)
− Φ
(
εi
σε
) , ε ∈ [εi, ε¯i]
With this approach, contestants’ types become random:
t˜i = ciαiA + ciβiB − εi = ti − εi
To match the original theoretical model, I must restrict the support of εi in the following way:
Assumption 1: Losing never results in negative utility:
ULi
(
AL, BL, εi
)
= ci
(
αiA
L + βiB
L
)
+ εi ≥ 0 ⇔ εi = −ci
(
αiA
L + βiB
L
)
Further, recall the deﬁnition of contestants’ types. Player i is the “greediest-to-win” (t˜i = t˜g) if
and only if t˜i > t˜−i:
t˜i > t˜−i ⇔ εi − ε−i < ti − t−i
Now, the identities refer to a particular realization of the preference shocks. In the original model,
players randomize uniformly on
(
0, t˜n
]
if and only if t˜n > 0 (see Proposition 1.1). This implies
eij ≤ t˜nj for both types. Then, I impose another constraint on the support of fi (ε):
Assumption 2: ε¯i = tij −max {enj, egj}, i = {g, n} for every match j.
Assumption 2 states that the noise distribution for type g depends on his opponent’s
characteristics. Moreover, the condition implies t˜nj > 0 for any match j and, as a consequence,
the non-trivial equilibrium.
Finally, the support of the noise distribution must be well-deﬁned. I introduce Assumption 3
to guarantee ε¯i > εi:
Assumption 3: max {enj, egj} < min
{
UWn, j, U
W
g, j
}
for every match j.
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Appendix D. Estimation Results and the Goodness-of-Fit:
Relative Eﬀort
I checks if the structural model replicates the key empirical patterns in eﬀort. Fitting this variable
in the proposed framework is potentially problematic. If the model is a good approximation of
contestants’ behavior, the athletes must play mixed strategies. Then, the sum of observed eﬀort
levels can diﬀer from its expected value characterized in the model. For this reason, I compare not
absolute but relative eﬀort between various groups of players.
Deﬁnition 1.10. Let there be k ≥ 1 ordered groups, and ek denotes average expected eﬀort of
group k. A chain ratio between groups k and k − 1 is the ratio of eﬀort levels in these groups:
ρk, k−1 =
ek
ek−1
, and ρ1, 0 = 1
First, I compare actual and predicted chain ratios over diﬀerent age and ranking groups.83 The
former partition looks as follows:
dagek ∈ Dage, Dage = {mini (agei) , 20, 25, 30, maxi (agei)}
i ∈ k ⇔ agei ∈
[
dagek , d
age
k+1
)
, k = {1, ..., 4}
where k is the group. The partition based on ranking points is given by variable q (see Subsection
4.1). In addition, I trace the total eﬀort in competitions where contestants from two extreme
elements of each partition meet.
Further, I divide matches into groups based on contestants’ heterogeneity. To approximate this
value in the data, I use two approaches:
1. Take absolute diﬀerences in contestants’ ranking points for every match j:
hetpj = |pointsij − points−ij|
In the structural model, I treat players’ valuations and skills as functions of their ranking
points. As a result, the proposed approach must capture some heterogeneity between players
in the data.
2. Take absolute diﬀerences in contestants’ betting odds for every match j:
83For every group, I take the average of expected eﬀort over games and simulations. In the data, I repeat the
same procedure for individual eﬀort choices. This determines predicted and empirical chain ratios.
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hetBj = |Betij − Bet−ij|
Betting odds may reﬂect not only contestants’ rankings but also additional information about
their relative strength.84
Partitions based on contestants’ heterogeneity are summarized as follows:
dhet, lk ∈ Dhet, l, l = {p, B}
j ∈ k ⇔ hetlj ∈
[
dhet, lk , d
het, l
k+1
)
, k =
{
1, ..., #Dhet, l − 1}
where k is the group, p and B refer to the approaches used to approximate heterogeneity in
the data.85
Figure 1.5.8 contains predicted and actual chain ratios. On average, the model replicates the
shapes of the empirical curves well although sometimes the magnitude of predicted peaks and falls
is not exactly captured.
84This additional information could be injuries, long recovery, changes in the training schedule etc.
85The partitions are based on empirical distributions of hetpj and het
B
j :
Dhet, p =
{
0, 200, 500, 1000, 1600, 3000, maxj
(
hetpj
)}
Dhet, B =
{
0, 1, 1.93, 6, 8, 11, maxj
(
hetBj
)}
The thresholds were subject to robustness checks.
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Figure 1.5.8: Goodness–of–Fit: Chain Ratios
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Note: the points-based partition is driven by variable q (see Subsection 4.1); other partitions look as follows:
dagek ∈ Dage, Dage = {mini (agei) , 20, 25, 30, maxi (agei)}
i ∈ k ⇔ agei ∈
[
dagek , d
age
k+1
)
, k = {1, ..., 4}
dhet, lk ∈ Dhet, l, l = {p, B}
j ∈ k ⇔ hetlj ∈
[
dhet, lk , d
het, l
k+1
)
, k =
{
1, ..., #Dhet, l − 1}
Dhet, p =
{
0, 200, 500, 1000, 1600, 3000, maxj
(
hetpj
)}
Dhet, B =
{
0, 1, 1.93, 6, 8, 11, maxj
(
hetBj
)}
hetpj = |pointsij − points−ij | , hetBj = |Betij −Bet−ij |
where k is the group, p and B refer to the approaches used to approximate heterogeneity in the data; group 5
(10) in subplot “Chain Ratios: Age” (“Chain Ratios: Points”) corresponds to mean expected aggregate eﬀort in the
matches where contestants from two extreme elements of the partition, 1 and 4 (1 and 9), meet.
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Appendix E. Proofs
Proposition 1.1. For tn ≤ 0 the equilibrium is always trivial. For tn > 0 the equilibrium is
unique and non-trivial:
• Contestant g randomizes uniformly on [0, tn], and his equilibrium payoﬀ is πg = tg−tn+ULg ≥
ULg .
• Contestant n randomizes uniformly on (0, tn], places the atom of size p0n =
tg−tn
tg
at e = 0,
and his equilibrium payoﬀ is πn = ULn ≤ πg.
Proof. Let Gi (e) be a probability that contestant i chooses at most e, and ei, e¯i, i = {g, n} are
lower and upper bounds of Gi (e)’s support. Denote πWi , πLi , i = {g, n} as payoﬀs player i gets
when wins or loses, respectively.
First, I show that non-trivial equilibria cannot be obtained under tn ≤ 0. Take contestant n
and assume en > 0 in equilibrium. If n wins, he gets πWn (en) = tn+ULn − en. In case of losing, the
payoﬀ becomes πLn (en) = ULn −en, and πWn ≤ πLn ∀ en > 0 under tn ≤ 0. Since losing is preferred to
winning, en > 0 is dominated by en = 0, and en > 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, Gn (0) = 1,
and there are no non-trivial equilibria.
Second, I show that a non-trivial equilibrium exists under tn > 0 by constructing it. Consider
player n. Let e1n 	= e2n be two eﬀort levels from [en, e¯n]. In equilibrium e1n, e2n must generate the
same expected payoﬀ:
Gg(e
1
n)
[
UWn − e1n
]
+
(
1−Gg
(
e1w
)) [
ULn − e1n
]
= Gg(e
2
n)
[
UWn − e2n
]
+
(
1−Gg
(
e2n
)) [
ULn − e2n
]
or rearranging terms and using a deﬁnition of tn:
Gg(e
1
n)−Gg(e2n)
e1n − e2n
=
1
tn
where the right-hand side is constant and does not depend on players’ actions. Then taking
e1n − e2n → 0 I get:
gg (e) =
1
tn
, Gg (e) =
e
tn
Next, I analyze player g and consider e1g 	= e2g from
[
eg, e¯g
]
. The equilibrium requires:
Gn(e
1
g)
[
UWg − e1g
]
+
(
1−Gn
(
e1g
)) [
ULg − e1g
]
= Gn(e
2
g)
[
UWg − e2g
]
+
(
1−Gn
(
e2g
)) [
ULg − e2g
]
and after simpliﬁcations:
Gn(e
1
s)−Gn(e2s)
e1s − e2s
=
1
ts
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Again, taking e1n− e2n → 0 delivers gn (e) = 1ts and Gn (e) = ets . Since both density functions Gg (e)
and Gn (e) are continuous, there are no atom points within
[
eg, e¯g
]
and [en, e¯n].
Further I characterize supports of contestants’ strategies:
Lemma 1. e¯g = e¯n = tn in equilibrium.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps:
1. e¯i ≤ tn, i = {g, n}.
Take player n and suppose he chooses en = tn + εn, εn > 0 is small enough. Then it must
be:
πWn (tn + εn) = U
L
n − εn < πWn (tn) = ULn
and en = tn dominates en = tn + εn. Hence, en > tn is never played in equilibrium.
Now consider player g and assume eg = tn+ εg ∈ (tn, tg), εg > 0 is small enough. As n never
bids above tn, g wins with certainty and gets πWg (tn) = tg − tn − εg + ULg > 0. If g chooses
eg = tn, he also succeeds with probability 1, but bears lower costs:
πWg (tn) = tg − tn + ULg
Hence, eg = tn dominates eg = tn + εg for any εg > 0, and e¯g ≤ tn follows.
2. e¯n = e¯g.
Suppose e¯n > e¯g and take player n. The contestant wins with certainty when bids e˜n ∈
(e¯g, e¯n]. However, en = e¯g also results in player n’s success and dominates en ∈ (e¯g, e¯n]:
πWn (e˜n) = tn + U
L
n − e˜n < πWn (e¯g) = tn + ULn − e¯g ∀ e˜n ∈ (e¯g, e¯n]
As a result, e¯n > e¯g cannot hold in equilibrium. Similar arguments apply to player g’s
behavior when e¯n < e¯g is assumed.
3. e¯n = e¯g = tn.
Assume e¯n = e¯g = k < tn and consider contestant g. If the player deviates towards eg ∈
(k, tn], he wins with certainty and generates no losses in terms of expected utility. The same
is true for contestant n.
As a result, e¯n = e¯g = tn must hold in equilibrium.
Lemma 2. eg = en = 0 in equilibrium.
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Proof. ei ≥ 0, i = {g, n} follows from a feasibility constraint imposed on ei. Next, I prove two
statements:
1. eg = en.
Assume eg > en and consider a best response of player g to en ∈
(
en, eg − ε
)
, ε ∈ (0, eg − en).
When bidding eg = eg, contestant g wins with certainty and gets πWg
(
eg
)
= tg + U
L
g − eg.
A deviation towards eˆg = eg − η, η ∈ (0, ε) also results in g’s success, but leads to higher
payoﬀ:
πWg (eˆg) = tg + U
L
g − eg + η > πWg
(
eg
)
= tg + U
L
g − eg ∀ η ∈ (0, ε)
Hence, under eg > en there exists a proﬁtable deviation contestant g can implement, and
this cannot be an equilibrium. Similar arguments apply to player n’s behavior when eg < en
is assumed.
2. en = 0. Suppose en = l > 0. If contestant n loses with en = en, he gets πLn (en) = ULn − en <
πLn (0). As a result, the player can proﬁtably deviate towards en = 0, and this will constitute
an equilibrium.
Two results combined together imply eg = en = 0 in equilibrium.
Now I can provide a complete characterization of contestants’ strategies:
• Gg (e¯g) = 1 and Gg
(
eg
)
= 0 imply that g’s strategy has no atoms, and the player randomizes
continuously in
[
eg, e¯g
]
with a corresponding expected eﬀort tn
2
;
• Gn (e¯n) = tntg < 1 signals that n’s strategy contains an atom at zero, and it must be Gn (en) =
tg−tn
tg
. Summing up, player n uses continuous randomization on (0, tn], places p0n =
tg−tn
tg
at
0, and his expected eﬀort is t
2
n
2tg
;
• Equilibrium payoﬀs are πg = tg − tn + ULg and πn = ULn , and it must be πg ≥ πn.
Lemma 3. tg ≥ tn implies πg ≥ πn.
Proof. The inequality πg ≥ πn can be rewritten in the following way:
πg ≥ πn ⇔ tg − tn ≥ ULn − ULg ⇔ UWg − UWn ≥ 0
Several possible outcomes emerge:
1. ULn ≤ ULg ⇒ πg ≥ πn follows from tg ≥ tn by deﬁnition of contestant types;
2. ULn > ULg :
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(a) UWg > UWn ⇒ tg ≥ tn implies πg ≥ πn;
(b) UWg < UWn ⇒ it must be: ⎧⎨⎩UWg < UWnULg < ULn
Summing these conditions up results in UWg + ULg < UWn + ULn , or equivalently, UWg −
UWn < U
L
n − ULg . Combining this constraint with tg > tn delivers⎧⎨⎩UWg − UWn < ULn − ULgUWg − UWn > ULg − ULn
and a set of feasible
{
UWg − UWn
}
is non-empty ⇔ ULn < ULg , a contradiction.
As a result, tg ≥ tn implies πg ≥ πn, and player g never gets less then his competitor n.
Since there is no any other candidate equilibrium, uniqueness follows by construction.
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Proposition 1.2. For any ˆB ∈ [−1, 1] and valuation proﬁle r ∈ R the designer
• Uses both goods and leaves a positive losing prize in dimension A, or
• Uses both goods and gives the endowment of A to a winner, or
• Does not use dimension B and gives the endowment of A to a winner.
Proof. Let r = {αg, αn, βg, βn}. A complete characterization of the designer’s problem under
ﬁxed BW , BL looks as follows:
max
AW , AL
{
J
(
AW , AL
)
+ ηWA
W + ηLA
L + λ
(
1− AW − AL)} (1.5.1)
Abusing notations, re-deﬁne J
(
AW , AL, BˆW , BˆL
)
≡ J
(
A, ˆB
)
. Let g = i, i = {1, 2} if and
only if ti
(
1, ˆB
)
> t−i
(
1, ˆB
)
, which implies
αg + βgˆB > αn + βnˆB ⇔ αg > αn + (βn − βg) ˆB (1.5.2)
Assume no good is left out.
Lemma 1. Problem (1) has no interior solution.
Proof. Consider a second-order derivative of J
(
A, ˆB
)
:
∂2J
∂2A
(
A, ˆB
)
=
ˆ2B (βnαg − βgαn)2
t2g
> 0
Then, any ∗A such that ∂J∂A
(
∗A, ˆB
)
= 0 corresponds to an interior minimum of J
(
A, ˆB
)
.
Corollary 1. ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
strictly increases in A.
Let ˜A be a prize spread in dimension A such that contestants’ types, tn and tg, equalize given
ˆB:
tg
(
A, ˆB
)
= tn
(
A, ˆB
)
⇔ ˜A = βn − βg
αg − αn ˆB
One can show that ˜A is never feasible for αg < αn:
˜A ≤ 1 ⇔ βn − βg
αg − αn ˆB ≤ 1 ⇔ αg ≤ αn + (βn − βg) ˆB
where the latter inequality contradicts condition 1.5.2. Hence, a necessary condition for A = ˜A
being feasible is αg > αn. Further, we will work only with this restriction.
Lemma 2. ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
has a jump point at A = ˜A for any αg 	= αn.
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Proof. To prove the statement, compute the limits of ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
when it approachesA = ˜A
from the left and from the right:
limA→−˜A
∂J
∂A (·) =
3αg−αn
2
limA→+˜A
∂J
∂A (·) =
3αn−αg
2
The limits are equal if and only if αg = αn. Thus, ∂J∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
has a jump point at A = ˜A
for any αg 	= αn.
Assume ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
is a right-continuous function.86 Here and after, ∂J
∂A
− (˜A, ˆB) and
∂J
∂A
+
(
˜A, ˆB
)
denote derivatives of J (·) to the left and to the right of A = ˜A, respectively.
Given ˆB, contestants’ types are well-deﬁned if and only if
tj
(
A, ˆB
)
≥ 0 ⇔ jA ≥ −
ˆBβj
αj
, j = {g, n}
Depending on players’ preferences, jA can be to the left or to the right of ˜A.
Deﬁnition. ˜A is type-feasible if and only if max {gA, nA} < ˜A.87
Lemma 3. For any valuation proﬁle such that ˜A is not type-feasible it is optimal to give the
endowment of good A to a winner (A = 1).
Proof. First, we show that no type-feasibility holds if and only if nA ≥ ˜A. Expanding nA ≥ ˜A
delivers:
nA ≥ ˜A ⇔
⎧⎨⎩
βg
αg
> βn
αn
if ˆB ≥ 0
βg
αg
< βn
αn
if ˆB < 0
where conditions imposed on contestants’ marginal rates of substitution correspond to
max {gA, nA} = nA for given ˆB. When A = nA, the designer ends up with zero expected
aggregate eﬀort, and this allocation is strictly dominated by A > nA. Hence, under nA ≥ ˜A,
the choice set is bounded by A ∈ (nA, 1].
Second, consider the derivative ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
at A = nA:
∂J
∂A
(
nA, ˆB
)
=
αn
2
> 0
86Continuity of ∂J∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
at any A 	= ˜A can be proved easily.
87Type-feasibility is introduced to avoid confusions with a standard feasibility notion, which means A ∈ [0, 1].
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Since ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
is positive at A = nA and ∂J∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
strictly increases in A
(Corollary 1), it must be ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
> 0 for any A ∈ (nA, 1]. As a result, J (·) strictly
increases in A, and A = 1 is optimal.
Lemma 4. For any valuation proﬁle such that ˜A is type-feasible the objective function J (·)
strictly increases in A for A ∈
[
gA, ˜A
)
. J (·) strictly decreases or is non-monotone in A for
A ∈
[
˜A, 1
]
if and only if αg > 3αn; otherwise, J (·) strictly increases in A for A ∈
[
˜A, 1
]
.
Proof. In the beginning, we prove that type-feasibility holds if and only if gA < ˜A:
gA < ˜A ⇔
⎧⎨⎩
βg
αg
< βn
αn
if ˆB ≥ 0
βg
αg
> βn
αn
if ˆB < 0
where latter inequalities guarantee max {gA, nA} = gA for any ˆB. Allocating A = gA results
in zero expected aggregate eﬀort, and the designer’s choice set is bounded by A ∈ (gA, 1].
Since ˜A is type-feasible and ∂J∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
has a jump point at A = ˆA, one must analyze
the intervals A ∈
[
gA, ˜A
)
and A ∈
[
˜A, 1
]
separately. Consider A ∈
[
gA, ˜A
)
and
evaluate ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
at A = gA:
∂J
∂A
(
gA, ˆB
)
=
αg
2
> 0
Given ∂J
∂A
(
gA, ˆB
)
> 0 and Corollary 1, J (·) must strictly increase in A for any A ∈[
gA, ˜A
)
.
Now, take A ∈
[
˜A, 1
]
and recall Lemma 2:
∂J
∂A
+ (
˜A, ˆB
)
=
3αn − αg
2
and ∂J
∂A
+
(·) ≥ 0 if and only if αg ≤ 3αn. Given Corollary 1, under αg ≤ 3αn and
∂J
∂A
(
1, ˆB
)
> 0 there exists a unique value ¯A ∈
(
˜A, 1
)
such that ∂J
∂A
(
¯A, ˆB
)
= 0 and
J (·) strictly decreases (increases) in A for A ∈
(
˜A, ¯A
)
(A ∈
(¯A, 1]). When αg ≤ 3αn
and ∂J
∂A
(
1, ˆB
)
< 0, the objective function J (·) strictly decreases in A for A ∈
(
˜A, 1
]
.
To sum up, type-feasibility requires:
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αg > max
{
αn + (βn − βg) ˆB, αn, αn βgβn
}
if ˆB ≥ 0⎧⎨⎩αg ∈
(
αn + (βn − βg) ˆB, αn βgβn
)
βg > βn
if ˆB < 0
(1.5.3)
Condition αg > 3αn is necessary (but not suﬃcient) to make A < 1 optimal. When it holds and
˜A is type-feasible, only two candidate prize allocations with both goods used are left and must
be compared directly (Lemma 1 excludes interior solutions):(
1, ˆB
)
or
(
˜A, ˆB
)
The designer cannot change the prize allocation in dimension B and may prefer to leave this
item out.
Lemma 5. If dimension B is left out, it is optimal to give the endowment of good A to a
winner (A = 1).
Proof. When there is no dimension B, ∂J
∂A (A, 0) looks as follows:
∂J
∂A (A, 0) =
αn (αn + αg)
2αg
I{αg>αn} +
αg (αg + αn)
2αn
[
1− I{αg>αn}
]
> 0
where I{αg>αn} = 1 if αg > αn and I{αg>αn} = 0, otherwise. Given that J (·) strictly increases in
A, it is optimal to choose A = 1 and use good A’s endowment completely.
Here and after, a prize schedule where dimension B is omitted is denoted as (1, 0){αg>αn}.
Now, we analyze the cases when type-feasibility holds and the objective function J (·) strictly
decreases or is non-monotone in A for A ∈
(
˜A, 1
]
, i.e. αg > 3αn:
1. ˜A ≤ −1, i.e. ˜A is not feasible.
This condition holds if and only if
αg ≤ αn − (βn − βg) ˆB (1.5.4)
For ˆB ≥ 0, (1.5.4) always has a non-empty intersection with (1.5.3) if and only if⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
αg ∈
(
3αn, αn − (βn − βg) ˆB
)
αn ∈
[
0, min
{
(βg−βn)
2
ˆB, βnˆB
})
βg > βn > 0
(1.5.5)
When ˆB < 0, (1.5.4) combined with (1.5.3) always delivers an empty set for βg > βn.
Hence, under ˜A ≤ −1, we study only the case of ˆB ≥ 0.
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Next, one must compare J
(
−1, ˆB
)
, J
(
1, ˆB
)
, and J (1, 0){αg>αn}. In the beginning,
consider J
(
−1, ˆB
)
and J
(
1, ˆB
)
:
J
(
−1, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
⇔ αnα2g +
(
α2n + β
2
nˆ2B
)
αg − ˆ2Bαnβg (βg + 2βn) > 0 (1.5.6)
The corresponding square equation solved for αg always has two real roots, and condition
(1.5.6) holds if and only if
αg > r1 > 0 (1.5.7)
where
r1 =
−
(
α2n + β
2
nˆ2B
)
+
√(
α2n + β
2
nˆ2B
)2
+ 4ˆ2Bα2nβg (βg + 2βn)
2αn
Conditions (1.5.5) and (1.5.7) deﬁne a non-empty set of αg’s if and only if
αn ∈ [0, q1) (1.5.8)
where
q1 =
(βn − 3βg) +
√
(βn + βg) (9βg − 7βn)
4
ˆB < min
{
(βg − βn)
2
ˆB, βnˆB
}
Further, compare J
(
−1, ˆB
)
and J (1, 0){αg>αn}:
J
(
−1, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn} ⇔(
2αn − βnˆB
)
α2g +
(
2α2n −
(
2αn − βnˆB
)
(βn + βg) ˆB
)
αg − α2nβgˆB > 0 (1.5.9)
where
(
2αn − βnˆB
)
< 0 for any αn ∈ [0, q1). The underlying square equation always has
two real roots, r˜1 and r˜2, and 0 < r˜1 ≤ r˜2 when αn ∈ [0, q1). Then, the designer prefers(
−1, ˆB
)
to (1, 0){αg>αn} if and only if αg ∈ (r˜1, r˜2), and this set combined with (1.5.5)
and (1.5.7) must deliver a non-empty intersection.
Lemma 6. For any preference structure such that ˜A = −1 is feasible and J
(
−1, ˆB
)
>
J
(
1, ˆB
)
, the designer never ignores good B.
Proof. To prove the lemma, r˜1 < 3αn and r˜2 > αn − ˆB (βn − βg) for any αn ∈ [0, q1) are
suﬃcient. Consider the r˜1 < 3αn condition. Solving the underlying equation r˜1 − 3αn = 0
with respect to αn delivers three roots:
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k1 =
βnˆB
2
> q1
k2, 3 =
(7βg+15βn∓
√
49β2g−78βgβn−63β2n)
48
ˆB
If βg ∈
(
βn,
(39+48
√
2)
49
βn
)
, roots k2 and k3 are complex. Then, r˜1 − 3αn < 0 for αn ∈ [0, k1)
and r˜1 − 3αn ≥ 0 for αn ≥ k1. Imposing constraint (1.5.8), we get r˜1 − 3αn < 0 for any
αn ∈ [0, q1).
When βg ≥ (39+48
√
2)
49
βn, both k2 and k3 become real and positive. Moreover:
k3 > k1 > q1 for any βg ≥ (39+48
√
2)
49
βn
k2 > k1 > q1 for βg ∈
[
(39+48
√
2)
49
βn, 3βn
)
and k2 ≤ k1 for βg ≥ 3βn
With βg ∈
[
(39+48
√
2)
49
βn, 3βn
)
, the inequality r˜1−3αn < 0 holds for αn ∈ [0, k1). Combining
this with constraint (1.5.8) results in r˜1 − 3αn < 0 for any αn ∈ [0, q1). Under βg ≥ 3βn,
r˜1 − 3αn < 0 (r˜1 − 3αn ≥ 0) holds for αn ∈ [0, k2) (αn ∈ [k2, k1)). We analyze q1 and k2 as
functions of βg. First, compare q1 (3βg) and k2 (3βg):
q1 (3βg) =
(√
5− 2
)
βnˆB < βnˆB
2
= k2 (3βg)
Second, compute derivatives of q1 and k2 with respect to βg:
∂q1
∂βg
=
9βg+βn−3
√
(βn+βg)(9βg−7βn)
4
√
(βn+βg)(9βg−7βn)
ˆB > 0
∂k2
∂βg
=
(−49βg+39βn+7
√
49β2g−78βgβn−63β2n)
48
√
49β2g−78βgβn−63β2n
ˆB < 0
Hence, q1 (k2) strictly increases (decreases) in βg for any βg, βn, ˆB ≥ 0, and the equation
k2 − q1 = 0 must have at most one root in βg ≥ 3βn. Finally, take a limit of (k2 − q1) for
βg → ∞:
lim
βg→∞
(k2 − q1) = 2βnˆB
21
> 0
Given strict monotonicity of k1 and q1, k2 (3βg) > q1 (3βg), and limβg→∞ (k1 − q1) > 0, there
does not exist β˜g > 3βn such that
(
k1
(
β˜g
)
− q1
(
β˜g
)
= 0
)
. Thus, k2 > q1 for any βg ≥ 3βn.
Since r˜1−3αn < 0 for any αn ∈ [0, k2), imposing constraint (1.5.8) delivers the ﬁrst statement
of the lemma.
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Next, consider the second inequality, r˜2 > αn−ˆB (βn − βg). Solving r˜2 = αn−ˆB (βn − βg)
with respect to αn delivers four roots:
d1, 2 =
ˆB
8
(
5βn − βg ∓
√
(βg + βn) (9βg − 7βn)
)
d3 =
βnˆB
2
, d4 = βnˆB
where d1 < 0 < d2 < d3 < d4 and q1 ∈ (0, d2) for any βg ≥ 0. The inequality r˜2 >
αn − ˆB (βn − βg) holds for αn ∈ [0, d2). Combining this with condition (1.5.8), r˜2 >
αn − ˆB (βn − βg) for any αn ∈ [0, q1) comes out.
Thus, feasibility of ˜A = −1 and J
(
−1, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
imply
J
(
−1, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn}.
To sum up, A = −1 is optimal if and only if⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
αg ∈
(
max {r1, 3αn} , αn − (βn − βg) ˆB
)
αn ∈ [0, q1)
βg > βn > 0
When αn ∈
(
q1, min
{
(βg−βn)
2
ˆB, βnˆB
})
, the set
(
r1, αn − (βn − βg) ˆB
)
becomes
empty. In words, the
(
1, ˆB
)
bundle strictly dominates the
(
−1, ˆB
)
allocation. To
complete the analysis, one must compare J
(
1, ˆB
)
and J (1, 0){αg>αn} directly:
J
(
1, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn} ⇔ βnα2g + βn
(
2αn + ˆB (βn + βg)
)
αg − α2nβg > 0 (1.5.10)
The underlying square equation always has two real roots, rˆ1 and rˆ2, rˆ2 < 0 < rˆ1. Condition
(1.5.10) holds if and only if αg > rˆ1.
Lemma 7. For any preference structure such that ˜A ≤ −1, type-feasibility holds and
J
(
−1, ˆB
)
< J
(
1, ˆB
)
, the designer never leaves good B out.
Proof. To prove the lemma, it is suﬃcient to show that rˆ1 < αn for any αn ∈
[
0, βnˆB
)
.
The corresponding equation rˆ1 − αn = 0 solved for αn has two roots:
c1 = 0, c2 =
ˆBβn (βn + βg)
βg − 3βn
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When βg < 3βn, the root c2 is negative, and rˆ1−αn < 0 holds for any αn ≥ 0. If βg > 3βn, c2
becomes positive, and c2 > ˆBβn. Then, the inequality rˆ1 −αn < 0 is satisﬁed for any αn ∈
[0, c2). Imposing αn ∈
[
0, βnˆB
)
, we get rˆ1 < αn for any αn ∈
[
0, βnˆB
)
. Thus, ˜A ≤ −1,
type-feasibility and J
(
−1, ˆB
)
< J
(
1, ˆB
)
imply J
(
1, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn}.
2. ˜A ∈ (−1, 1), i.e. ˜A is feasible.
This is the case if and only if
αg > αn − (βn − βg) ˆB (1.5.11)
Condition (1.5.11) has a non-empty intersection with (1.5.3) and αg > 3αn if and only if⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
αg > max
{
αn + ˆB max {βn − βg, βg − βn} , 3αn, αn βgβn
}
if ˆB ≥ 0⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
αg ∈
(
max
{
αn + (βn − βg) ˆB, 3αn
}
, αn
βg
βn
)
αn > −βnˆB
βg > 3βn
if ˆB < 0
(1.5.12)
In the beginning, consider the case of ˆB ≥ 0. The designer prefers a bundle with A =
˜A ∈ (−1, 1) to the
(
1, ˆB
)
allocation if and only if
J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
⇔
(
βnˆB − αn
)
α2g + ˆBl1αg + αnl2 > 0 (1.5.13)
where
l1 = βnˆB (βg − βn)− αn (βn + 3βg)
l2 = αn
(
αn + βgˆB
)
+ 2ˆB
(
αnβn − β2g
)
+ ˆ2Bβn (βn + βg)
Lemma 8. For αn ∈
(
0, βnˆB
)
and ˆB ≥ 0 there exists α∗g such that J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
>
J
(
1, ˆB
)
for any αg > α∗g.
Proof. The equation corresponding to condition (1.5.13) always has two real roots:
s1 = αn + (βn − βg) ˆB, s2 =
αn
(
αn + 2βgˆB + βnˆB
)
βnˆB − αn
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where s1 coincides with the lower bound of set (1.5.2). First, take αn ∈
(
0, βnˆB
)
when
both s1 and s2 are positive. If βg ≥ βn, it is always the case that s2 > s1, and inequality
(1.5.13) holds if and only if
αg ∈ [0, s1) ∪ (s2, ∞)
Combining this with condition (1.5.12) for ˆB ≥ 0, deﬁne
α∗g = max
{
αn + ˆB (βg − βn) , 3αn, αn βgβn , s2
}
. Given αn ∈
(
0, βnˆB
)
and inequality
(1.5.13), it must be J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
for any αg > α∗g.
Next, consider βg < βn. If αn ∈
(
0, βn−βg
2
ˆB
]
, it must be s2 < s1, and condition (1.5.13)
implies J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
. When αn ∈
(
βn−βg
2
ˆB, βnˆB
)
, the outcome is exactly
the same as in case of βg ≥ βn. Thus, choosing
α∗g = max
{
αn + ˆB (βg − βn) , 3αn, αn βgβn , s2, s1
}
for αn ∈
(
0, βnˆB
)
, we get the
statement of the lemma.
Finally, take αn > βnˆB, which results in s2 < 0. Then, condition (1.5.13) holds if and only
if αg ∈ [0, s1), and this contradicts (1.5.12). Hence, the
(
˜A, ˆB
)
bundle is never preferred
to the
(
1, ˆB
)
allocation when αn > βnˆB and ˆB ≥ 0.
Lemma 9. For any preference structure such that J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
and ˆB ≥ 0
the designer never leaves good B out.
Proof. The designer prefers the
(
˜A, ˆB
)
bundle to the (1, 0){αg>αn} allocation if and only
if
J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn} ⇔
(
2βnˆB − αn
)
α2g − βgαnˆBαg + α3n > 0 (1.5.14)
where μ1 = 2βnˆB − αn > 0 for αn ∈
(
0, βnˆB
)
and ˆB ≥ 0. Two cases emerge:
• βg ≥ βn ⇒ inequality (1.5.14) has two real roots, r¯1 and r¯2, where r¯1 < r¯2 and r¯1 > 0
for αn ∈
(
0, βnˆB
)
. Then, the designer prefers
(
˜A, ˆB
)
to (1, 0){αg>αn} if and only
if αg ∈ [0, r¯1) ∪ (r¯2, ∞). Now, consider how r¯2 relates to s2 deﬁned in Lemma 8.
Solving (r¯2 − s2 = 0) with respect to αn delivers two roots:
r¯2 − s2 = 0 ⇔ α1, 2n = ˆB
(
βn ±
√
2βn (βg + βn)
)
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where α1n > 0 > α2n for βg ≥ βn and α1n > βnˆB. The inequality r¯2 < s2 holds for any
αn ∈ [0, α1n); given α1n > βnˆB, it must be r¯2 < s2 under αn ∈
(
0, βnˆB
)
. Hence,
αg > s2 implies αg > r¯2, i.e. for any preference structure such that βg ≥ βn and
J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
hold the designer prefers to use both goods.
• βg < βn ⇒ roots of condition (1.5.14) are real if and only if
αn ∈
(
0, ˆB
(
βn −
√
β2n − β2g
))
∪
(
ˆB
(
βn +
√
β2n − β2g
)
, ∞
)
(1.5.15)
Otherwise, J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn} holds for any αg. Suppose (1.5.15) is
satisﬁed. Consider how r¯2 and
(
αn + ˆB (βn − βg)
)
, a lower bound of αg from
condition (1.5.12), locate relative to each other. The equation{
r¯2 = αn + ˆB (βn − βg)
}
has two roots: αn =
2βnˆB(βn−βg)
βg−3βn < 0 and
αn = 2βnˆB > βnˆB – and r¯2 < αn + ˆB (βn − βg) for any αn ∈
[
0, 2βnˆB
)
. Hence,
J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
implies J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn} for
αn ∈
(
0, βnˆB
)
, βg < βn, and ˆB ≥ 0.
Under conditions speciﬁed in (1.5.12) and Lemma 9 , A = ˜A is an optimal prize spread.
Then, one must check if the designer uses good A’s endowment completely.
Lemma 10. For ˆB ≥ 0, ˜A ∈ (−1, 1) and J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
the designer
assigns AW , AL > 0 in a reward bundle and does not waste good A’s endowment.
Proof. To prove the statement, recall properties of the designer’s objective function
established in Lemma 4. When J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
, it must be
∂J+
∂A
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> 0. First-order conditions of the designer’s problem look as follows:
∂L
∂AW
(·) = ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
+ ηW − λ
∂L
∂AL
(·) = − ∂J
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
+ ηL − λ
Take the case of βg ≥ βn where ˜A ∈ (−1, 0). Suppose λ = ηL = 0, ηW > 0 must hold in
the optimum, i.e. the designer wastes a share of good A’s endowment. Then, it has to be:
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∂L+
∂AW
(
˜A, ˆB
)
= ∂J
+
∂A
(
˜A, ˆB
)
+ ηW = 0 ⇔ ηW = − ∂J+∂A
(
˜A, ˆB
)
∂L+
∂AL
(
˜A, ˆB
)
= − ∂J+
∂A
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> 0
∂L–
∂AW
(
A, ˆB
)
= ∂J
–
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
+ ηW > 0 ∀A ∈
[
max [gA, −1] , ˜A
)
∂L–
∂AL
(
A, ˆB
)
= − ∂J–
∂A
(
A, ˆB
)
< 0 ∀A ∈
[
max [gA, −1] , ˜A
)
∂L–
∂AW
(
A, ˆB
)
> 0 implies non-optimality of AW = 0, and the initial guess ηW > 0 was
incorrect. Further, assume λ > 0, ηL,W = 0, and ﬁrst-order conditions become:
∂L+
∂AL
(
˜A, ˆB
)
= − ∂J+
∂A
(
˜A, ˆB
)
− λ = 0 ⇔ λ = − ∂J+
∂A
(
˜A, ˆB
)
∂L+
∂AW
(
˜A, ˆB
)
= ∂J
+
∂A
(
˜A, ˆB
)
− λ < 0
∂L–
∂AW
(
A, ˆB
)
= ∂J
–
∂A
(
˜A, ˆB
)
− λ > 0 ∀A ∈
[
max [gA, −1] , ˜A
)
∂L+
∂AL
(
A, ˆB
)
= − ∂J–
∂A
(
˜A, ˆB
)
− λ < 0 ∀A ∈
[
max [gA, −1] , ˜A
)
These conditions do not result in a contradiction. For A ∈
[
max [gA, −1] , ˜A
)
the
designer beneﬁts when assigns the highest (the lowest) feasible AW > 0 (AL > 0). Under
A ∈
[
˜A, 1
]
it is optimal to choose the smallest prize spread such that both reward
components are positive and the endowment is not wasted. Non-optimality of ηL > 0 for the
case of βg < βn and ˜A ∈ (0, 1) can be shown in the same way.
Thus, with ˆB ≥ 0, the designer leaves a positive prize to a loser if and only if⎧⎨⎩αg > α∗gαn ∈ (0, βnˆB)
When αn > ˆBβn, the designer always prefers the
(
1, ˆB
)
allocations to the
(
˜A, ˆB
)
schedule (Lemma 8 ). Then, one must compare J
(
1, ˆB
)
and J (1, 0) directly:
J
(
1, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0) ⇔ αg > rˆ1 > 0 (1.5.16)
Condition (1.5.16) was derived and analyzed above.
Lemma 11. For βg > 3βn and ˆB ≥ 0 there exists α∗n > ˆBβn > 0 such that rˆ1 >
αn+ˆB (βg − βn) for any αn > αˆn and rˆ1 < αn+ˆB (βg − βn), otherwise. For βg ∈ (0, 3βn)
and ˆB ≥ 0 the inequality rˆ1 < αn − ˆB min (βn − βg, βg − βn) holds for any αn ≥ 0.
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Proof. Deﬁne f1 (αn) = rˆ1 −
(
αn + ˆB (βg − βn)
)
and f2 (αn) = rˆ1 −
(
αn + ˆB (βn − βg)
)
.
First, take βg ≥ βn and solve f1 (αn) = 0 with respect to αn:
f1 (αn) = 0 ⇔ αn = ki, i = {1, 2}
where k1, 2 =
ˆB
(
∓
√
βn(βn+βg)(8β2g−15βnβg+9βn)−βn(3βn−5βg)
)
2(βg−3βn) , k1 < k2. Diﬀerent outcomes
emerge:
• βg ∈ [βn, 3βn) ⇒ k2 < 0 and f1 (αn) < 0 for any αn ≥ 0
• βg > 3βn ⇒ k1 < 0, k2 > ˆBβn > 0 and f1 (αn) ≤ 0 for αn ∈ [0, k2], f1 (αn) > 0 for
αn > k2
Taking α∗n = k2 for βg > 3βn, we get the ﬁrst statement of the lemma.
Second, consider the case of βg < βn and solve f2 (αn) = 0 with respect to αn:
f2 (αn) = 0 ⇔ αn = 2ˆBβn (βn − βg)
βg − 3βn < 0 or αn = −ˆBβn
Since both roots are negative, f2 (αn) does not change its sign in αn ≥ 0, and f2 (αn) < 0
holds for any αn ≥ 0.
With Lemma 11 , we can specify when the designer prefers to leave good B out under
ˆB ≥ 0:
J (1, 0) > J
(
1, ˆB
)
> J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
⇔
⎧⎨⎩αg ∈
(
αn − ˆB (βn − βg) , rˆ1
)
αn > α
∗
n, βg > 3βn
J
(
1, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0) > J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
⇐
⎧⎨⎩αg > rˆ1αn > α∗n, βg > 3βn
Next, assume ˆB < 0. Any allocation with A < 0 leads to negative winning beneﬁts and
destroys incentives to compete. The conditions, under which type-feasibility, ˜A ∈ [0, 1],
and
∂J+(˜A, ˆB)
∂A < 0 hold simultaneously, are⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
αg ∈
(
max
{
αn + (βn − βg) ˆB, 3αn
}
, αn
βg
βn
)
αn > −βnˆB
βg > 3βn
Lemma 12. For βg > 7βn and ˆB < 0 there exist valuation proﬁles such that the designer
prefers to leave a positive prize for a loser.
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Proof. First, we compare J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
and J
(
1, ˆB
)
. The case of
J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
is characterized by condition (1.5.13) and roots s1 and s2
(Lemma 8) where
s1 < s2 ⇔ αn ∈
[
0, ˆB (βn − βg)
2
)
For βg > 3βn, this set has a non-empty intersection with αn > −βnˆB. Also,
αn ∈
[
0, ˆB (βn−βg)2
)
implies
{
αn + (βn − βg) ˆB > 3αn
}
. Combining all conditions
together, J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J
(
1, ˆB
)
holds if and only if⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
αg ∈
(
αn + (βn − βg) ˆB, min
{
αn
βg
βn
, s2
})
αn ∈
(
−ˆBβn, ˆB (βn−βg)2
)
βg > 3βn
(1.5.17)
Second, we investigate when J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn} holds:
J
(
˜A, ˆB
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn} for ˆB < 0 ⇔ αg ∈ [0, r¯1)
where r¯1 was deﬁned in Lemma 9. This condition delivers a non-empty intersection with
(1.5.17) if and only if⎧⎨⎩αn ∈
(
−ˆBβn, min
{
2ˆBβn(βn−βg)
βg−3βn ,
ˆB(βn−βg)
2
})
βg > 7βn
Lemma 11 illustrates that the designer indeed assigns AL > 0 in the bundle.
Using the proof of Lemma 12 , one can also show when the designer prefers to leave good
B out and run a one-dimensional contest over item A.
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Theorem 1.1. For any valuation proﬁle r ∈ R the designer uses goods’ endowments completely
and either
• Leaves a positive losing prize at least in one dimension or
• Gives both items to a winner.
Proof. Let r = {αg, αn, βg, βn}. A complete characterization of the designer’s problem looks as
follows:
L
(
AW , AL, BW , BL, {ηi}Li=W , {κi}Li=W , {λi}θi=B
)
= J
(
AW , AL, BW , BL
)
+
+ηWA
W + ηLA
L + κWB
W + κLB
L + λA
(
1− AW − AL)+ λB (1− AW − AL)
The designer’s objective function can be rewritten in terms of prize spreads:
J
(
AW , AL, BW , BL
) ≡ J (A, B)
We call player i, i = {1, 2} type g if and only if ti (1, 1) > t−i (1, 1).
Lemma 1. The designer’s problem has no interior solution.
Proof. To prove the statement, compute the hessian of J (A, B):
H =
⎡⎣ 2B(βnαg−βgαn)2t2g −AB(βnαg−βgαn)2(αgA+βgB)3
−AB(βnαg−βgαn)2
(αgA+βgB)3
2A(βnαg−βgαn)2
t2g
⎤⎦
Since H is not negative deﬁnite, any prize allocation that satisﬁes at least one ﬁrst order condition
corresponds to an interior minimum.
Corollary 1. ∂J
∂A (·) and ∂J∂B (·) increase in A and B, respectively.
Since the designer can change the prize allocation in both dimensions, one does not need to
consider reward schedules (A, 0) and (0, B), where one good is left out, separately. Fixing the
prize scheme in one of the dimensions, deﬁne ˜’s in items A and B such that contestants’ types
equalize:
tg (·) = tn (·) ⇔ ˜A = βn − βg
αg − αnB or ˜B =
αn − αg
βg − βnA
and the types are well-deﬁned if and only if
tj
(
A, ˆB
)
≥ 0 ⇔ jA ≥ −
βj
αj
B orjB ≥ −
αj
βj
A, j = {g, n}
It is easy to prove that ˜A (˜B) cannot be feasible for αg < αn (βg < βn):
˜A ≤ 1 ⇔ βn−βgαg−αnB ≤ 1 ⇔ αg ≤ αn + (βn − βg)B
˜B ≤ 1 ⇔ αn−αgβg−βnA ≤ 1 ⇔ βg ≤ βn + (αn − αg)A
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Both inequalities contradict the deﬁnition of type g provided above. Thus, a necessary condition
for feasibility of A = ˜A (B = ˜B) is αg > αn (βg > βn).
Deﬁnition. ˜k, k = {A, B} is type-feasible if and only if max {gk, nk} < ˜k.
The proof of Proposition 1.2 (Lemma 2) states that ∂J
∂A (·) has a jump point at A = ˜A
for any αg 	= αn. A similar result holds for ∂J∂B (·) and βg 	= βn.
Lemma 2. ∂J
∂B (·) has a jump point at B = ˜B for any βg 	= βn.
Proof. The limits of ∂J
∂B (·) from the left and from the right of B = ˜B are
limB→−˜B
∂J
∂B (·) =
3βg−βn
2
limB→+˜B
∂J
∂B (·) =
3βn−βg
2
These values coincide if and only if βg = βn. Thus, ∂J∂B (·) has a jump point at B = ˜B for any
βg 	= βn.
We treat ∂J
∂A (·) and ∂J∂B (·) as right-continuous function and denote their derivatives to the left
and to the right of ˜’s with the “–” and “+” signs, respectively.
Lemma 3. For any valuation proﬁle such that ˜A (˜B) is not type-feasible
∂J
∂A (max {
g
A, nA} , B) > 0 ( ∂J∂B (A, max {
g
B, nB}) > 0).
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1.2 (Lemma 3) shows that there is no type-feasibility in
dimension A if and only if max {gA, nA} = nA. One can apply similar arguments and prove
that max {gB, nB} = nB in the absence of type-feasibility over good B.
Next, evaluate ∂J
∂A (nA, B) and ∂J∂B (A, nB):
∂J
∂A (nA, B) = αn2 > 0
∂J
∂B (A, nB) =
βn
2
> 0
and the statement of the lemma follows.
Lemma 4. For any valuation proﬁle such that ˜k, k = {g, n} is type-feasible the objective
function J (·) strictly increases in k for k ∈
[
gk, ˜k
)
. J (·) strictly decreases or is non-
monotone in k for k ∈
[
˜k, 1
]
if and only if ∂J
∂k
+
(
˜k
)
< 0; otherwise, J (·) strictly increases
in k for k ∈
[
˜k, 1
]
.
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Proof. The proof of Proposition 1.2 (Lemma 4) characterizes the case of type-feasibility in
dimension A (k = A). The same set of arguments can be used to prove the lemma for k = B
when βg > 3βn is necessary to support non-monotonicity of J (·) in k.
Enough heterogeneity in contestants’ valuations over a particular dimension (αg > 3αn or / and
βg > 3βn) is necessary (but not suﬃcient) to make a positive losing prize optimal. Given Lemma
1 and Lemma 4, the optimal reward schedule is a corner solution of the designer’s problem. Then,
the following alternatives must be compared directly when type-feasibility holds:
(1, 1) vs.
(
1, max
{
min
{
˜B, 1
}
, −1
})
vs.
(
max
{
min
{
˜A, 1
}
, −1
}
, 1
)
vs.(
−1, max
{
min
{
˜B, 1
}
, −1
})
...
A single allocation that cannot feature positive losing prizes is the (1, 1) schedule. To prove the
optimality of A 	= 1 or / and B 	= 1, it is suﬃcient to show when (1, 1) is dominated by at least
one reward schedule with A < 1 or / and B < 1. Take Proposition 2 and ﬁx ˆB = 1. Then,
there must exist valuation proﬁles such that the designer prefers to use both goods and leaves
a positive losing prize in dimension A. With the details from the proof of Proposition 1.2, we
construct an example. Assume βg > βn and ∂J∂B
+
(
˜B
)
> 0 ⇔ βg ∈ (βn, 3βn). Then, Corollary
1, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 imply that ∂J
∂B (·) > 0 holds for any feasible prize allocation, and
B = 1 is optimal. Next, take ˆB = 1 and consider the case when ˜A = βn−βgαg−αn is type-feasible.
The designer prefers the
(
˜A, 1
)
allocation to the (1, 1) schedule if and only if⎧⎨⎩αg > max
{
αn + (βg − βn) , 3αn, αn βgβn , α∗g
}
αn ∈ (0, βn) , βg ∈ (βn, 3βn)
where all conditions and α∗g were deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 1.2. One can construct
examples for other valuation proﬁles similarly. To show that the designer uses goods’ endowments
completely, the proof of Proposition 1.2 (Lemma 10) applies.
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Theorem 1.1. There exists a non-empty subset of R, Rb, such that for any {αg, αn, βg, βn} ∈
Rb the designer prefers one contest with bundled prizes to two separate contests with unbundled
prizes.
Proof. To show the existence of Rb 	= Ø we refer to the proofs of Proposition 1.2 and Theorem
1.1. First, consider the case when the designer prefers to assign a positive losing prize in good A
(A = max
{
˜A, −1
}
) and gives item B to a winner (B = 1, and βg ∈ (βn, 3βn) is assumed):
1. ˜A ≤ −1 ⇔ αg < αn − βn + βg, i.e. ˜A is not feasible.
The optimality of (−1, 1) requires⎧⎨⎩αg ∈
(
max {r1, 3αn} , αn − (βn − βg) ˆB
)
αn ∈ [0, q1) , βg ∈ (βn, 3βn)
(1.5.18)
where all roots and conditions were deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 1.2 (ˆB = 1 is taken).
The (−1, 1) schedule dominates two separate contests over dimensions A and B if and only
if
J (−1, 1) > J (1, 0){αg>αn} + J (0, 1){βg>βn} ⇔
(β2n + 2βgαn)α
2
g − 2βgαn (βg + βn − αn)αg − β2gα2n > 0
The underlying square equation always has two real roots, h1 and h2, h1 < 0 < h2. Then,
J (−1, 1) > J (1, 0){αg>αn} + J (0, 1){βg>βn} holds if and only if αg > h2, and this set has a
non-empty intersection with (1.5.18) if and only if h2 < αn − βn + βg.
Lemma 1. For ˜A ≤ −1 βg > βn there exists αhn ∈ (0, βn) such that h2 < αn − βn + βg for
any αn ∈
(
0, αhn
)
.
Proof. Deﬁne fh (αn) = h2−αn− (βg − βn). Solving fh (αn) = 0 with respect to αn delivers:
fϕ (αn) = 0 ⇔ αn = αin, i = {1, ..., 4}
α1n = βn, α
2
n = − β
2
n
2βg
αjn =
−3β2g−β2n+4βgβn∓(βg−βn)
√
(βg+βn)(9βg+βn)
8βg
, j = {3, 4}
α3n < 0 < α
4
n < βn
where fh (αn) < 0 for αn ∈ (0, α4n) and fh (αn) > 0 for αn ∈ (α4n, βn). Taking αhn = α4n gives
the statement of the lemma.
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Thus, the designer prefers the (−1, 1) allocation to two separate contests if and only if
r ∈ Rb1 =
⎧⎨⎩αg ∈ (max {r1, 3αn, h2} , αn − βn + βg)αn ∈ (0, min{q1, αhn}) , βg ∈ (βn, 3βn)
2. ˜A ∈ (−1, 1) ⇔ αg > αn + βg − βn for βg ∈ (βn, 3βn), i.e. ˜A is feasible.
With two-dimensional rewards, the designer assigns a positive losing prize in dimension A if
and only if ⎧⎨⎩αg > max
{
αn + βg − βn, 3αn, αn βgβn , α∗g
}
αn ∈ (0, βn) , βg ∈ (βn, 3βn)
(1.5.19)
The
(
˜A, 1
)
bundle dominates two separate contests with single-item prizes if and only if:
J
(
˜A, 1
)
> J (1, 0){αg>αn} + J (0, 1){βg>βn} ⇔ γ1α2g + γ2αg + γ3 > 0
γ1 = −β2n + βgβn − βgαn, γ2 = αn
(−2β2g + βgβn + β2n)
γ3 = β
2
gα
3
n
γ1 > 0 ⇔ αn < βn(βg−βn)βg , γ2 < 0 ∀ βg > βn
The corresponding square equation always has two real roots, r1γ and r2γ, r1γ < r2γ. Take the
case of αn ∈
(
0, βn(βg−βn)
βg
)
when γ1 > 0. This implies r1γ > 0, and the bundle is optimal if
and only if αg ∈
(
0, r1γ
) ∪ (r2γ, ∞). Then, a suﬃcient condition to guarantee the optimality
of the
(
˜A, 1
)
allocation over two separate contests is
r ∈ Rb2 =
⎧⎨⎩αg > max
{
αn + βg − βn, 3αn, αn βgβn , α∗g, r2γ
}
αn ∈
(
0, βn(βg−βn)
βg
)
, βg ∈ (βn, 3βn)
Next, we show when the (1, 1) bundle dominates two simultaneous competitions over
dimensions A and B. In the beginning, assume αg > αn and βg > βn. One contest with bundled
prizes is preferred to two separate competitions if and only if
J (1, 1) > J (1, 0){αg>αn} + J (0, 1){βg>βn} ⇔
⇔ − (βgαn−βnαg)2
2βgαg(αg+βg)
> 0
This condition never holds for βg, αg > 0. Thus, if type g values both goods more than his
opponent, the “Winner-Takes-All” bundle never dominates two simultaneous competitions.
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Now, we analyze the case of αg > αn and βg < βn. To support the optimality of A = 1, we
impose αg ∈ (αn, 3αn) (see the proof of Theorem 1.1). The “Winner-Takes-All” bundle dominates
other feasible two-dimensional allocations if and only if⎧⎨⎩αg ∈ (αn + βn − βg, 3αn) , αn >
βn−βg
2
βg ∈ [0, βn)
(1.5.20)
The designer prefers the (1, 1) allocation to two simultaneous contests with single-item rewards
if and only if
J (1, 1) > J (1, 0){αg>αn} + J (0, 1){βg<βn} ⇔ η1α2g + η2αg + η3 > 0
η1 = −β2g − βgβn + β2n, η2 = (βn − βg) (βg + βn)2 + 2αnβ2n > 0
η3 = −α2nβnβg < 0
η1 > 0 ⇔ βg ∈
[
0, β¯g
)
, β¯g =
√
5−1
2
βn < βn
For βg < βn, the underlying square equation always has two real roots, r1η and r2η. Take the case
of βg ∈
[
βn
3
, β¯g
)
when η1 > 0. Then, r1η < 0 < r2η holds, and the (1, 1) bundle dominates two
single-item contests if and only if αg > r2η. The condition r2η < αn + βn − βg holds for any αn > 0
and βg < βn. Then, αg ∈ (αn + βn − βg, 3αn) implies αg > r2η, and the designer prefers the
“Winner-Takes-All” bundle to other alternative reward schedules if and only if
r ∈ Rb3 =
⎧⎨⎩αg ∈ (αn + βn − βg, 3αn) , αn >
βn−βg
2
βg ∈ [0, βn)
Taking a union of Rb1, Rb2, and Rb3, we deﬁne a non-empty subset of Rb:(
Rb1 ∪Rb2 ∪Rb3
) ⊆ Rb
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Proposition 1.4. For min {tg1, tg2} > 0 there exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium in
monotonically increasing strategies such that:
• At least one type places an atom at zero: ∃ i = {1, 2} , j = {g, n} : Gi
(
tji , 0
)
> 0;
• There is no e > 0 played with a positive probability;
• Supports of Gi (tgi , e), i = {1, 2} have the same supremum: sup (sg1) = sup (sg2);
• Supports of Gi (tni , e), i = {1, 2} have the same inﬁmum, and it is equal to zero: inf (sn1 ) =
inf (sn2 ) = 0.
Proof. To show the existence, I construct an equilibrium. Given properties derived in Siegel (2014),
the equilibrium of this game must look like a partition where various types randomize on speciﬁc
intervals. Another result states that this partition can be obtained using a “top-down” approach.
Let ULi, l correspond to the losing beneﬁt of contestant i with type l, l = {g, n}. Assume tgi > tgj ,
i, j = {1, 2}. First, I show that tgj ≤ 0 never supports the non-trivial equilibrium.
Lemma 1. For tgj ≤ 0 there does not exist a non-trivial equilibrium.
Proof. Assume tgj ≤ 0 chooses egj > 0 in equilibrium. If he wins, the payoﬀ becomes:
πWj, g
(
egj
)
= tgj + U
L
j, g − egj
Bidding egj = 0, the contestant gets πWj, g (0) = t
g
j + U
L
j, g (πLj, g (0) = ULj, g) if wins (loses). Then
πLj, g (0) ≥ πWj, g (0) > πWj, g
(
egj
)
for any egj > 0, t
g
j ≤ 0, and egj > 0 cannot be in equilibrium. As a
result, tgj ≤ 0 must place p0
(
tgj
)
= 1 at e = 0.
Next, consider tgj > 0 and characterize the top-interval of the partition where t
g
i and t
g
j play
against each other. Take two eﬀort choices, 0 < egi < e˜
g
i , corresponding to best responses of t
g
i and
generating the same equilibrium payoﬀ. Then it must be:
P
(
tnj
) (
tgi + U
L
i, g
)
+ P
(
tgj
) (
tgiGj
(
tgj , e˜
g
i
)
+ ULi, g
)− e˜gi =
= P
(
tnj
) (
tgi + U
L
i, g
)
+ P
(
tgj
) (
tgiGj
(
tgj , e
g
i
)
+ ULi, g
)− egi
The ﬁrst element of the sum reﬂects the case when tgi plays against tnj and wins with certainty
because tnj never bids in the top interval. Matched against t
g
j , t
g
i succeeds with probability Gj
(
tgj , e
)
(the second term of the sum). Simpliﬁcation delivers
Gj
(
tgj , e˜
g
i
)−Gj (tgj , egi )
e˜gi − egi
=
1
P
(
tgj
)
tgi
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where the right-hand side is constant. Taking e˜gi − egi → 0 brings gi (tgi , e) = 1P(tgi )tgj . Similarly, one
can obtain gj
(
tgj , e
)
= 1
P(tgj)t
g
i
.
Type tgi (t
g
j ) exhausts his bidding probability in the top-interval iﬀ its length (Ltop) is equal to
P (tgi ) t
g
j (P
(
tgj
)
tgi ). Since t
g
j < t
g
i by assumption, it must be Ltop = P (t
g
i ) t
g
j ; otherwise, there is a
contradiction:
Ltop = P
(
tgj
)
tgi ⇒ Gi
(
tgi , P
(
tgj
)
tgi
)
=
tgi
tgj
> 1
Thus, tgi exhausts his bidding probability, and t
g
j has
{
1− t
g
j
tgi
}
to expend in the game against tni .
Moving downward, take the interval where tgj and tni play. Several possibilities emerge:
1. tni > 0.
Following similar steps, one can show:
gi (t
n
i , e) =
1
P (tni ) t
g
j
, gj
(
tgj , e
)
=
1
P
(
tgj
)
tni
Types’ bidding probabilities exhaust in the intervals of length Lim = P (tni ) t
g
j for tni and
Ljm = P
(
tgj
) (tgi−tgj)tni
tgi
for tgj (t
g
j cannot expend more than
{
1− t
g
j
tgi
}
). Then Lim > Ljm holds
iﬀ:88
Lim > L
j
m ⇔ P
(
tgj
)
<
tgi t
g
j
tni
(
tgi − tgj
)
+ tgi t
g
j
≡ T˜ , T˜ ∈ [0, 1)
(a) P
(
tgj
) ∈ [0, T˜)⇒ Lm = Ljm. This implies that type tgj exhausts his bidding probability
in Lm and tni expends
{
P (tgj )(t
g
i−tgj)tni
tgi t
g
jP (t
n
i )
}
. As a result, tni can compete against tnj in the
lowest segment of the equilibrium partition that has length Lb.
In the beginning, take the case of tnj > 0. Then the strategies of n types become:
Gi (t
n
i , e) =
e
P (tni ) t
n
j
, Gj
(
tnj , e
)
=
e
P
(
tnj
)
tni
tnj and tni exhaust their bidding probabilities in intervals of length L
j
b = P
(
tnj
)
tni and
Lib = t
n
j
(
P(tni )t
g
i t
g
j−P (tgj )(tgi−tgj)tni
tgi t
g
j
)
, respectively:
Lib < L
j
b ⇔ P
(
tgj
)
>
tgi t
g
j
(
tnj − tni
)
tnj t
n
i
(
tgi − tgj
)
+ tgi t
g
j
(
tnj − tni
) ≡ Tˆ , Tˆ ∈ (0, 1) , Tˆ < T˜
88I use P (tni ) = P
(
tnj
)
= 1− P (tgj) to simplify the expression.
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Consider these options separately:
• Lib < L
j
b ⇒ Lb = Lib, and tni exhausts his bidding probability on the interval.
Lemma 2. inf (sn1 ) = inf (sn2 ) = 0 in equilibrium.
Proof. The argument is similar to one provided in the proof of Proposition 1.1,
Lemma 2 .
As tnj still has some bidding probability left, he places p01
(
tnj
)
at e = 0, p01
(
tnj
)
=
1− tnj
P (tnj )t
n
i
tnj
(
P(tni )t
g
i t
g
j−P (tgj )(tgi−tgj)tni
tgi t
g
j
)
.
• Lib > L
j
b ⇒ Lb = Ljb, and tnj exhausts his bidding probability in the interval. Lemma
2 holds, and tni must place p01 (tni ) =
(
1− P(t
g
j)(t
g
i−tgj)tni tnj +P(tnj )tni tgi tgj
tgi t
g
j t
n
j P(tni )
)
at e = 0.
To sum up, for P
(
tgj
) ∈ [0, T˜), tnj > 0 the equilibrium partition Ti, i = {1, 2, 3} and
contestants’ strategies can be characterized as follows:
• T1 = Lb:
– P
(
tgj
) ∈ (max{0, Tˆ} , T˜): with probability {1− P (tgj )(tgi−tgj)tni
tgi t
g
jP (t
n
i )
}
tni
randomizes uniformly on [0, T1]; tnj uses a strategy including uniform
randomization on (0, T1] and the atom p01
(
tnj
) ∈ (0, 1) placed at e = 0;
– P
(
tgj
) ∈ [0, max{0, Tˆ}]: tnj randomizes uniformly on [0, T1] with probability
1; tni uses a strategy including uniform randomization on (0, T1] and the atom
p01 (t
n
i ) ∈ (0, 1) placed at e = 0;
• T2 = T1 + Lm: tni and t
g
j randomize uniformly on (T1, T2] with probabilities{
P (tgj )(t
g
i−tgj)tni
tgi t
g
jP (t
n
i )
}
and
{
1− t
g
j
tgi
}
, respectively;
• T3 = T2 + Ltop: tgi and t
g
j randomize uniformly on (T2, T3] with probabilities 1 and{
tgj
tgi
}
, respectively.
Further suppose tnj ≤ 0. In this case type tnj places the atom p02
(
tnj
)
= 1 at e = 0 (the
argument is similar to Lemma 1 ). Lemma 3 characterizes the strategy of tni :
Lemma 3. For P
(
tgj
) ∈ [0, T˜), tnj ≤ 0 type n of contestant i (tni ) places p02 (tni ) =
1− P (t
g
j )(t
g
i−tgj)tni
tgi t
g
jP (t
n
i )
∈ (0, 1) at e = 0.
Proof. When tnj ≤ 0, type tnj chooses e = 0 with probability 1 (the argument is similar
to Lemma 1 ). Suppose there exists y > 0 such that tgj never bids in [0, y], but tni
randomizes uniformly on [0, y] when plays against tnj in equilibrium. For any eni ∈ (0, y]
type tni wins with certainty and gets πWi, n (eni ) = tni + ULW − eni . Take eni , e˜ni ∈ (0, y],
CHAPTER 1. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PRIZES 104
eni > e˜
n
i . Then πWi, n (e˜ni ) > πWi, n (eni ), and e˜ni dominates eni . that cannot be in equilibrium.
As a result, type tni must place the atom at e ≥ 0 when plays against tnj ≤ 0.
Further assume tni places the atom at e = q > 0 in equilibrium and wins against tnj
with certainty. Take ε > 0 small enough, ε ∈ (0, q). Then πWi, n (q − ε) > πWi, n (q)
holds for any ε > 0, and there exists a proﬁtable deviation. As a result, for tnj ≤ 0
type tni never places the atom at e > 0 in equilibrium. Since there is no other type of
contestant j to compete with, tni must expend his bidding probability left by allocating
p02 (t
n
i ) = 1−
P (tgj )(t
g
i−tgj)tni
tgi t
g
jP (t
n
i )
∈ (0, 1) to e = 0.
Summing up, for P
(
tgj
) ∈ [0, T˜), tnj ≤ 0 the equilibrium partition Mi, i = {1, 2} and
contestants’ strategies look as follows:
• M1 = Lm: tnj and tni place p02
(
tnj
)
= 1 and p02 (tni ) ∈ (0, 1) at e = 0, respectively; tni
and tgj randomize uniformly on (0, M1] with corresponding probabilities
{1− p02 (tni )} and
{
1− t
g
j
tgi
}
;
• M2 = M1 + Ltop: tgi and t
g
j randomize uniformly on (M1, M2] with probabilities 1
and
{
tgj
tgi
}
, respectively.
(b) P
(
tgj
) ≥ T˜ ⇒ Lm = Lim. In this case type tgj still has a positive bidding probability
left, but tni exhausts his strategy in the lowest interval of the equilibrium partition.
Since there is no other type of contestant i to compete with, tgj must place p01
(
tgj
)
=
1− t
g
j(t
g
i P (t
n
i )+t
n
i P (t
g
j ))
P (tgj )t
n
i t
g
i
∈ (0, 1) at e = 0. Then the equilibrium partition is characterized
by thresholds D1 = P (tni ) t
g
j and D2 = P (t
g
i ) t
g
j +D1 = t
g
j .
Lemma 4. For P
(
tgj
) ≥ T˜ type n of contestant j places p03 (tnj ) = 1 at e = 0.
Proof. Suppose tnj randomizes in (0, h) ⊆ (0, D1) in equilibrium. Then tnj always loses
against tgi (t
g
i bids on [D1, D2]), but can win with a positive probability if he faces tni .
Take enj , e˜nj ∈ (0, h); in equilibrium tnj must be indiﬀerent between all the points of this
interval:
P (tgi )U
L
j, n + P (t
n
i )
(
tnjGi
(
tni , e
n
j
)
+ ULj, n
)− enj =
= P (tgi )U
L
j, n + P (t
n
i )
(
tnjGi
(
tni , e˜
n
j
)
+ ULj, n
)− e˜nj
When substitute for Gi (tni , e), the simpliﬁed expression becomes:(
enj − e˜nj
) [tnj
tgj
− 1
]
= 0
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Since
[
tnj
tgj
− 1
]
< 0, this equality holds iﬀ enj = e˜nj , a contradiction. Hence, tnj must place
the atom of size 1 at e ≥ 0.
Now assume tnj always plays enj = q > 0, q ∈ (0, D1) in equilibrium, and this results in
expected payoﬀ πj, n (q):
πj, n (q) = P (t
n
i )U
L
j, n + P (t
n
i )
(
tnjGi (t
n
i , q) + U
L
j, n
)− q
Given that q is a best reply, it must be πj, n (q) ≥ πj, n (0) = ULj, n where πj, n (0) is a
payoﬀ when tnj chooses enj = 0:
πj, n (q) ≥ πj, n (0) ⇔ q
[
tnj
tgj
− 1
]
≥ 0
As
[
tnj
tgj
− 1
]
< 0 always holds, the condition is never satisﬁed for q > 0: enj = 0 dominates
enj = q for any q > 0. Hence, tnj must place p03
(
tnj
)
= 1 at e = 0 in equilibrium.
Overall, for P
(
tgj
) ≥ T˜ the equilibrium partition and contestants’ strategies look
become:
• (D1, D2]: tgi and t
g
j randomize uniformly on the interval with probabilities 1 and{
tgj
tgi
}
, respectively;
• (0, D1]: tni and t
g
j randomize uniformly on the interval with probabilities 1 and{
P(tni )t
g
j
P(tgj)tni
}
, respectively;
• tgj and tnj place p01
(
tgj
) ∈ (0, 1) and p03 (tnj ) = 1 at e = 0, respectively.
2. tni ≤ 0.
First, tni ≤ 0 will always place p03 (tni ) = 1 at e = 0 in equilibrium (the argument is similar
to Lemma 1 ). Then tgj competing against tni ≤ 0 must choose p02
(
tgj
)
= 1 − t
g
j
tgi
∈ (0, 1)
to exhaust his bidding probability (the argument is similar to Lemma 3). Finally, tnj plays
e = 0 with probability 1 (Lemma 4). As a result, the equilibrium partition consists of one
interval [0, Ltop]:
• tgi and t
g
j randomize uniformly on (0, Ltop] with probabilities 1 and
{
tgj
tgi
}
, respectively;
• tgj places p02
(
tgj
) ∈ (0, 1) at e = 0; tni and tnj always choose e = 0.
To show the uniqueness, I refer to Siegel (2014). He proved that the “top-down” algorithm
delivers the unique equilibrium of the speciﬁed game if P (tj| ti) ti increases in ti for any tj,
i, j = {1, 2}:
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P
(
tgj | tgi
)
tgi > P
(
tgj | tni
)
tni , P
(
tnj | tgi
)
tgi > P
(
tnj | tni
)
tni , i 	= j
Since in this case realizations of α1 and α2 are independent, it must be P (tj| ti) = P (tj). Then
the condition reduces to tgi > tni that holds by deﬁnition. Thus, the partitions characterized
above correspond to a unique equilibrium of the game for given preferences, types’ probability
distribution, and prize schedules.
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Proposition 1.5. For β1 > β2 and α1 > α¯2 + β1 − β2 there exists a non-empty subset of Rsk,
RL, sk , such that for any probability–valuation proﬁle in R
L, s
k the designer uses both goods completely
and assigns a positive losing prize in dimension A.
Proof. The problem of the designer was introduced in Proposition 1.2. Deﬁne
J
(
AW , AL, BW , BL
) ≡ J (A, B). Depending on the probability-valuation proﬁle and the
prize scheme, the equilibrium partition in the game between contestants looks diﬀerently (see
Proposition 1.4). Moreover, expected aggregate eﬀort exhibits high-order non-linearity in prize
spreads (A and B), and RLk cannot be characterized completely. To get analytical results, I
look only at asymmetric preference proﬁles (α¯1 > α¯2, α¯1 < β2), assume α1 > α2 and characterize
R¯Lk , a non-empty subset of RLk .
Suppose B = 1 is optimal (verify this later). Also assume no switch in contestants’ identities
for any feasible A:
tj1 (A, 1) > tj2 (A, 1) ∀A ∈ [−1, 1] , j = {g, n} ⇔
⇔ max
{
˜gA (1) , ˜nA (1)
}
< −1 ⇔
⎧⎨⎩α¯1 < α¯2 + β1 − β2α1 < α2 + β1 − β2
˜nA (1) = α¯2−α¯1β1−β2 , ˜
g
A (1) =
α1−α2
β1−β2
To make the analytical solution tractable, I ﬁx the following parametrization:
α¯1 = 0.5, α¯2 = 0.1, β1 = 2, β2 = 1
and leave α1, α2 and k free.
Since αi has two possible realizations, P (tgi ) must depend on A:
A ∈ [0, 1] ⇒ tgi = α¯iA + βi, P (tgi ) = k
A ∈ [−1, 0) ⇒ tgi = αiA + βi, P (tgi ) = 1− k
and J (·) changes when passes A = 0.
There are two equilibrium conﬁgurations that support tj1 (A, 1) > tj2 (A, 1), j = {g, n} (all
notations are speciﬁed in the proof of Proposition 1.4):
1. E1 with P (tg2) ∈
[
0, T˜ (A, B)
)
:
• tn1 randomizes uniformly on [0, T1] and (T1, T2] with probabilities p (tn1 ) and 1− p (tn1 ),
respectively, p (tn1 ) =
P (tg2)(t
g
1−tg2)tn1
tg1t
g
2P (t
n
1 )
;
• tn2 uses a strategy including uniform randomization on (0, T1] and the atom p01 (tn2 ) ∈
(0, 1) at e = 0;
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• tg1 randomizes uniformly on (T2, T3] with probability 1;
• tg2 randomizes uniformly on (T1, T2] and (T2, T3] with probabilities p (t
g
2) and 1− p (tg2),
respectively, p (tg2) =
tg2
tg1
.
2. E2 with P (tg2) ∈
[
T˜ (A, B) , 1
]
:
• tn1 randomizes uniformly on [0, D1] with probability 1;
• tn2 places the atom p03
(
tnj
)
= 1 at e = 0;
• tg1 randomizes uniformly on (D1, D2] with probability 1;
• tg2 randomizes uniformly on [0, D1] and (D1, D2] with probabilities p1 (t
g
2) and p2 (t
g
2)
respectively, and places the atom {1− p1 (tg2)− p2 (tg2)} at e = 0, p1 (tg2) =
P(tn1 )t
g
2
P(tg2)tn1
,
p2 (t
g
2) =
tg2
tg1
.
First, take A ∈ [0, 1], i.e. P (tgi ) = k. Also suppose k ∈
[
0, T˜ (A, 1)
)
for any A ∈ [0, 1],
and the equilibrium conﬁguration E1 realizes. The “Winner–Takes–All” schedule is not optimal if
∂J
∂A (1, 1) < 0:
∂J
∂A (1, 1) < 0 ⇔ γ1k
2 + γ2k + γ3 < 0
where γi, i = {1, 2, 3} are functions of α1 and α2 that can take both negative and positive values.
Lemma 1. There exist positive α˜2 (α1) (the function of α1) and k˜ such that
∂J
∂A (1, 1) < 0
holds for any α2 ∈ [0, α˜2 (α1)) and k ∈
[
0, k˜
)
.
Proof. Consider γi, i = {1, 2, 3} as the functions of α2. Then γ1 looks as follows:
γ1 = δ
γ
1α
2
2 + δ
γ
2α2 + δ
γ
3
δγ1 =
∑3
j=0 c1jα
j
1, δ
γ
l =
∑4
j=0 cljα
j
1, l = {2, 3}
c1j, c3j > 0, c2j < 0 ∀ j
where γ1 = 0 always has two positive real roots, u1γ1 and u
2
γ1
, u1γ1 < u
2
γ1
such that u2γ1 > α1 and
u1γ1 > α1 for any α1 ∈ [0, α¯1) and α1 ∈ (0.12, α¯1), respectively. Hence, under α1 ∈ (0.12, α¯1) the
condition α1 > α2 implies γ1 > 0.
Analyzing γ2 and γ3 delivers:
γ2 = μ
γ
1α
2
2 + μ
γ
2α2 + μ
γ
3 γ3 = ϕ
γ
1α
2
2 + ϕ
γ
2α2 + ϕ
γ
3
μγl =
∑2
j=0 dljα
j
1, l = {1, 2, 3} ϕγ1 =
∑1
j=0 s1jα
j
1, ϕ
γ
2 =
∑2
j=0 s2jα
j
1, ϕ
γ
3 = s3α
j
1
d1j, d2j < 0, d3j > 0 ∀ j s1j, s2j > 0, s3 < 0 ∀ j
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where γ2 > 0 (γ3 > 0) holds under α2 ∈ [0, uγ2) (α2 ∈ [uγ3 , min {α1, α¯2})) and uγ2 (uγ3)
corresponds to the positive real root of γ2 = 0 (γ3 = 0). Finally, uγ2 > α1 is satisﬁed with
α1 ∈ [0, 0.003) and uγ3 < α1 for any feasible α1.
Further I investigate how uγ2 and uγ3 relate to each other. Both functions monotonically
increase in α1, but uγ2 changes faster.89 As a result, it must be uγ2 > uγ3 , and for α1 ∈ (0.12, α¯1)
one can sign γi, i = {1, 2, 3} as follows:
α2 ∈ [0, uγ3) ⇒ γ1, 2 > 0, γ3 < 0
α2 ∈ [uγ3 , uγ2) ⇒ γl > 0, l = {1, 2, 3}
α2 ∈ [uγ2 , min {α1, α¯2}) ⇒ γ1, 3 > 0, γ2 < 0
Deﬁne α˜2 (α1) = uγ3 and take α2 ∈ [0, α˜2 (α1)). Then equation γ1k2 + γ2k + γ3 = 0 has one
positive real root kˆ such that γ1k2 + γ2k + γ3 < 0 for k ∈
[
0, kˆ
)
. Since the equilibrium structure
E1 requires k ∈
[
0, T˜ (1, 1)
)
, imposing k˜ = min
{
kˆ, T˜ (1, 1)
}
gives the lemma.
Using the parameter sets speciﬁed in Lemma 1 , I ﬁx α1 = 0.15 and α2 = 0.01 but leave k
free. Since T˜ (1, 1) exceeds kˆ under imposed restrictions, it must be k˜ = kˆ = 0.12.
Lemma 2. T˜ (A, 1) decreases in A for any A ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. ∂T˜ (A, 1)
∂A > 0 holds iﬀ A ∈ (−∞, −6.6) ∪ (13.8) that has an empty intersection with
A ∈ [0, 1].90 Then ∂T˜ (A, 1)∂A < 0 for any A ∈ [0, 1] follows.
Lemma 2 implies that T˜ (A, 1) has its maximum at A = 0, and T˜ (0, 1) = 12 . As a
result, k ∈
[
0, T˜ (1, 1)
)
is the strictest target, and no additional constraint on k is needed when
A ∈ [0, 1].
Further, I check how ∂J
∂A (A, 1) behaves with respect to A ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 3. ∂J
∂A (A, 1) increases in A ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. ∂
2J
∂2A
(A, 1) is non-negative iﬀ:
89Derivatives of uγ2 and uγ3 with respect to α1 look as follows:
∂uγ2
∂α1
> 0 ∀α1 ∈ [0, 4.79)
∂uγ3
∂α1
> 0 ∀α1 ∈ [0, 2.9)
that implies ∂uγl∂α1 > 0, l = {2, 3} for any feasible α1 (remember α1 < α¯1 = 0.5). Also
∂uγ2
∂α1
>
∂uγ3
∂α1
holds under
α1 ∈ [0, 7.84), and it must be ∂uγ2∂α1 >
∂uγ3
∂α1
for any feasible α1 follows.
90A complete derivative is ∂T˜ (A, 1)∂A =
−5∑2j=0 wjjA
[z(A)]2 where w1 < 0, w2, 3 > 0 and z (A) is a function of A.
CHAPTER 1. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PRIZES 110
π1k
2 + π2k + π3 ≥ 0
πl =
∑8
j=0 qljjA, l = {1, 2, 3} , q1j, q3j > 0 ∀ j
π2 > 0 ∀A ∈ [0, 1]
and the inequality holds for any k ≥ 0.91 As a result, ∂J
∂A (A, 1) must increase in A ∈ [0, 1].
Next, consider A ∈ [−1, 0). Since P (tgi ) and contestants’ types switch at A = 0, the
equilibrium conﬁguration in the interval of interest can diﬀer. Suppose E1 is played in A ∈
[−1, 0). Then P (tgi ) = 1−k must belong to
[
0, T˜s (A, B)
)
where T˜s (·) reﬂects the probability
threshold in the case of changed types. Rewritten in terms of k, the condition becomes k ∈(
1− T˜s (·) , 1
]
.
Lemma 4. T˜s (A, 1) decreases in A for any A ∈ [−1, 0).
Proof. ∂T˜s(A, 1)
∂A > 0 holds iﬀ A ∈ (−∞, −19.8)∪ (−5.7) that has a non-empty intersection with
A ∈ (−1, 0].92 Then ∂T˜s(A, 1)∂A < 0 for any A ∈ [−1, 0) follows.
Given Lemma 4 ,
{
1− T˜s (·)
}
must increase in A ∈ [−1, 0):
sup
{
1− T˜s (A, 1)
}
= 1− T˜s (0, 1) = 12
inf
{
1− T˜s (A, 1)
}
= 1− T˜s (−1, 1) = 0.41
However, the sets k ∈
(
1− T˜s (0, 1) , 1
]
and k ∈
[
0, k˜
)
have an empty intersection. Hence,
∂J
∂A (1, 1) < 0 and E1- type equilibrium in A ∈ [−1, 0) result in a contradiction.
Now assume E2 is played in A ∈ [−1, 0). Then the relevant equilibrium constrain on k
becomes k ∈
[
0, 1− T˜s (·)
]
, and this is implied by k ∈
[
0, k˜
)
:
inf
{
1− T˜s (A, 1)
}
> k˜
Let ∂J−
∂A (A, 1) be the derivative of J (·) with respect to A ∈ [−1, 0).
Lemma 5. ∂J
−
∂A (A, 1) increases in A ∈ [−1, 0).
Proof. ∂
2J−
∂2A
(A, 1) looks as follows:
∂2J−
∂2A
(A, 1) =
∑3
j=0 y1jjAk2+
∑3
j=0 y2jjA
(
∑2
j=0 y3jjA)
3
y2j, y3j > 0 ∀ j, y11 < 0
91When A ≥ 0, positive entries of π2 over-compensate negative ones.
92A complete derivative is ∂T˜s(A, 1)∂A =
−40∑2j=0 wsjjA
[zs(A)]2 where wsj > 0 ∀ j and zs (A) is a function of A.
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where polynomial coeﬃcients are positive underA ∈ [−1, 0).93 Hence, ∂J−∂A (A, 1) must increase
in A ∈ [−1, 0) for any feasible k.
Since ∂J−
∂A (A, 1) is continuous (no switching points were assumed) and increasing in A ∈
[−1, 0), the condition ∂J−
∂A (0, 1) < 0 is suﬃcient for J (A, 1) to decrease in A ∈ [−1, 1]:94
∂J−
∂A (0, 1) = −m1k
2 −m2, mi > 0, i = {1, 2}
As a result, for k ∈
[
0, k˜
)
the designer’s objective J (A, 1) decreases in A ∈ [−1, 1]. Thus, it
is optimal to choose A = −1 given B = 1 and use good A’s endowment completely.
Further I verify the optimality of B = 1. The proposed valuation structure features feasible
identity switching and cutoﬀ points:
1. A ≥ 0: type tn2 is well-deﬁned only for B ∈
[
−α2
β2
A, 1
]
,
{
−α2
β2
A
}
∈ (−1, 0), and no
switch in contestants’ power takes place:
˜gB (A) < ˜nB (A) =
α2 − α1
β1 − β2 A < −
α2
β2
A ∀A ≥ 0
2. A < 0: type tn1 is well-deﬁned only for B ∈
[
− α¯1
β1
A, 1
]
,
{
− α¯1
β1
A
}
∈ (0, 1), and the
power of n types switches on the interval:
˜gB (A) < −
α¯1
β1
A < ˜nB (A) =
α¯2 − α¯1
β1 − β2A ∀A < 0
and for B ∈
[
− α¯1
β1
A, ˜nB (A)
)
type n of contestant 2 has stronger incentives to win.
Since βi is deterministic, P (tni ) does not change when J (A, B) passes B = 0 for given
A. First, take the case of A ≥ 0 when E1 is played. Let ∂J∂B
(+A, B) be the derivative of
J (·) with respect to B when A ≥ 0.
Lemma 6. There exists k¯ ∈ (0, 1] such that for any k ∈ [0, k¯] the derivative ∂J
∂B
(+A, B)
increases in B, B ∈
[
−α2
β2
+A, 1, 1
]
.
Proof. ∂
2J
∂2B
(+A, B) looks as follows:
∂2J
∂2B
(+A, B) = ν1k2+ν2k+ν3(3A+40B)3[z(A,B)]4
νi =
∑8
j=0 hijjA8−jB , i = {1, 2, 3}
h1j, h3j > 0 ∀ j
93∑3
j=0 y1jjA has a single real root 1A = 19.6 such that
∑3
j=0 y1jjA > 0 for any A < 1A. Coeﬃcient∑3
j=0 y2jjA reduces to (A + 4)3 and is always positive under A ∈ [−1, 0). Polynomial
∑2
j=0 y3jjA has two
negative real roots located below A = −1.
94Continuity of ∂J
−
∂A (A, 1) and ∂J
−
∂A (0, 1) < 0 imply
∂J−
∂A (A, 1) < 0 in a neighborhood to the left of A = 0.
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Since B cannot be lower than
{
−α2
β2
+A, 1
}
, the denominator of this expression is always
positive. Moreover, both ν1 > 0 and ν3 > 0 hold for any feasible B,95 but the sign of ν2 is
ambiguous. If ν2 > 0 or ν2 < 0, but the discriminant of ν1k2 + ν2k + ν3 = 0 is negative, any
k ∈ [0, 1] results in ∂2J
∂2B
(+A, B) > 0, and one can take k¯ = 1. Otherwise, ν2 < 0 combined
with the positive discriminant delivers two real roots of ν1k2 + ν2k + ν3 = 0, k1 and k2, k1 < k2,
such that ∂2J
∂2B
(+A, B) ≥ 0 holds for k ∈ [0, k1] ∪ [k2, ∞). Then taking k¯ = min {1, k1} gives
the lemma.
Using Lemma 6 , I restrict k ∈
[
0, min
{
k˜, k¯
})
. Given that ∂J
∂B
(+A, B) is continuous and
increasing in B ∈
[
−α2
β2
+A, 1
]
, the condition ∂J
∂B
(
+A, −α2β2+A
)
> 0 is suﬃcient to guarantee
∂J
∂B
(+A, B) > 0 for any +A and feasible B:
∂J
∂B
(+A, B) > 0 ⇔ τ1k2 + τ2k + τ3 > 0
where τ1 < 0, τ2, 3 > 0. The inequality holds for k ∈ (−0.4, 2.5), and this set includes all
feasible values of k. Hence, ∂J
∂B
(+A, B) is positive for any +A, B ∈ [−α2β2+A, 1] and k ∈[
0, min
{
k˜, k¯
})
.
Next, I analyze the case of A < 0 where E2 is played. Deﬁne ∂J∂B (–A, B) as the derivative
of J (·) with respect to B. Since type n of contestant 2 has stronger incentives to win when
B ∈
[
− α¯1
β1
–A, ˜nB (–A)
)
, one must consider this interval and B ∈
[
˜nB (–A) , 1
)
separately.
Let E+2 and E–2 (
∂J+
∂B (–A, B) and ∂J
–
∂B (–A, B)) correspond to the equilibria (the derivatives)
to the right and to the left of ˜nB (–A), respectively. Deﬁne T˜ rs (–A, B) as the probability
threshold for –A and B ∈
[
− α¯1
β1
–A, ˜nB (–A)
)
.
Lemma 7. T˜s (–A, B) and T˜ rs (–A, B) decrease in B for any B ∈
[
˜nB (–A) , 1
]
and
B ∈
[
− α¯1
β1
–A, ˜nB (–A)
)
, respectively.
Proof.
∂T˜s(–A,B)
∂B and
∂T˜ rs (–A,B)
∂B look as follows:
∂T˜s(–A,B)
∂B =
–Aϕ1(–A,B)
[x1(–A,B)]
2
∂T˜ rs (–A,B)
∂B =
–Aϕ2(–A,B)
[x2(–A,B)]
2
ϕl (–A, B) =
∑2
j=0 yljjA2−jB , l = {1, 2}
where ylj > 0 for any l, j and xl (–A, B) is the function of –A, B. Solving ϕ1 (–A, B) with
95When B ≥ 0, all elements of the polynomials exceed zero. When B < 0, positive entries over-compensate
negative ones corresponding to odd powers.
CHAPTER 1. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PRIZES 113
respect to B brings that ϕs (–A, B) is positive for any B > −0.17A, and this includes all
feasible values of B. Similarly, ϕ1 (–A, B) > 0 holds under B > −0.11A that covers B ∈[
− α¯1
β1
–A, ˜nB (–A)
)
. Thus, for –A ∈ [−1, 0) it must be
∂T˜s(–A,B)
∂B < 0 and
∂T˜ rs (–A,B)
∂B < 0 for
any B ∈
[
˜nB (–A) , 1
]
and B ∈
[
− α¯1
β1
–A, ˜nB (–A)
)
, respectively.
Lemma 7 implies that
{
1− T˜s (–A, B)
}
and
{
1− T˜ rs (–A, B)
}
must increase in B and
have inﬁma at B = ˜nB (–A) and B = − α¯1β1–A, respectively:
inf
{
1− T˜s (–A, B)
}
= 0.24
inf
{
1− T˜ rs (–A, B)
}
= 0.16
Given that k˜ is smaller than any of these values, k ∈
[
0, min
{
k˜, k¯
})
implies both
k ∈
[
0, 1− T˜s (–A, B)
]
and k ∈
[
0, 1− T˜ rs (–A, B)
]
. Hence, no additional restrictions are
needed on k.
Lemma 8. ∂J
+
∂B (–A, B) and ∂J
–
∂B (–A, B) increase in B for any feasible B and –A.
Proof. Consider ∂2J–
∂2B
(–A, B):
∂2J–
∂2B
(–A, B) = ρ1k
2+(A+10B)3
(3A+40B)3(A+10B)3
ρ1 =
∑3
j=0 x1jjA3−jB , x1j > 0 ∀ j
The denominator and the second component of the numerator increase in B, are positive at
B = minB , minB =
{
− α¯1
β1
–A
}
and, consequently, any feasible B. Consider ρ1 as the function
of B (recall –A < 0):
∂ρ1 (B)
∂B ≤ 0 ⇔ B ∈ [−0.05, −0.08]
–
A
The set has an empty intersection with B ∈
[
− α¯1
β1
–A, ˜nB (–A)
)
, and ρ1 must increase in B
for any feasible B. Then estimate ρ1 (minB ):
ρ1
(minB ) = − (–A)3 (p1k2 + p2) > 0, p1, 2 > 0
This implies ρ1 (B) > 0 for any feasible B. As a result, ∂J–∂B (–A, B) must increase in B for
any feasible B and –A.
Next, I investigate ∂2J+
∂2B
(–A, B):
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∂2J+
∂2B
(–A, B) = ρ2k
2+(A+4B)3
(3A+40B)3(A+4B)3
ρ2 =
∑3
j=0 x2jjA3−jB , x2j > 0 ∀ j
Again, the denominator and the second element of the numerator are positive for all
B ∈
[
˜nB (–A) , 1
]
. Treating ρ2 as the function of B delivers:
∂ρ2(B)
∂B ≤ 0 ⇔ B ∈ [−0.01, −0.11]–A
ρ2 (minB ) = −p3 (–A)3 > 0, p3 > 0
and ρ2 must be positive for any feasibleB. Hence, ∂2J+∂2B (
–
A, B) > 0 follows, and ∂J
–
∂B (–A, B)
has to increase in B for any feasible B and –A.
Lemma 8 implies that a suﬃcient condition for ∂J
∂B (–A, B) to increase in B for any –A
is ∂J–
∂B
(
− α¯1
β1
–A, B
)
> 0 and ∂J+
∂B
(
˜nB (–A) , B
)
> 0:
∂J+
∂B
(
˜nB (–A) , B
)
= − (–A)4 (q1k2 − q2) , q1, 2 > 0, q2q1 > 1
∂J–
∂B
(
− α¯1
β1
–A, B
)
= (–A)4 (q3k2 + q4) , q3, 4 > 0
As a result, for k ∈
[
0, min
{
k˜, k¯
})
the objective function J (A, B) monotonically increases
in B for any feasible A, and B = 1 is indeed optimal.
To sum up, for the set of symmetric probability–valuation proﬁles
R¯Lk = {0.5, 0.1, 0.15, 0.01, 2, 1, k} ∈ RLk such that k ∈
[
0, min
{
k˜, k¯
})
the designer chooses
A = −1, B = 1 and uses goods’ endowments completely.
Chapter 2
Take Me to Court: Explaining
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2.1 Introduction
The state sets the rules to resolve civil and criminal disputes. It can stick to retribution or
deterrence concerns, try to save on costs of the conﬂict intervention, but overall, the design of the
justice system is a very complex issue.1 The existing mechanisms of the dispute resolution are very
diverse, especially in the criminal law. Some countries (for example, the United States) adopt a
paternalistic approach and take the criminal conﬂict out from the victim. Other legal systems,
such as Russia and a few other post-Soviet countries (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania),
can delegate the dispute resolution to the parties involved. Disclosing strong and weak sides of
each institutional setting is crucial for the optimal design of the justice system.
Generally, the state prefers to not intervene into the dispute resolution if the conﬂict does
not threaten social interests. For example, opponents in civil lawsuits can always settle among
themselves and go to court only if they fail to achieve an agreement. This practice allows the
society save on costs of litigation.2 There is a room for the state to delegate the conﬂict resolution
in case of the criminal justice as well. Around 20% of European convicts are sentences for less
than 1 year.3 4 At the same time, the average annual cost per inmate reaches e16’425 in Europe.
Hence, making the criminal prosecution more ﬂexible to minor-harm non-intentional crimes by
means of “victim-defendant” settlements could help the state decrease its expenses on prisons.5
Nevertheless, the decentralized case resolution may also create some problems for the society.
First, excluding the state from the conﬂict can result in milder sanctions and reduce deterrence.
Another important concern relates to direct (violent) or indirect enforcement to settle.6 The latter
aspect occurs because of the power imbalance between the conﬂicting parties. If one individual
displays a strong advantage, the opponent feels discouraged and reduces his ﬁghting eﬀort. Since
winning the conﬂict becomes less likely, this player agrees on a lower settlement oﬀer than he
would request from a rival of the same strength. Hence, the settlement turns to be cheaper for
individuals with better ﬁghting abilities, and the power imbalance at the negotiation stage can
increase the inequality before the law.
Explaining the settlement process under asymmetric bargaining positions is crucial for the
optimal design of the justice system. This paper sheds light on key driving forces behind
1The costs of the conﬂict intervention include salaries for judges and prosecutors, expenses on prisons etc.
2If the case does not go to court, it reduces the load on judges. Also, the conﬂicting parties face no need to
spend money for lawyers and waste their time on trials.
3See http://criminaljusticealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CJA_ReducingImprisonment_Europe.pdf
4In 69 countries, a number of inmates per 100’000 population exceeds 200 (see
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate).
21 European states, including Italy, Belgium, and France, had overcrowded prisons in 2013
(see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11405588/England-and-Wales-near-top-of-prison-spending-
league-table.html).
5For example, Russia allows for “victim-defendant” settlements in case of criminal traﬃc oﬀenses.
6The direct enforcement to settle takes place when victims face credible threats from the defendants’ side.
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out-of-court negotiations and emphasizes what kind of problems the institute of
“victim-defendant” settlements may cause for the society. Speciﬁcally, we propose a stylized
theoretical model with two players, the victim (she) and the defendant (oﬀender, or he), who
diﬀer in their (dis)-utility of punishment, non-monetary ﬁghting abilities and face asymmetric
budget constraints. All individual characteristics are assumed to be common knowledge. The two
conﬂicting parties exert costly eﬀort in order to move the case to court. Before the ﬁght starts,
the defendant can make a “take-it-or-leave-it” oﬀer to the victim. If the proposal is accepted, the
case closes with a settlement. Otherwise, the players enter the contest game, and the defendant
gets punished with a positive (endogenously deﬁned) probability.7
In the absence of private information, the optimal settlement oﬀer (S) must be equal to the
victim’s equilibrium payoﬀ at the contest stage. The amount of S decreases when the bargaining
position of the defendant strengthens (namely, his disutility of punishment rises or ﬁghting abilities
improve). More resources and higher winning beneﬁts allow the defendant increase his eﬀort and
reduce the probability that the case ends up in court. Consequently, the victim’s equilibrium
payoﬀ declines. Hence, being matched with a richer opponent does not guarantee the victim a
better settlement oﬀer. On the contrary, if the victim gets stronger, the amount of S grows, and
it becomes more expensive for the defendant to avoid the punishment.
When the victim is not very vindictive (i.e. her winning beneﬁt is less than the disutility
of punishment the oﬀender faces), the defendant always prefers to make an oﬀer. In this sense,
the settlement is eﬃcient. However, if the victim extracts high vengeance beneﬁts, even feasible
settlements can fail to happen. In other words, the defendant who has suﬃcient resources to pay
the amount of S decides to enter the contest stage. This scenario requires the victim to be strong
enough, which makes the settlement relatively expensive. At the same time, the oﬀender must
display a suﬃciently high probability to win the contest stage and avoid the punishment. If the
defendant makes the settlement oﬀer, the victim accepts the proposal, and the amount of S must
be paid with probability 1. Since the defendant still has high chances to avert the court, entering
the contest stage is associated with a greater expected payoﬀ and becomes a more attractive
alternative.
To recover the distribution of players’ bargaining positions, we bring the model to the data on
criminal traﬃc oﬀenses in Russia. Here, defendants who have no previous felonies can settle with
their victims out of court. We use a centralized police database that covers the period from 2013
to 2014 and aggregates criminal traﬃc oﬀenses across 84 Russian regions (about 70’000 cases in
total). The dataset contains detailed information about victims’ and defendants’ socio-economic
characteristics, accident-speciﬁc controls and reports the case outcome. Around 17% of conﬂicts
settle.
7We use the Tullock contest success function to model a probability to reach the court.
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First, we provide the reduced form evidence that non-monetary ﬁghting abilities matter for the
conﬂict resolution. To identify the eﬀect of interest, we focus on law enforcers and government
oﬃcials. This group tends to know the justice system better and has well-established connections
with legislators and other powerful individuals. Controlling for defendants’ wealth (their expected
car prices), law enforcers and government oﬃcials are more (less) likely to settle with their victims
(end up in prison) than other oﬀenders.
Further, we structurally estimate the model on two diﬀerent subsamples. Overall, the
proposed theoretical framework successfully replicates the observed probabilities to settle, to end
up in court and to get a real sentence. On average, victims hold 10 times less wealth than
defendants. Moreover, the degree of the resource imbalance becomes stronger when we focus on
“car vs. pedestrian” matches. Victims who happen to be close relatives of their oﬀenders are 9.6
times less vindictive than strangers (pedestrians). At the same time, the value of winning the
case for each opponent positively depends on his / her wealth.
In the structural setting, we do not ﬁnd the evidence that law enforcers and government oﬃcials
display better non-monetary ﬁghting abilities. This fact, however, can be explained with the
selection bias. Speciﬁcally, very powerful law enforcers and government oﬃcials can use their
inﬂuence to avoid the investigation stage. As a result, they never appear in the sample, and the
estimator needs to be adjusted respectively.
We use the model to approximate expected equilibrium payoﬀs defendants get when they settle
with their victims and end up in court. The former value turns to be signiﬁcantly less than the
contest stage payoﬀ (–.007 versus –810.78 if we take “car vs. pedestrian” matches only). The
disparity persists even when we divide the accidents into groups based on the harm made. Hence,
those defendants who have enough resources to settle with their victims encounter much milder
punishment, and this indeed generates the inequality before the law.
Further, we perform counterfactual experiments with the estimates obtained. In the
beginning, we evaluate how the prison population changes if the state abandons
“victim-defendant” settlements. As a result, 30% of the previously settled cases (more than 2’850
matches in the complete dataset) would close with a real sentence.8 If all these individuals were
convicted for one year, this would cost Russia e2.3 million.9
Then, we investigate how increasing the defendant’s wealth (i.e. improving his bargaining
position) aﬀects the optimal oﬀer and changes his ability to settle. Relaxing the oﬀender’s resource
constraint has two eﬀects. First, it makes him able to aﬀord better oﬀers and settle with more
victim types (“volume eﬀect”). Second, higher wealth improves the defendant’s bargaining position
and allows the player increase his eﬀort. This reduces the victim’s equilibrium payoﬀ and drives
8The total number of cases with complete “victim-defendant” proﬁles amounts to 56’000.
9The calculation is based on e2.2 per day for one prisoner.
See http://www.rbc.ru/society/11/02/2015/54db24779a794752506f1ebf.
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the optimal settlement oﬀer down (“price eﬀect”). Actually, the amount of S displays an inverse
U -shape with respect to the oﬀender’s wealth. When the defendant is relatively poor and his
resource constrain relaxes slightly, the “volume eﬀect” prevails, and the average settlement oﬀer
rises. At some point, the oﬀender becomes suﬃciently rich, and the “price eﬀect” gets stronger.
Finally, we perturb the wealth distribution for victims and trace the eﬀect on their bargaining
positions. With our identiﬁcation restrictions, more resources available drive vindictiveness up,
and eventually, victims systematically obtain higher winning beneﬁts than their opponents. This
increases the optimal settlement oﬀer, and a probability to achieve a pre-court agreement declines
for two reasons. Obviously, some defendants cannot aﬀord the amount of S any longer. On top of
this, we start observing oﬀenders who have enough wealth to settle but prefer to enter the contest
stage. To generate the latter result, the resource advantage must be on the victims’ side, which is
true for some types of crimes and civil disputes.
To complete the analysis, one must discuss “victim-defendant” settlements from the social
welfare prospective. In our theoretical setting, the given institute makes no conﬂicting party worse
oﬀ, and defendants gain much more than victims. Hence, with the utilitarian welfare function,
the presence of pre-court agreements never hurts the society.10 However, if the policymaker also
cares about deterrence or has equality concerns, “victim-defendant” settlements may reduce social
welfare because this legal practice leads to signiﬁcantly milder sanctions for oﬀenders with better
bargaining positions. Overall, a more thorough discussion needs a particular social welfare function.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 examines the related literature and indicates a
contribution our work makes. Section 2.3 describes how Russian justice system processes criminal
traﬃc oﬀenses. Section 2.4 introduces the model and states our main theoretical results. Section
2.5 characterizes the data and a structural setup, reports estimation results and counterfactual
experiments. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper brings together two strands of the Law and Economics literature. In particular, our
work contributes to research on settlements and relates it to the literature dealing with resource
imbalances and unequal access to justice. The former ﬁeld traditionally develops game-theoretic
models of settlements and praises cost-saving beneﬁts of this institute, both in civil litigations and
the criminal law (plea bargaining). Here, trials are treated as a failure to achieve an agreement, and
a considerable body of research has been trying to explore what provokes this “ineﬃciency” (Spier
(2007)). Among the reasons, the literature cites asymmetric information (Reinganum (1986)),
divergent beliefs of the parties (Landes (1971); Priest (1984)) and, for civil disputes, binding budget
10Here, the policymaker simply aggregates utilities over all victims and defendants.
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constraints defendants may face. In this paper, we also investigate what explains settlements in
case of criminal oﬀenses. However, instead of looking at plea bargaining, we concentrate on
“victim–defendant” negotiations and endow oﬀenders with a right to make a “take-it-or-leave-it”
oﬀer.11 We show that relaxing the defendant’s budget constraint does not necessarily lead to more
settlements and higher compensation amounts in equilibrium. On the contrary, the willingness
to settle may vanish because the defendant can use the resources to increase his probability to
win the trial instead. Hence, in our model, no settlement can not be interpreted as a negotiation
failure: actually, going to court is optimal from the defendant’s prospective.12
Despite their cost-saving beneﬁts, the settlements also rise some objection. Usually, the
criticism points out the increased coercion of guilty pleas from innocents (Langbein (1978);
Alschuler (1981)) and the inability to reach socially desirable outcomes (Polinsky (1988);
Garoupa and Stephen (2008)). One of the most prominent critics of civil case settlements in the
law literature, Fiss (1983), argues that scholars usually assume no resource asymmetries between
the parties involved. In reality, richer defendants may force their victims to accept lower oﬀers,
so the latter party still incurs implicit costs of litigation through a reduced settlement amount.
According to Fiss (1983), this goes against the core idea of justice, which should prevent such
distortions. Glaeser et al. (2003) perceives unequal outcomes of the justice system as a sign of
the overall institutional deterioration. Also, it is broadly discussed whether rich defendants
should be allowed to transform their resources into better legal counseling (Lott (1987); Garoupa
and Gravelle (2003)).
In our paper, the power imbalance plays a crucial role. We construct a theoretical model and
propose an empirical framework to study the impact of asymmetric preferences and ﬁghting abilities
on the outcome of the settlement stage. Indeed, defendants with weaker resource constraints and /
or better non-monetary characteristics (for example, well-connected individuals) manage to avoid
the court at a lower price. On top of this, we approximate the inequality in judicial outcomes for
settled and non-settled cases and run counterfactual experiments to trace the eﬀect of banning
pre-court agreements on the prison population.
The paper also contributes to the literature on victims’ role in the criminal process, which
usually builds upon the idea of restorative justice (Zedner (2011)). In this case, the state takes the
conﬂict away from the victim who becomes a passive actor (Sebba (1996); Shapland (2000); Strang
(2003)).13 The settlements we consider represent an alternative dispute resolution that brings the
agency back to victims (Harland (1982)). Generally, this allows the victim reveal her taste for
11In case of plea bargaining, it is the prosecutor who makes an oﬀer to the defendant, and the victim does not
play any role.
12With our modeling assumptions, the victim stays indiﬀerent between settling with the defendant and going to
court.
13The literature on plea bargaining follows this idea and never looks at the victim’s side.
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vengeance (Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003)). Using our identiﬁcation approach, we estimate how
vindictiveness varies across diﬀerent demographic groups and types of harm for Russia.
Our work is not the ﬁrst one to structurally estimate the model of settlements. The most recent
study is Silveira (2017). The paper focuses on plea bargaining under asymmetric information
and proposes a non-parametric estimator to recover the distribution of defendants’ types (their
probabilities to be found guilty). Merlo and Tang (2016) look at civil settlements in medical
malpractice disputes and recover beliefs of the conﬂict participants. As the authors claim, a
failure to reach a pre-court agreement may arise from excessive optimism of the parties involved.
Merlo and Tang (2016) ﬁnd that the plaintiﬀ’s perception of winning the trial changes with the
harm made and the identity of his opponent (in this case, a doctor). Sieg (2000) and Watanabe
(2006) also employ the data on medical malpractice litigations. The former paper shows that the
bargaining model with settlements replicates all observed patterns quite well. Watanabe (2006)
studies dynamic aspects of the negotiation process and emphasizes the role of learning about the
opponent’s beliefs in achieving the settlement.
This work diﬀers from the aforementioned studies in several respects. First, we concentrate on
“victim-defendant” settlements in the criminal law. Second, imperfect information concerns are left
out, and the research focus shifts to resource asymmetries. Third, we build upon a diﬀerent model.
Now, if the settlement does not happen, the case ends up in court with a certain probability that
depends on eﬀorts conﬂicting parties exert. Fourth, we do not observe settlement oﬀers, which
was not the case in the previous studies. However, our theoretical framework and case-speciﬁc
controls available allow us build a parametric estimator and recover the distributions of players’
preferences and ﬁghting abilities.
Finally, the modeling approach we develop in this paper brings us closer to the literature on
contests and conﬂicts. In particular, the “victim-defendant” interaction is treated as a Tullock-
type competition where both parties exert costly eﬀort in order to reach / avoid the court stage.
Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1997) study an asymmetric Tullock contest and prove the existence
of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Yamasaki (2008) extends their result by adding
player-speciﬁc budget constraints and focusing on a very general contest success function. Baye
at al. (1994) analyze a discrete Tullock rent-seeking model with two homogeneous players and
a contest success function that displays increasing returns to scale. In this class of games, the
equilibrium cannot be derived from ﬁrst-order conditions. The authors, however, prove that a
symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies exists and develop an algorithm to construct it. We use
the indicated results to analyze contestants’ decision to settle among themselves, which is a key
issue our model aims to explain.
The game we design is essentially a conﬂict, and this research ﬁeld builds upon a contest
mechanism. Sambanis et al. (2017) analyze a ﬁght between two groups, the government and the
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rebels, under a threat of an external intervention. The interaction is modeled as a Tullock-type
contest where the rebels can make the government a settlement oﬀer. However, this study does
not take account of asymmetric resource constraints and in this respect diﬀers from the model we
propose.14
Robson and Skaperdas (2008) consider diﬀerent ways to resolve conﬂicts over property rights.
They employ a dynamic contest setting with two players. The parties can either settle or go
to court, but both options are associated with positive enforcement costs. The authors show
that going to court immediately can be preferred to the settlement. The result is driven by
contestants’ willingness to save on enforcement costs and avoid discounting. Our model is static
and accommodates only the cost of exerting eﬀort. Nevertheless, we show that the defendant can
strictly prefer to go to court even if the settlement does not require any additional cost. This
ﬁnding strongly relates to contestants’ heterogeneity in preferences and ﬁghting abilities.15
2.3 A Legal Process for Criminal Traﬃc Oﬀenses in Russia
According to Russian laws, all traﬃc oﬀenses are classiﬁed into civil and criminal cases. The
accident enters the latter group if it resulted in serious bodily injuries, which must be certiﬁed
by the forensic medical exam results.16 The Criminal Code of Russia categorizes respective traﬃc
oﬀenses based on a number of fatalities (namely, no death, one death, and multiple deaths). Also,
it distinguished between sober and drunk drivers. The combination of these two characteristics
deﬁnes six types of criminal traﬃc accidents. The highest possible prison sentence changes with
the oﬀense category. For example, a driver of “no death & sober” type can get at most two years
of incarceration. At the same time, an oﬀender from “multiple deaths & drunk” group may spend
up to nine years in jail. On top of prison sentences, drivers can temporary lose his licenses.17 Also,
the court decides how much the defendant must pay in order to cover all moral damages the victim
faced. The compensation of medical expenses and property damages is determined by civil courts,
and this usually involves insurance companies.
14Another example where the conﬂict analysis builds on a Tullock-type contest without budget constraints is
Esteban and Ray (2011).
15Baye et al. provide one more application of the contest theory to the legal setting. The authors employ the
all-pay auction model to analyze symmetric litigation disputes and compare aggregate legal expenditure under
diﬀerent institutional frameworks.
16According to the Criminal Code, bodily injuries can be classiﬁed into light, average, and serious ones for the
purposes of prosecution. The division builds on the forensic medical exam results. According to the Code, a serious
bodily injury must be “hazardous for human life” or involve the loss of sight, speech, hearing, or any organ or the
loss of the organ’s functions. Also, the legal deﬁnition accounts for a permanent loss of a general ability to work,
an interruption of pregnancy, mental derangements, or post-traumatic addictions.
17In case of imprisonment, the license withdrawal starts the day after the oﬀender’s release from jail.
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Assume a traﬃc accident happens. The police station that controls the location where the
oﬀense took place must register the case as a criminal one if there is at least one death or a
medical report about serious bodily injuries. Then, the case goes to an investigator who collects
and analyzes all pieces of evidence: medical certiﬁcates, witness testimonies, experts’ reports,
photographs and video materials etc. If the oﬀender escapes after the accident, it is also the police
job to ﬁnd this person. By the end of the process, the investigator passes all the materials to a
prosecutor.
Based on the evidence, the prosecutor decides whether to send the case to court.18 At this
stage, the defendant with no criminal history and the victim can settle in a civil case fashion and
dismiss the criminal charge. In particular, the oﬀender voluntarily compensates all moral damages
the victim faced. The victim forgives the defendant and oﬃcially, in a written form, asks for the
criminal prosecution to be stopped, subject to the approval of the investigator (with the permission
of the prosecutor) or to the judge.19 The oﬀender gets no criminal record because his guilt has not
been veriﬁed in court. However, the fact of the settlement enters all police databases and can be
observed by external parties (for example, potential employers or other government entities).
If no settlement agreement was reached, the judge uses the evidence provided and decides on
the defendant’s guilt. One remarkable feature of Russian criminal system is that in-court acquittals
are very rare (less than 1% out of all cases). If the defendant is found guilty, the judge may suspend
the prison sentence.20 For the “no death & sober” oﬀense type, the judge may also replace a real
incarceration term with diﬀerent restrictions of liberty, which are milder than prison. It allows the
oﬀender live usual life, except for certain geographical limitations.
2.4 The Model
2.4.1 Model Setup
To characterize the interaction between the victim (V , or she) and the defendant (D, or he),
we introduce a simple contest model with two heterogeneous players. Such a setup is commonly
used in the conﬂict literature to represent situations where parties exert costly eﬀort in order to
win a battle.21 In our instance, V ﬁghts against D for the case being considered in court. Once
it happens, D can get recognized as guilty, and the punishment follows. Also, we depart from
standard models in two ways. First, V and D can settle among themselves before entering the
18When the police identiﬁes a deceased person as the oﬀender, the case usually does not go to court and closes
with conviction.
19If a true victim dies, his / her close relatives are recognized as victims.
20The sentence suspension applies only to ﬁrst-convicted oﬀenders. Otherwise, the judge must assign a real jail
term.
21For example, see Esteban and Ray (2011), Sambanis (2017), Robson and Skaperdas (2008).
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contest. Second, we introduce asymmetric budget constraints for the players, and this modiﬁcation
leads to a richer set of possible equilibria and non-trivial settlement decisions.22
Suppose an accident happens, and V and D are matched against each other. In the beginning,
consider a so-called “in-court” scenario. Let ph be a probability that D is found guilty.23 Then, D
gets punishment x ≥ 0 and faces a total monetary disutility of {−bx} where b > 0.24 At the same
time, V gains {ax} in monetary terms, a > 0. We interpret a as V ’s vindictiveness and do not
restrict how b and a relate to each other (both a ≥ b and a < b are feasible).
Clearly, V and D have misaligned preferences. The “in-court” outcome is desirable for V
(victim); however, D (defendant) would like to avoid this scenario. It results in a conﬂict where
both V and D are willing to exert eﬀort (eV and eD, respectively) and change the outcome in their
favor. To model how a probability to end up in court (PC) depends on players’ eﬀort choices, we
employ a standard Tullock contest success function:
PC (eV , eD) =
erV
erV + e
r
D
, r = 1
Also, we state that if no party exerts positive eﬀort, the case certainly goes to court, i.e. PC (0, 0) =
1. This assumption is not standard in the literature; however, in case of criminal oﬀenses, it makes
perfect sense to break a “0–0” tie in the victim’s favor.
Next, suppose V (D) has a total budget of wV ≥ 0 (wD ≥ 0), which can be spent on eﬀort
eV (eD). Also, deﬁne a player-speciﬁc cost parameter, mi, i = {V, D}. Hence, the total monetary
cost of exerting eV (eD) is {mV eV } ({mDeD}).25 We treat wi and mi, i = {D, V } as monetary
and non-monetary ﬁghting abilities, respectively. The interpretation of wi is quite intuitive: more
resources can buy stronger lawyers who are able to build a high quality defense. Non-monetary
ﬁghting abilities reﬂect players’ connections (for example, their access to or the position in the
network of legislators etc.). In particular, lower mi means that every monetary unit transforms
into higher eﬀort, and player i can ﬁght more with the same total budget. We assume that
contestants’ utility is additively separable in punishment (x) and the cost of eﬀort ({miei}, i =
{V, D}). Finally, monetary and non-monetary ﬁghting abilities, as well as contestants’ preferences,
constitute common knowledge.
22For example, D may not want to settle even if he has enough budget to do so.
23Generally, ph must depend on the true state of guilt: those who are actually culpable are more likely to get
a conviction. Since we concentrate on unintentional crimes (namely, traﬃc accidents), we simply the analysis and
do not introduce guilty / non-guilty types separately. However, the model can accommodate the guilt-dependent
likelihood of conviction easily.
24Generally, the punishment x is case-speciﬁc and depends on the level of harm made to a victim and the degree
of quilt.
25Here, we work with a linear cost function. The analysis extends to the case of convex cost speciﬁcations.
CHAPTER 2. “VICTIM-DEFENDANT” SETTLEMENTS 125
At the contest stage, V and D choose their eﬀort levels to maximize expected payoﬀs given
budget constraints:
V : maxeV πV (eV , eD)
s.t. πV (eV , eD) = axp
hPC (eV , eD)−mV eV
mV eV ≤ wV , eV ≥ 0
D : maxeD πD (eV , eD)
s.t. πD (eV , eD) = −bxphPC (eV , eD)−mDeD
mDeD ≤ wD, eD ≥ 0
Now, we introduce a pre-contest stage where V and D can settle. Assume the defendant makes
an oﬀer S to the victim before entering the conﬂict phase.26 27 For simplicity, if S is such that
the victim is indiﬀerent between settling and ﬁghting, she accepts the oﬀer.28 Further, we deﬁne
contestants’ bargaining positions.
Deﬁnition. Contestant i’s bargaining position, i = {V, D} is a combination of his / her (dis)-
utility of punishment, monetary and non-monetary ﬁghting abilities (wi and mi, respectively).
Overall, the game proceeds as follows:
1. Defendant (D) makes an oﬀer S to Victim (V ). If V accepts the proposal, the game ends.
Otherwise, D and V move to the contest stage.
2. D and V simultaneously choose their eﬀort levels, eD and eV , respectively.
3. The contest outcome realizes (the two parties either end up in court or the case closes), and
the agents get their payoﬀs.
To solve the game, we proceed by backward induction.
2.4.2 The Contest Stage
When V and D do not manage to settle, they move to the contest stage. Proposition 2.1 provides
a general equilibrium characterization of the contest game:
26As lawyers say, in most of the cases it is indeed the defendant who makes a settlement oﬀer.
27In principle, one could model the pre-contest stage as a Nash bargaining game where V and D split the surplus
among themselves. However, to identify contestants bargaining power, it is crucial to observe the settlement amount,
which is never reported. For this reason, we stick to a simplistic assumption of D making a ﬁrst move and extracting
all the surplus.
28The analysis extends to the case when V can randomize between settling and ﬁghting.
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Proposition 2.1. The equilibrium of the contest stage exists and is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The existence and uniqueness results are proven by construction. In equilibrium, both
contestants always stay active. When players’ budget constraints do not bind, we get a standard
asymmetric Tullock contest with two participants. This case is well-studies in the literature.
With the given contest success function, the equilibrium is always interior and unique. Also, it
features pure strategies. If only one constraint binds, a player with limited resources expends all
the budget, i.e. ei = wimi , i = {V, D} becomes optimal. The opponent’s best reply to ei = wimi
solves his / her ﬁrst-order condition and satisﬁes a feasibility requirement (mjej ≤ wj, j 	= i).
Here, the constrained player strictly prefers to stay active because only then he / she gets a
chance to win against the advantaged opponent.
When both budget constraints bind, the players decide whether to exert positive eﬀort (ei = wimi )
or abstain from participation (ei = 0). In this case, the total eﬀort cost contestants pay if choose
ei =
wi
mi
> 0 is always lower than the relative beneﬁt of avoiding the punishment for D ( bxp
h
mD
) /
imposing the sanction on D for V (axp
h
mV
):29
2∑
i=1
wi
mi
< min
{
axph
wV
,
bxph
wD
}
Since a winner gains a lot compared to the cost paid, the competition is attractive for both players.
Hence, V and D optimally select ei = wimi > 0 and never abstain from participation.
Further, we summarize how contestants’ equilibrium eﬀort depends on the structure of their
ﬁghting abilities and the preferences over punishment.
Proposition 2.2. Contestants’ equilibrium eﬀort, e∗i , i = {V, D} always increases in his / her
valuation of punishment and wi, decreases in mi:
∂e∗V
∂a
≥ 0, ∂e
∗
D
∂b
≥ 0, ∂e
∗
i
∂wi
≥ 0, ∂e
∗
i
∂mi
≤ 0, i = {V, D}
For a
mV
≥ b
mD
1. e∗V increases in b and e∗D decreases in a
2. e∗V decreases in mD and increases in wD
29Here, we work with a rescaled version of the original contestants’ programs where
π˜V (eV , eD) =
axph
mV
PC (eV , eD)− eV
π˜D (eV , eD) = − bxp
h
mD
PC (eV , eD)− eD
This monotone transformation does not change the equilibrium V and D play.
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3. e∗D increases in mV and decreases in wV if and only if wV ≥ bxp
hmV
4mD
> 0. Otherwise, e∗D
strictly decreases in mV and strictly increases in wV
For a
mV
< b
mD
1. e∗V strictly decreases in b and e∗D strictly increases in a
2. e∗V increases in mD and decreases in wD if and only if wD ≥ axp
hmD
4mV
> 0. Otherwise, e∗V
strictly decreases in mD and strictly increases in wD
3. e∗D strictly decreases in mV and strictly increases in wV
Proof. See Appendix A.
Some results stated in Proposition 2.2 are straightforward. Players’ equilibrium eﬀort never
decreases in the valuation they attach to the punishment. Higher a and b drive contestants’
willingness to win up and make the competition more intense.30 Also, better non-monetary
ﬁghting abilities (namely, lower mi, i = {V, D}) decrease the eﬀort cost and allow the players to
ﬁght more with the same budget. These two facts are well-documented in the contest literature.
Other eﬀects depend on both relative winning beneﬁts ( a
mV
and b
mD
) and players’ resources (wD
and wV ).
Take a
mV
≥ b
mD
when V displays a stronger willingness to compete than her opponent. Here,
the winning is relatively more desirable for the victim. Then, if D gets better stimuli to clash (b
goes up or D’s monetary and non-monetary ﬁghting abilities improve), V wants to increase her
eﬀort as well and ﬁghts back. The opposite holds for the defendant. When a increases, the victim
who already has an advantage ( a
mV
≥ b
mD
) gets even stronger incentives to ﬁght. This discourages
D, and in equilibrium, he exerts less eﬀort. The same happens if the victim has enough resources
to expend (wV ≥ bxphmV4mD > 0) and her monetary or non-monetary ﬁghting abilities rise. However,
the pattern reverts when V ’s budget constraint shrinks (wV ∈
[
0, bxp
hmV
4mD
)
).31 In this case, D
has enough monetary resources (compared to wV ) to overcome the victim’s advantage and win.
Similar logic applies when a
mV
< b
mD
, i.e. D displays a better bargaining position than V .
2.4.3 The Settlement Stage
In this subsection, we move one step back and analyze when V and D settle. Let π∗i , i = {V, D}
be i’s equilibrium payoﬀ at the contest stage. First, we characterize how the optimal settlement
oﬀer S must look like.
30If a goes up, V extracts more utility from D being punished. Higher values of b translate into bigger costs of
conviction for D, and his incentives to avoid the court stage increase.
31Although V has stronger incentives to win, she does not have a suﬃcient amount of money to support a desirable
eﬀort level.
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Lemma 2.1. The optimal settlement oﬀer equals to V ’s equilibrium payoﬀ at the contest stage,
i.e. S = π∗V .
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Without loss of generality, suppose D’s budget is unlimited,
and he can aﬀord any settlement oﬀer. Also, assume D incurs signiﬁcant losses in case of ﬁght and
is willing to avoid the contest stage. Formally, ﬁx π∗D  − (π∗V + τ) where τ  0 is suﬃciently
high.32 First, take S = π∗V + ε, ε > 0 is small enough. The victim strictly prefers to accept the
oﬀer, and D’s payoﬀ becomes πε+D = − (π∗V + ε). Next, consider S = π∗V − ε. Now, the victim
does not want to settle, the game proceeds to the contest stage, and πε−D = π
∗
D. Finally, check
S = π∗V . In this case, V accepts the proposal (see the assumptions of Subsection 2.4.1), and D
gets πD = −π∗V . S = π∗V strictly dominates all other alternatives:
πD = −π∗V > πε+D > πε−D
and D prefers this strategy.
Lemma 2.1 illustrates a typical ﬁrst-mover advantage. Since D makes a “take-it-or-leave-it”
oﬀer, he extract all the surplus in the absence of private information. If D prefers to avoid the
contest stage (π∗D < −π∗V ), proposing S = π∗V allows him to terminate the game, save on settlement
costs and get the highest possible payoﬀ.
Once the optimal settlement oﬀer is deﬁned, we check how it depends on the “victim–defendant”
characteristics.
Proposition 2.3. The optimal settlement oﬀer S always decreases (increases) in D’s (V ’s)
willingness to win b (a) and his ﬁghting abilities. S always increases in V ’s non-monetary
ﬁghting ability. S increases in wV if and only if wV is suﬃciently small (wV ∈ [0, w˜V ], w˜V > 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result is quite intuitive. If the defendant gets stronger incentives to compete (either his
winning beneﬁt increases or ﬁghting abilities improve), he exerts more eﬀort. Depending on V ’s
characteristics, the victim can either ﬁght back or give up.33 Under the former scenario, V faces
higher eﬀort cost; in the latter case, her winning probability decreases. Overall, V ’s equilibrium
payoﬀ declines, and it becomes easier to settle for the defendant.
32The extreme case would be π∗D = −∞.
33 See Proposition 2.2 for more details.
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The opposite happens when V ’s willingness to win grows or her ability to ﬁght rises. In this
case, D faces a stronger opponent who exerts signiﬁcant eﬀort, wins with a high probability and,
consequently, obtains a larger equilibrium payoﬀ. To prevent the ﬁght, D must give the competitor
a suﬃcient amount of money. Hence, settling with a mighty victim is more expensive (it may be
even infeasible).
The eﬀect of wV on the optimal settlement oﬀer depends on contestants’ relative winning
beneﬁts (namely, a
mV
and b
mD
). S becomes sensitive to wV if and only if V ’s budget constraint
binds, which happens for wV small enough. Next, take the case of amV ≥ bmD when V ’s relative
utility from D being punished is suﬃciently high. Then, if V ’s budget constrain binds, the optimal
settlement oﬀer S always increases in wV .34 This happens because V has a stronger willingness to
win than her opponent. Hence, more resources allow the victim increase the eﬀort, succeed with
a higher probability, and obtain a better equilibrium payoﬀ.
Further, assume a
mV
< b
mD
. Now, D has more incentives to win the contest and avoid the
punishment. When V ’s budget constraint binds and wV increases, two eﬀects emerge. Obviously,
the victim can ﬁght more, i.e. eV goes up. However, D also responds to growing wV with higher
eﬀort.35 In other words, the defendant, whose willingness to win is higher, does not feel discouraged
when his opponent displays better monetary ﬁghting abilities. With higher values of wV , D engages
into more ﬁght, and at some point, V ’s winning probability starts decreasing. Also, the eﬀort
cost the victim must pay (mVwV ) grows, and this coupled with lower values of PC (·) drives V ’s
equilibrium payoﬀ down. Hence, the optimal settlement oﬀer S declines in wV for wV suﬃciently
high because D competes more aggressively.
Proposition 2.3 implies that matching with a richer defendant does not lead to a better
settlement oﬀer (keeping V ’s characteristics constant). If wD grows and D uses all his budget,
the value of S must go down. The victim still accepts the oﬀer made; however, her equilibrium
payoﬀ diminishes. This result goes against a conventional perception developed in the literature
on “victim-defendant” settlements. The diﬀerence stems from our way to model the interaction
between players. In particular, we use the contest framework where V and D challenge each
other. Then, D’s ﬁghting abilities aﬀect V ’s equilibrium payoﬀ directly, and vice versa. The
previous studies on the topic did not employ this competitive approach and could not discover
the pattern we ﬁnd here.
Overall, increasing wD has two eﬀects. For simplicity, take a population of potential victims.
First, more resources allow the defendant settle with stronger opponents. In particular, he can
aﬀord the oﬀers that were infeasible before. We call this the “volume eﬀect”. Second, those
settlements that could appear even under lower values of wD can happen with smaller oﬀers.36
34See the proof of Proposition 2.3 for more details.
35See Proposition 2.2 for more details.
36If D’s budget constraint did not bind in a particular match under lower wD, the settlement oﬀer does not
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This pattern is labeled as the “price eﬀect”. Hence, more resources available make it easier for the
defendant to avoid the ﬁght not only because he can convince many victim types to settle, but
also because it gets cheaper (the amount of S reduces).
Next, we analyze when the settlement indeed takes place. To prevent the conﬂict, two
conditions must hold:
π∗D ≤ −S ⇔ −xphPC (e∗V , e∗D) (a− b) +mV e∗V +mDe∗D ≥ 0 (2.4.1)
S ≤ wD ⇔ axphPC (e∗V , e∗D)−mV e∗V ≤ wD (2.4.2)
where asterisks denote equilibrium values. Condition (2.4.1) states that D must be willing to settle,
i.e. his payoﬀ from entering the contest stage cannot exceed the settlement cost. On top of this,
the defendant has to hold enough resources to make an oﬀer the victim would accept (inequality
(2.4.2)). If at least one condition violates, the settlement does not happen. The ﬁrst thing to notice
connects players’ preferences and D’s willingness to settle. When V is not suﬃciently vindictive
(i.e. a ≤ b), condition (2.4.1) always holds. In this case, the settlement is eﬃcient. Otherwise,
D may prefer to ﬁght even if he has enough resources to make the oﬀer required. Further, we
concentrate on the latter case speciﬁcally.
Deﬁnition. Let y = (a, b, mV , mD, wV , wD) be a “preference–abilities” proﬁle, y ∈ Y ≡ R6≥.
Also, deﬁne Ya>b:
Ya>b = {y ∈ Y : a > b}
Proposition 2.4 illustrates that condition (2.4.2) not necessarily implies D’s willingness to settle.
Proposition 2.4. There exist non-empty sets of “preference–abilities” proﬁles YS¯ ⊂ Ya>b and
YS ⊂ Ya>b such that
• For any y ∈ YS¯ the defendant has enough resources to settle but is not willing to do so:⎧⎨⎩−xphPC (e∗V , e∗D) (a− b) +mV e∗V +mDe∗D < 0axphPC (e∗V , eD)−mV e∗V ≤ wD 	= Ø
• For any y ∈ YS the defendant has enough resources to settle and is willing to do so:⎧⎨⎩−xphPC (e∗V , e∗D) (a− b) +mV e∗V +mDe∗D ≥ 0axphPC (e∗V , eD)−mV e∗V ≤ wD 	= Ø
Proof. See Appendix A.
change with wD adjusting upward. Otherwise, S decreases with wD. See Proposition 2.3 for details.
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The result stated in Proposition 2.4 strongly relates to the victim’s advantage (or disadvantage)
in the contest. Whether feasible settlements always happen (namely, condition (2.4.2) implies
(2.4.1)) also depends on whose budget constraint binds in equilibrium. Take the case when both
contestants have enough resources to choose the interior eﬀort level. Then, the defendant wants
to settle if and only if V ’s non-monetary ﬁghting ability is relatively low (0 < 1
mV
≤ 2b2
amD(a−b)).
37
Since both players are unconstrained and the victim turns to be vindictive enough (a > b), a single
possibility D can dominate in the competition and drive the optimal settlement oﬀer down comes
from non-monetary ﬁghting abilities (mV and mD). If V has an advantage in both a and mV , in
equilibrium, the amount of S must rise (Proposition 2.3), and the settlement becomes expensive.
If the oﬀer is accepted, D pays the value of S with probability 1. However, if the game proceeds
to the contest stage, the defendant faces the punishment with probability less than 1, and his
equilibrium payoﬀ turns to be higher.38 Hence, D prefers to ﬁght even if he has enough resources
to aﬀord the settlement oﬀer.
Next, take the case when only D’s budget constraint binds. Here, the victim’s advantage stems
from both higher willingness to win (a > b) and more resources available. In this case, the defendant
who has enough money to make the settlement oﬀer always prefers to do so (condition (2.4.2)
implies (2.4.1)). If the victim dominates in non-monetary ﬁghting abilities as well (mV < mD),
the optimal amount of S increases suﬃciently. Then, the defendant who has limited resources can
never aﬀord the settlement oﬀer and must proceed to the contest stage. When D has an advantage
in non-monetary ﬁghting abilities (mV > mD), he can compete more and drive the optimal amount
of S down. Thus, avoiding the contest stage becomes feasible.39
If only V has limited resources, the case is similar to the unconstrained equilibrium we analyzed
before. Again, V ’s characteristics aﬀect the outcome of the settlement stage. When the victim
dominates in non-monetary ﬁghting abilities and / or incentives to win, this partly oﬀsets D’s
advantage in wD, and the optimal oﬀer S rises. As a result, the defendant no longer wants to
settle and prefers to move to the contest stage. However, if high values of wD are couples with
better non-monetary ﬁghting abilities and / or stronger willingness to avoid the punishment (b),
the settlement can happen.
Importantly, more wealth on D’s side (wD) not necessarily means that D is keen to settle. For
example, take the case when only D’s budget constraint is active. Also, assume wD is suﬃcient
37The condition of interest can also be rewritten in terms of relative winning beneﬁts:
mV ≥ amD (a− b)
2b2
⇔ a
mV
≤ b
mD
2b
(a− b)
38To make the contest more attractive than the settlement, D’s equilibrium winning probability must be
suﬃciently high.
39Similar patterns appear when both contestants face binding budget constraints. See the proof of Proposition
2.4 for more details.
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to make the optimal oﬀer S. Then, feasibility (condition (2.4.2)) implies D’s willingness to settle
(condition (2.4.1)).40 Now, increase wD such that D’s budget constraint does not bind and the
resources are suﬃcient to make the new optimal oﬀer S. If V has an advantage in non-monetary
ﬁghting abilities ( 1
mV
> 2b
2
amD(a−b)), the defendant is no longer willing to settle even if he holds
enough budget. Here, making D stronger in terms of resources available does not oﬀset the
victim’s dominance in winning beneﬁts (a > b) and mV . Speciﬁcally, the optimal settlement oﬀer
S does not reduce much. However, more money available allows the defendant increase his eﬀort
and avoid the punishment with a higher probability. The latter eﬀect prevails, and the ﬁght turns
to be more attractive for D. Hence, those defendants who do not manage to settle not necessarily
fail to meet the feasibility requirement (condition (2.4.2)): they can just display no willingness to
avoid the contest stage.
The case where the defendant prefers to ﬁght corresponds to relatively high aggregate
equilibrium eﬀort. Also, it features V ’s dominance in winning beneﬁts and ﬁghting abilities. In
other words, victims win more often, and non-settled cases end up in court with a higher
probability.
It is an open question whether no willingness to settle, combined with a suﬃcient amount of
resources available to the defendant, can create any problems for the society. If the institute of
“victim-defendant” settlements aims to delegate the case resolution to the parties involved when
oﬀenders have enough money to compensate their opponents and reduce the total load on courts,
this goal might not be achieved. As emphasized earlier, this type of non-settled matches also
features signiﬁcant aggregate eﬀort. It may translate into longer trials and higher processing costs
for prosecutors and judges as well. Further, victims, who exert more eﬀort in the given scenario,
pay an additional cost on top of the harm they have already encountered. This observation drives
us to revictimization concerns. Overall, the cases with feasible but not desirable settlements may
generate some cost for the society, and we leave a broader discussion for the future.
2.5 The Empirical Analysis
In this section, we bring the proposed theoretical model to the data on criminal traﬃc oﬀenses in
Russia. As it was emphasized earlier, for this group of crimes, Russian laws allow defendants
settle with their victims before entering the court stage. Also, traﬃc oﬀenses constitute
unintentional crimes where two conﬂicting parties are matched randomly. We exploit this feature
in our identiﬁcation strategy, structurally estimate the model, and highlight which channels
explain the settlements observed.
40See the proof of Proposition 2.4 for more details.
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2.5.1 The Data
2.5.1.1 Data Sources
To estimate the model, we use centralized databases that aggregate police-level data across 84
Russian regions for the period from 2013 to 2014. All investigators must ﬁll in special statistical
cards, which contain the information about diﬀerent stages of the process.41 The ﬁrst database
represents the universe of criminal traﬃc oﬀenses that have been registered by police stations.42
Here, a unit of observation is a case. The information available includes:
1. The time and the date when the accident happened (Form 1);43
2. The aggregate data on victims such as a number of deaths and / or serious bodily injuries,
average bodily injuries plus the employment status of up to two victims (Form 1);44
3. The outcome of the investigation stage (Form 3).
Another database incorporates information about oﬀenders’ characteristics. Now, a unit of
observation is a defendant. We observe:
1. The data on defendants’ demographic attributes such as gender, his / her socio-economic
status etc. (Form 2)
2. The defendant’s history of criminal and administrative records (Form 2);
3. The court outcome, including the type of punishment and its duration (Form 6).
For every registered case, there can be no defendant (an oﬀender has not been caught or did not
get an accusation), exactly one defendant, and more than one defendant (the crime was committed
by a group). Using the case identiﬁer, the code of the police department, and the year when the
accident happened, we merge the two datasets. Overall, 56′000 records have at least one defendant.
The third database provides detailed information for each victim. It includes:
1. Gender, which age and ethnic group the victim belongs to (Form 5);
2. The victim’s employment status (Form 5);
3. His / her citizenship and residency (Form 5);
41The Institute for the Rule of Law at the European University at Saint Petersburg has an access to police-level
statistical cards. This information is provided for research purposes under a restricted user agreement.
42We exclude the cases with military defendants because they are considered under the jurisdiction of military
courts.
43All form numbers are set by the federal law.
44Unfortunately, the form does not allow us distinguish who, out of the two victims, got more severe injuries.
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4. The harm caused by the oﬀense (Form 5).
Once we merge this information with the ﬁrst database, 57′000 cases have at least one entry
from Form 5. However, some crimes stay unmatched. One possible explanation comes from
investigators’ behavior. Since Form 5 partly duplicates Form 1, they may skip this card in order to
save time. As a piece of supportive evidence, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between a probability of
Form 5 missing and a number of victims reported in Form 1. Also, the absence of Form 5 displays
a weak positive correlation with the outcome of the investigation stage, especially if investigators
or prosecutors decided not to press charges.
The data also include a so-called fabula that describes the case shortly. Often, investigators
use this document for their own easy reference. The description style and the amount of details it
contains show signiﬁcant variation across police departments. Usually, the fabula consists of two
parts. First, it provides general information on the situation (time, location, weather conditions
etc.) and the participants starting from the description of the oﬀender’s actions. As a rule, the
text speciﬁes the types of cars driven by the defendant and the victim (where applicable). It also
mentions whether pedestrians were involved. The second part of the fabula describes the harm
made and clariﬁes who the victim is: a pedestrian, a passenger, or a driver.
Using the information on cars mentioned in the fabula, their expected prices are imputed. To
approximate these values, we collect data on prices of same-brand second-hand cars posted on
https://auto.ru/ in October, 2014.45 Then, the ﬁrst car mentioned in the fabula is attributed to
the oﬀender. We assign the second vehicle that appears in the fabula to the victim if and only if
• It is mentioned in the ﬁrst part of the text and
• The second part explicitly attributes the victim to this car.
The information from all the fabulas is automatically processed with the use of regular expressions.
2.5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
The dataset includes more than 70′000 registered criminal traﬃc oﬀenses. This covers all 84
Russian regions, 2′500 police departments, and 700 courts.46 Around 14′000 cases have no oﬀender
identiﬁed. Partly, it explains with hit-and-runs. On top of this, the accidents that took place in
the end of 2014 were still under investigation when the dataset was collected. Finally, the police
does not press charges for some of the identiﬁed oﬀenders, and the prosecutors happen to drop
cases as well.
45https://auto.ru/ is one of the largest on-line platforms for private car sales in Russia.
46The data on courts are incomplete because around a half of the processed cases have no court identiﬁers.
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In total, charges are pressed in 55′000 out of 70′000 cases. The information on victims is
available for almost all registered criminal traﬃc oﬀenses. Oﬀenders’ characteristics become
observable only if the charges apply. We restore car prices for roughly a half of the oﬀenders. At
the same time, the information on vehicles where the victim has been injured is available only for
a small subset of cases. Table 2.1 summarizes all the data available.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of The Data
Number of
police departments 2′533
courts 705
regions 84
Number of cases
by stage:
case registered 73′661
oﬀender is identiﬁed 59′868
oﬀender is charged by the police 56′010
oﬀender is charged by the prosecutor 55′240
by information available:
info on victims 72′294
info on car prices for victims 5′904
info on oﬀenders 56′280
info on car prices for oﬀenders 29′777
by reporting period:
2013 37′327
2014 36′334
We sort the variables into four blocks:
1. Сharacteristics of the accident and the harm made;
2. Victim-speciﬁc details;
3. Oﬀender’s characteristics;
4. The case outcomes.
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics for all the groups. The ﬁrst block of observations includes
a total number of victims and speciﬁes how many of them ended up dead or seriously injured. The
data also distinguish female victims and minors. Further, block (1) indicates whether the oﬀender
and the victim were intoxicated. Using the information from the fabulas, we recover the cases that
involve pedestrians and passengers.47
47Any match with the phrase “hit a pedestrian” and its variations raises the ﬂag for the variable pedestrian. Any
match with the word “passenger” and its variations raises the ﬂag for the variable passenger.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Case-Speciﬁc Characteristics
Accident and Harm
variable mean sd
Number of victims 1.18 0.76
out of which:
survived in the accident 0.66 0.59
died in the accident 0.45 0.70
minors 0.12 0.35
females 0.46 0.59
Under inﬂuence:
oﬀender 0.22 0.41
victim 0.04 0.19
Victim’s role:
pedestrian 0.27 0.44
passenger 0.26 0.44
Victim
variable mean sd
Female 0.44 0.50
Age:
1 to 13 (8 y.o.) 0.07 0.25
14 to 15 (15 y.o.) 0.02 0.16
16 to 17 (17 y.o.) 0.03 0.17
18 to 24 (20 y.o.) 0.14 0.35
25 to 29 (27 y.o.) 0.12 0.33
30 to 49 (40 y.o.) 0.31 0.46
50 to 54 (52 y.o.) 0.07 0.26
55 to 59 (57 y.o.) 0.07 0.25
≥ 60 (65 y.o.) 0.15 0.36
Employment status:
no job 0.46 0.50
worker 0.24 0.43
oﬃce worker 0.02 0.15
top-manager 0.00 0.06
entrepreneur 0.01 0.10
budget oﬃce worker 0.01 0.12
student 0.08 0.27
welfare recipient 0.03 0.16
retired 0.13 0.34
other 0.01 0.08
In law enforcement: 0.01 0.10
Related:
acquaintance 0.06 0.24
cohabitant 0.00 0.06
family 0.01 0.10
close family 0.03 0.16
Imputed car price (rub. mln) 0.31 0.26
Offender
variable mean sd
Female 0.09 0.28
Age:
16 to 17 (17 y.o.) 0.01 0.08
18 to 24 (20 y.o.) 0.21 0.41
25 to 29 (27 y.o.) 0.21 0.41
30 to 39 (35 y.o.) 0.26 0.44
40 to 49 (45 y.o.) 0.15 0.36
50 to 59 (55 y.o.) 0.11 0.32
≥ 60 (65 y.o.) 0.05 0.22
Employment status:
no job 0.41 0.49
worker 0.42 0.49
oﬃce worker 0.03 0.18
top-manager 0.01 0.10
entrepreneur 0.03 0.17
budget oﬃce worker 0.02 0.14
student 0.03 0.17
welfare recipient 0.00 0.05
retired 0.04 0.20
other 0.01 0.08
In law enforcement 0.02 0.12
Education:
college (16 years) 0.19 0.39
vocational (13 years) 0.34 0.47
technical (13 years) 0.02 0.14
high school (11 years) 0.35 0.48
secondary school (9 years) 0.08 0.27
elementary school (4 years) 0.01 0.12
no school (0 years) 0.00 0.05
Imputed car price (rub. mln) 0.29 0.25
Past oﬀences:
criminal history 0.17 0.38
administrative ﬁnes 0.10 0.30
Outcomes
variable mean sd
Settlements 0.17 0.38
In court 0.58 0.49
out of which:
incarcerated 0.13 0.33
no information 0.24 0.43
Note: Summary statistics are provided only for the cases where oﬀenders were charged by a prosecutor.
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To make the analysis simpler, we use the information only on the ﬁrst victim mentioned in Form
5; if this is not available, we exploit Form 1.48 One can observe the victim’s gender, his/her age
group and employment status (see Table 2.2).49 Additionally, we create a dummy to distinguish
those individuals who work in law enforcement or in the government. Also, the data indicate
whether two parties of the conﬂict know each other. In particular, a victim can be an oﬀender’s
acquaintance, cohabitant, family member, or close relative. Finally, for some victims, we manage
to restore expected car prices.50
For oﬀenders’ personal characteristics, the dataset is a bit richer. On top of socio-economic
aspects, it provides information on oﬀenders’ educational background, which ranges from no
education to holding a college degree (seven categories in total). All other demographic
characteristics are the same as for victims, except the age groups do not coincide.51 Also, we
trace if the oﬀender has any past criminal and/or administrative oﬀense records.
As for the outcomes, the cases can be broadly categorized into:
1. Those that settled out-of-court,
2. Those that reached the court stage, and
3. Those that neither settled nor reached the court stage.52
If the case ends up in court and the oﬀender is recognized as guilty, he can get a real incarceration
term, receive a suspended sentence or face other forms of punishment. Some cases have missing
outcomes. Most of such oﬀenses were registered in the end of 2014 and were still at the investigation
stage when the observation terminated. For simplicity, we treat these cases as those that have not
reached the court yet.53
2.5.2 Non-Monetary Fighting Abilities: The Reduced Form Evidence
To illustrate that not only monetary resources aﬀect the case outcome, consider some reduced
form evidence. We focus on law enforcers and government oﬃcials. Belonging to these socio-
economic groups has two non-monetary returns. First, law enforcers and government oﬃcials know
48When there are many victims, the ﬁrst person registered is assumed to be the one with the least disputed victim
status.
49The original data specify which age group a victim belongs to. Instead of creating a set of indicators, we recode
the variable by taking the mean for every interval.
50Apparently, this measure displays a signiﬁcant noise when used to approximate the victim’s wealth. In fact,
being a passenger of a certain car gives less information about one’s income than driving this particular vehicle. To
provide a robustness check, we will also estimate the model without this wealth proxy.
51This is the case because in Russia, criminal responsibility starts from the age of 14.
52The last group includes only the cases that had an indicted oﬀender but were dropped later. We also acknowledge
that there can exist criminal traﬃc oﬀense that did not reach the sample, and they may constitute a suﬃcient share
of all the cases. However, for now we do not account for this possibility.
53In the future, we are going to impute expected outcomes for such cases as a part of the estimation.
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the institutional setting better and can defend themselves more eﬃciently in case of committing
a crime / becoming a victim. Second, these people are connected to the networks of lawyers,
legislators, and other mighty individuals. Hence, they may exploit the latter channel to aﬀect the
case outcome. For these reasons, we expect the given group to display diﬀerent patterns.
Consider the following regression equation:
yi = α+βDlawenf
i
D +βV lawenf
i
V + γlawenf
i
Dlawenf
i
V +ψ1pcar
i
D +ψ2policei+ψ3ti+ui (2.5.1)
where
• lawenf il = 1 speciﬁes whether l = {V, D} is a law enforcer or a government oﬃcial (otherwise,
lawenf il = 0);
• pcariD reﬂects a mean car price for D;
• policei identiﬁes a ﬁxed eﬀect of the police department;
• ti captures year-speciﬁc eﬀects.
Including pcariD into (2.5.1) allows us isolate the eﬀect of lawenf il , l = {V, D}. In particular, we
compare law enforcers and government oﬃcials with individuals of the same wealth level but from
other socio-economic groups. Estimation results are reported for three diﬀerent samples. First,
we consider all criminal traﬃc oﬀenses available. Then, we focus only on “car vs. pedestrian”
accidents where victims and oﬀenders are deﬁnitely stranger.54 Finally, to make the evidence even
more convincing, we exclude low-status defendants (namely, unemployed individuals and welfare
recipients) from the sample. Now, the baseline group – non-oﬃcials – becomes more comparable
to law enforcers and government oﬃcials in terms of wealth. Standard errors are clustered at the
police department level because a share of law enforcers and government oﬃcials is likely to vary
across diﬀerent locations.
Table 2.3 summarizes the estimates of βD and γ speciﬁed in (2.5.1). The ﬁrst three columns
include all observations available; columns 4–6 report the results only for “car vs. pedestrian”
cases; the last subsample (columns 7–10) also disregards low-status defendants (individuals without
permanent job and welfare recipients). The “None” speciﬁcation (columns 1, 4, and 7) does not
control for car prices or brands.55 The “Price” approach (columns 2, 5, and 8) and the “Brand”
model include imputed car prices and brands as additional explanatory variables, respectively.
Now, we comment on the estimation results brieﬂy. Controlling for defendants’ wealth proxies,
law enforcers and government oﬃcials are more likely to settle with their victims. Notice that the
eﬀect disappears when we estimate the model on the full sample (Table 2.3, columns 1–3): the
54With this approach, we eliminate all possible correlations between V ’s and D’s wealth.
55Car brands identify trucks, buses, and motorcycles as separate categories.
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Table 2.3: Case Outcomes When Defendants Are Law Enforcers and Government Oﬃcials
Sample: All Pedestrians† Pedestrians &
No low-status
oﬀenders‡
Car controls: None Price Brand None Price Brand None Price Brand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Settled
βD .003 .028 .029 .083 .216* .217* .069 .163* .172*
(.014) (.028) (.026) (.047) (.086) (.086) (.050) (.081) (.081)
γ .158** .142 .187 -.169 -.156 -.190 -.244 .012 -.073
(.057) (.105) (.099) (.122) (.100) (.102) (.225) (.117) (.111)
N all 50987 21939 26266 11455 5581 6508 6771 3290 3860
Among the non-settled cases
Reached the court
βD -.028 -.042 -.036 .041 -.066 -.060 .029 -.069 -.060
(.020) (.036) (.034) (.047) (.104) (.099) (.060) (.114) (.110)
γ -.023 -.071 -.101 -.033 -.006 -.010 -.085 -.117 .074
(.065) (.135) (.124) (.083) (.128) (.119) (.101) (.150) (.141)
Incarceration or
deprivation of
freedom
βd -.064*** -.075* -.062* -.007 -.177* -.146 -.015 -.157* -.137
(.018) (.030) (.028) (.058) (.073) (.078) (.070) (.079) (.084)
γ .012 .149 .090 .098 .744*** .825*** .009 .107 .558***
(.060) (.122) (.112) (.195) (.111) (.115) (.161) (.151) (.152)
Incarceration
βd -.027 -.032 -.030 -.039 -.149* -.111 -.023 -.126 -.099
(.015) (.024) (.022) (.042) (.065) (.070) (.048) (.068) (.074)
γ -.050 .021 .001 .067 .753*** .743*** .143 .729*** .799***
(.051) (.097) (.089) (.191) (.097) (.102) (.235) (.116) (.118)
N not settled 42383 18091 21751 9485 4594 5373 5452 2636 3105
Note:
† Sample with one victim who is a pedestrian, not a student or retired;
‡ Same as † excluding low-status oﬀenders (unemployed individuals and welfare recipients);
The regression with police department ﬁxed eﬀects; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the police
department level. To compute a number of settled cases, we use the lawsuits with non-missing information on
victims’ and defendants’ employment status, which roughly matches the sample of cases with prosecutorial charges.
The other outcomes – those that reached the court and where oﬀenders got incarcerated or faced the deprivation
of freedom – are based on the sample of non-settled cases.
Car brands identify trucks, buses, and motorcycles as separate categories.
See (2.5.1) for the meaning of βD and γ.
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null hypothesis of βD = 0 cannot be rejected. At the same time, the interaction term γ is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. It happens because the full sample accommodates all the cases where
the victim got injured inside the defendant’s car, and this implies non-random matching between
the two conﬂicting parties.56 Focusing only on “car vs. pedestrian accidents” (Table 2.3, columns
4–9) gives a clearer prediction. Controlling for car prices or brands, a probability to settle for law
enforcers and government oﬃcials exceeds its counterpart for the baseline group by 20 percentage
points. Excluding low-status defendants from the analysis reduces the magnitude of the eﬀect (βD
gets smaller) but does not harm its statistical signiﬁcance. The interaction term γ is negative,
although insigniﬁcant.
Then, we check what happens with non-settled cases. The probability to reach the court does
not display any variation across the groups: neither βD nor γ are statistically signiﬁcant in the
respective regressions. However, the probability to get a strict punishment (namely, a deprivation
of freedom or a real prison term) tends to diﬀer. In particular, law enforcers and government
oﬃcials are less likely to end up with a real sentence (βD is negative and statistically signiﬁcant).
The eﬀect is not so pronounced if we look at incarceration rates separately. Remarkably, the
interaction term in the “car vs. pedestrian” sample is positive and quite large. These observations
call for the following story. Suppose a law enforcer or a government oﬃcial hurts a person from the
same socio-economic group. If these individuals happen to know each other, they prefer to settle.
However, if the two parties are strangers, the case is likely to move to the court stage where the
defendant has worse chances to avoid the prison.
Overall, law enforcers and government oﬃcials tend to behave diﬀerently in the case resolution.
Controlling for wealth proxies and non-random matching does not eliminate the discrepancies
observed across groups, and we can indeed connect these patterns to non-monetary channels of
inﬂuence.
2.5.3 The Structural Setup
To identify contestants’ bargaining positions, we use the variation in the harm made, case outcomes,
match- and individual-speciﬁc characteristics. The most important proxies for players’ wealth are
socio-economic status and imputed mean car prices. Also, the non-intentional nature of traﬃc
oﬀenses allows us avoid any issues related to self-selection into crime. With the proposed theoretical
model, we formulate three key results and build the identiﬁcation strategy upon them. 57
Result 1. The optimal oﬀer S increases in the expected punishment xph.
56For example, the victim and the defendant may be friends or colleagues who have the same occupation.
57See Section 2.4 for technical details.
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In the data, the likelihood of observing a settlement indeed declines when the harm made (and,
consequently, expected punishment) grows. The model relates this fact to increasing optimal oﬀers
that most defendants cannot aﬀord. Hence, the variation in the observed harm can help us identify
budget constraints oﬀenders with comparable case- and individual-speciﬁc attributes face.
Result 2. The optimal oﬀer S increases in the vindictiveness parameter a.
Matching with a more vindictive person makes a settlement more expensive, and the likelihood
of reaching an out-of-court agreement decreases. Notice that the indicated eﬀect works in the same
direction as the one presented in Result 1. To distinguish these two channels, we treat “Car vs.
pedestrian” accidents with purely random matches as a control group for criminal traﬃc oﬀenses
where two sides of the conﬂict know each other. The latter subset includes more than 10% of
the victim population (see Table 2.2). Looking at a particular level of the harm made, we can
already see that settlements are less frequent for “Car vs. pedestrian” accidents and almost never
happen for oﬀenses with more than one death. The proposed identiﬁcation scheme requires two
assumptions to produce consistent and unbiased estimates:
1. The vindictiveness parameter a does not depend on the harm made;
2. Judges do not internalize the eﬀect of non-random matching, i.e. the expected punishment
does not correlate with victim-defendant relationship.
Result 3. Non-monetary ﬁghting abilities and contestants’ preferences can be separately
identiﬁed.
For this claim to hold, one must observe individual wealth or have strong proxies for this
variable. A separate identiﬁcation of preferences and non-monetary ﬁghting abilities becomes
possible for two reasons. First, our theoretical model accommodates budget constraints. Second,
the dataset includes uneven victim-defendant matches where these constraints are likely to
bind.58 Otherwise, one could not distinguish the eﬀect of a (b) from mV (mD) without additional
assumptions.
To illustrate Result 3, consider a simple “2 × 2” example. Take a population of potential
victims (v = {1, ..., N}) and defendants (d = {1, ..., N}) who match at random. Suppose there
are only two wealth levels that are perfectly observed by an econometrician, i.e. wi =
{
wi, wi
}
,
i = {V, D}.59 Further, assume player i’s budget constraint always (never) binds when he (she)
faces wi = wi (wi = wi). For simplicity, we require all contestants to have identical preferences
and non-monetary ﬁghting abilities that the econometrician must infer:
av ≡ a, mV, v = mV ∀ v = {1, ..., N}
58For instance, we observe individuals, who drive expensive cars, matched against people without a permanent
job.
59The result still holds if contestants’ wealth is observable with a small noise.
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bd ≡ d, mD, d = mD ∀ d = {1, ..., N}
Let f(wD, wV ) denote an empirical frequency of observing the (wD, wV ) match in court, and assume
the following:
f(wD, wV ) = f(wD, wV ) = f1, f(wD, wV ) = f2 and f(wD, wV ) = 1− f2
Using the theoretical model developed in Section 2.4, we can compute case-speciﬁc probabilities
to end up in court:
wV = w
V wV = w
V
wD = w
D w˜V
w˜V +w˜D
1−
√
w˜D
a˜xph
wD = w
D
√
w˜V
b˜xph
a˜
a˜+b˜
where w˜i = wimi , i = {V, D}, a˜ = amV , and b˜ = bmD . Matching these theoretical moments against
their empirical counterparts, we can obtain the following estimates:
aˆ =
f1w
V
(1− f1) f 22
1
xph
, bˆ =
(1− f1)wD
f1f 22
1
xph
and
(̂
mV
mD
)
=
(1− x1)
x1
aˆ
bˆ
where xph can be identiﬁed by exploring the variation in the harm made and the corresponding
court decisions. Unfortunately, we cannot separate the eﬀect of mV from mD without imposing
additional restrictions. However, using the variation in players’ approximated wealth and empirical
frequencies to end up in court for diﬀerent types of victim-defendant matches, we can estimate
preferences and non-monetary ﬁghting abilities separately. The described strategy works well when
we assume no selection bias at a pre-investigation stage. If, however, some matches (for example,(
wD = w¯
D, wV = w
V
)
) are systematically underrepresented in our sample, the estimator must be
adjusted respectively. Other identiﬁcation restrictions will be discussed later.
Let γ and X denote the sets of parameters and controls, respectively.
Deﬁnition. Nε∈[u1, u2] (m, σ) denotes the truncation of a normally distributed random variable
ε ∼ N (m, σ) for ε ∈ [u1, u2]. Parameters m and σ correspond to mean and standard deviation of
the general normal distribution.60
Given the data available, we cannot distinguish x from ph and work only with the expected
punishment, xph. Assume xph is drawn from the following distribution:
xph ∼ Nxph≥0 (f (h, Z) , σx)
60The theoretical model we developed in Section 2.4 is well-deﬁned only for non-negative values of xph, a, b, wi,
mi, i = {V, D}. For this reason, one must restrict the supports of the underlying distributions.
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where f (h, Z) is a deterministic function of harm made (h) and other case- and region-speciﬁc
controls (Z).61 The draws of xph are independent across “victim-defendant” matches. For every
case i, we impose the following restriction on the shape of f (h, Z):
f (hi, Zi) = λ0 + λ1hi + λ2regioni
where
• hi includes all characteristics of the accident, such as:
1. A number of victims from diﬀerent gender and age groups;
2. Whether D and / or V were drunk;
3. If D already has criminal and / or administrative records.
All these controls enter the value of hi linearly.
• regioni contains dummy variables showing where the accident happened.
As it was mentioned before, all the cases have three possible outcomes:
1. s = 1: D and V settle among themselves (otherwise, s = 0)
2. c = 1: D and V do not settle, and the case goes to court (otherwise, c = 0):
• xobs = 1: the decision is known
• xobs = 0: the decision is not known
3. nc = 1: D and V do not settle, and the case does not go to court (for example, an investigator
or a prosecutor can decide to close the ﬁle)
In practice, underlying parameters of the model, such as vindictiveness or non-monetary ﬁghting
abilities, depend on victim- and defendant-speciﬁc characteristics. For this reason, we impose
following assumptions on the distributions of a, b, wV , mD, mV , mD:62
wiV ∼ NwiV ≥0 (w¯iV , σwV ) where
w¯V = α0 + α1SES
i
V + α2gender
i
V + α3child
i + α4age
i
V + α5 (age
i
V )
2
wiD ∼ NwiD≥0 (w¯iD, σwD) where
w¯iD = β0 + β1SES
i
D + β2gender
i
D + β3age
i
D + β4 (age
i
D)
2
+ β5edu
i
D + pcar
i
D
ai ∼ Nai≥0 (a¯i, σ¯a) where
a¯i = δ0 + δ1pedestrian
i
V + δ2related
i + δ3w¯
i
V , σ¯a =
√
σ2a + δ
2
2V ar (w
i
V )
61The distribution of xph is the lower truncation of N (0, σx) with the xph ∈ [0, ∞) support.
62All draws are assumed to be independent across cases.
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bi ∼ Nbi≥0
(
b¯i, σ¯b
)
where
b¯i = η0 + η1w¯
i
D, σ¯b =
√
σ2b + η
2
1V ar (w
i
D)
mij ∼ Nmij≥0
(
m¯ij, σ
m
j
)
, j = {V, D} where
m¯ij = π
j
0 + π
j
1lawenf
i
j
where
• SESij denotes socio-economic status of l = {V, D};
• childi = 1 if V ’s age is below 18;
• ageij indicates which age group l = {V, D} belongs to;
• pcariD reﬂects a mean car price for D;
• pedestrianiV = 1 signals that V is a pedestrian;
• eduiD shows the highest degree D holds (in years of education);
• relatedi establishes if V knows D and how close their relationships are (for example, family
members);
• lawenf il = 1 speciﬁes whether l = {V, D} is a law enforcer or a government oﬃcial.63
We comment on these assumptions brieﬂy. To identify parameters that shape expected wealth
(w¯V and w¯D), we exploit the variation in players’ socio-economic status (SES), gender, age,
educational attainment, and imputed mean car prices (where applicable). Clearly, SES aﬀects
individual income and positively correlates with wV and wD. On average, we expect top-managers
to display higher wealth than workers and people without a permanent job. Also, we take account
of gender to explore the variation in resources available to males and females. Mean car prices
(pcar) convey another piece of information about contestants’ wealth. On average, those who drive
more expensive vehicles are richer.64 However, car prices become a relevant proxy for V ’s wealth
if and only if the victim happened to be a driver or a passenger but not a pedestrian. As it was
mentioned earlier, the information on V ’s car price is harder to get from the fabulas and may
contain a lot of noise. For these two reasons, we do not include pcar into wV .
Child victims can display diﬀerent wealth patterns because they do not have own income
yet. To capture this source of variation in wV , we assign a separate indicator, childi, to the
63The iid assumption stems from random matching between victims and defendants in traﬃc accidents, which
constitute unintentional crimes.
64Notice that pcar enters wD with the weight of 1. This allows us measure wD in currency units and treat other
coeﬃcients as exchange rates between money and the controls of interest.
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given group. Typically, individuals earn less in the beginning and in the end of their career, i.e.
wi, i = {V, D} can display an inverse U -shape pattern with respect to age (keeping all other
characteristics constant). For this reason, wi, i = {V, D} must be instrumented with age and
age2. Finally, well-paid jobs often require a college degree. Thus, better educational background
can be associated with higher wealth.
Next, consider what drives contestants’ preferences. In the beginning, we focus on the
vindictiveness parameter a. To identify the value of interest, two sources of variation can be
exploited. First, we look at victim-defendant relationship. Particularly, close relatives of the
defendant who play on the victim’s side may be less vindictive than strangers. Second, if richer
individuals lose their ability to work and generate more income, they can extract higher
vengeance beneﬁts from D being punished. To capture this eﬀect, wV enters a. D’s disutility of
being punished also correlates with his wealth. For instance, those defendants who earn a lot or
have a very promising career can lose more in case of punishment, especially if they get a real jail
term.
In the end, we explain how mV and mD are shaped. As it was emphasized before, being a
law enforcer or a government oﬃcial gives two advantages. First, it allows the individual learn
the system (its institutional setting, legal procedures etc.) better and act faster if the accident
happens. Second, those who work in the given sectors operate in the network of law enforcers,
build new connections and can use this inﬂuence if needed. Both aforementioned assets are clearly
non-monetary and aﬀect the contest outcome.65 Hence, we use lawenf to explain mV and mD .
Generally, mV and mD cannot be separately identiﬁed (see Result 3 and the discussion on
Page 142). Nevertheless, instrumenting mV and mD with lawenf makes it possible to quantify the
advantage (or disadvantage) law enforcers and government oﬃcials have in non-monetary ﬁghting
abilities. In the data, we observe four types of matches:
1. Both V and D do not work in law enforcement or in the government, i.e. lawenfV =
lawenfD = 0;
2. Only V (D) works in law enforcement or in the government, i.e. lawenfV = 1, lawenfD = 0
(lawenfV = 0, lawenfD = 1);
3. Both V and D work in law enforcement or in the government, i.e. lawenfV = lawenfD = 1.
Let
(
mV
mD
)
{lawenfV , lawenfD}
denote the ratio of non-monetary ﬁghting abilities for each
{lawenfV , lawenfD} match. Estimating the model, we obtain four values:(̂
mV
mD
)
{0, 0}
= r1,
(̂
mV
mD
)
{1, 0}
= r2
65See Subsection 2.5.2 for more details.
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(̂
mV
mD
)
{0, 1}
= r3,
(̂
mV
mD
)
{1, 1}
= r4
Using this information, one can compute a lower bound for the relative diﬀerence in non-monetary
ﬁghting abilities victims and defendants from diﬀerent groups display:
m̂1V
m0V
= min
{
r4
r3
,
r2
r1
}
,
m̂1D
m0D
= min
{
r1
r2
,
r2
r4
}
where m0i (m1i ) corresponds to the mi value under lawenfi = 0 (lawenfi = 1), i = {V, D}.
The random nature of traﬃc oﬀenses and the modeling assumptions imposed on key parameters
allow us identify the variance of underlying noise distributions. The expected punishment xph
must not aﬀect players’ preferences and ﬁghting abilities. Including region-speciﬁc controls and
distinguishing between diﬀerent types of victims (children, females etc.) help us isolate common
shocks judges face when making their decisions about sanctions.66 Hence, the unexplained variation
can be associated with a noise term.
Players’ wealth levels, wV and wD, are assumed to be uncorrelated with their preferences and
non-monetary ﬁghting abilities. Moreover, given that defendants and victims match at random,
wV and wD must be independently drawn from diﬀerent distributions. Here, we assume that two
sides of the conﬂict can display contrasting wealth patterns. The identiﬁcation becomes possible
when we use “Car vs. car” accidents as a control group for “Car vs. pedestrian” oﬀenses. On
average, those who happen to own a car can be richer than individuals without vehicles. Hence,
wV and wD are driven by diﬀerent data generating processes. Controlling for systematic patterns
(socio-economic status, age, educational attainment, imputed mean car prices), we attribute the
residual variation to wealth shocks and identify σwV and σwD.
As Result 3 shows, contestants’ preferences can be separately identiﬁed, and we model them as
a function of individual wealth. For the vindictiveness parameter a, there is one more instrumental
variable – victim-defendant relationship – that helps in capturing other systematic patterns.67
Again, the randomness of traﬃc accidents allows us assume a zero correlation between a and
b, which is especially true when one concentrates on “Car vs. pedestrian” matches. Hence, all
unexplained variation in players’ preferences is treated as shocks to the corresponding variables.
Similar arguments apply to the identiﬁcation of σmV (σmD ) where mV (mD) is assumed to be
independent of wealth, preference parameters, case- and opponent-speciﬁc characteristics.
Now, we employ the theoretical model to construct the likelihood function. Let FG⊆R7≥ (g),
G =
{
wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, xp
h
}
denote a joint distribution of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph.
66Ideally, one should also control for policy department and court-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Unfortunately, this
information is not available for all cases.
67Also, it is crucial that the harm made does not shape preferences for revenge (a).
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Assume Ij, j = {1, ..., 4} is equal to a unity if equilibrium j is played (otherwise, Ij = 0).68 Then,
a complete data likelihood for every case i (Lci) looks as follows:
Lci (γ, Xi) =
4∑
j=1
Iij
((
ISij
)si [(
1− ISij
) (
P ijC
(
xph
)xiobs
i
)ci (
1− P ijC
)nci]1−si)
where
• ISij = 1 if D and V prefer to settle in equilibrium j for given parameter values and budget
constraints;
•
(
xph
)
i
represents the expected in-court punishment.
Since we do not observe wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph directly, Iij and ISij must be replaced with
corresponding probabilities. Also, one has to take expected values of
(
xph
)
i
and P ijC (a probability
to end up in court for case i).
To give an example, consider equilibrium 1 where budget constraints of both D and V are
non-binding. This outcome emerges if and only if:69⎧⎨⎩wV ≥ mV
xpha2bmD
(amD+bmV )
2
wD ≥ mD xphb2amV(amD+bmV )2
Then, we can deﬁne a probability to observe equilibrium 1 in the data:
P1 = Pr
(
wV ≥ mV xp
ha2bmD
(amD + bmV )
2 , wD ≥ mD
xphb2amV
(amD + bmV )
2
)
where P1 can be compute given FG⊆R7≥ (g) and the assumptions on the distributions of wV , wD, a,
b, mV , mD, and xph.70 Similarly, one can ﬁnd the probabilities to observe equilibria 2, 3, and 4:
P2 = Pr
(
wV ≥ mV xpha2bmD(amD+bmV )2 , wD < mD
xphb2amV
(amD+bmV )
2
)
Pr
(
wV < mV
xpha2bmD
(amD+bmV )
2 , wD ≥ mD xphb2amV(amD+bmV )2
)
P4 = Pr
(
wV < mV
xpha2bmD
(amD+bmV )
2 , wD < mD
xphb2amV
(amD+bmV )
2
)
Now, for every equilibrium outcome j, we can ﬁnd a probability to settle, P sj . Recall conditions
(2.4.1) and (2.4.2) where the former indicates D’s willingness to settle and the latter states when
it is feasible to prevent the ﬁght. Then, a probability to settle becomes
68The equilibrium type depends on whose budget constrain binds in the optimum. See the proof of Proposition
2.1 for more details.
69See the proof of Proposition 2.1 for more details.
70There is no analytical solution for P1. To approximate this value, we simulate the FG⊆R7≥ (g) distribution for
given parameters and recover P1.
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P sj = Pr
(
π∗D, j ≤ −π∗V, j, π∗V, j ≤ wD | j
)
where π∗D, j and π∗V, j reﬂect contestants’ payoﬀs in equilibrium j.71
Further, we turn our attention to scenario-speciﬁc probabilities to end up in court (P jC). In the
complete data case, these values look as follows:
P 1C =
amD
amD+bmV
, P 2C = 1−
√
wDmV
mDaxph
P 3C =
√
wV mD
mV bxph
, P 4C =
wV mD
wV mD+wDmV
Since we only know the distributions of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph, one needs to take expected
values of P jC , j = {1, ..., 4}:
P¯ jC = E
(
P jC | j
)
P jC , j = {1, ..., 4} are well-deﬁned over supports of the corresponding conditional distributions.72
The probability to avoid the court stage is just a complement of PC (or its expected value).
For each case that goes to court, the decision is either available (xobs = 1) or not (xobs = 0). In
the data, xobs includes various types of punishment ranging from diﬀerent limitations of freedom
to real prison sentences. To rank these options in utility (or disutility) terms, one might propose a
scale. However, it requires extensive robustness checks. Instead, we employ the following (although
simplistic) assumption:
x∗ =
⎧⎨⎩1whenD gets a real jail term0, otherwise
where x∗ denotes the punishment observed. With this formulation, we arrive to a typical binary
choice model:
x∗ =
⎧⎨⎩1 if xph ≥ t0 if xph < t
and t indicates a threshold value to be estimated. Then, the probability to observe a particular
decision becomes:
Px∗=1 = 1− Pr
(
xph < t
)
, Px∗=0 = Pr
(
xph < t
)
71See the proof of Proposition 2.1 for closed-form expressions of π∗D, j and π
∗
V, j .
72All values under square roots stay positive; P jC ∈ [0, 1].
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With all computations provided, an expected likelihood function for case i (Lei ) becomes:
Lei (γ, Xi) =
4∑
j=1
Pij
((
P Sij
)si [(
1− P Sij
)(
P¯ ijC
[
(Px∗=1)
x∗i (Px∗=0)
1−x∗i
]xiobs)ci (
1− P¯ ijC
)nci]1−si)
Since draws of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph are independent over cases, a full-sample expected
likelihood (Le) is just a product of Lei :
Le (γ, X) =
N∏
i=1
Lei (γ, Xi)
where N is a sample size. Taking logarithms, we get:
le (γ, X) = log (Le (γ, X))
Finally, to have a well-deﬁned game, all underlying parameters of the model (such as preferences,
monetary and non-monetary ﬁghting abilities) must be non-negative. The resulting program to
solve is:
maxγ {le (γ, X)}
s.t. mini
{
w¯iD, w¯
i
V , a¯
i, b¯i, e¯i, m¯i,
( ¯xph)
i
} ≥ 0
Since our econometric model has a parameter-dependent support, we use a derivative-free numerical
algorithm to solve the optimization program. Typically, the estimators of this class are consistent,
but not necessarily asymptotically normal. For this reason, we do not approximate the variance-
covariance matrix as the inverse of Hessian (this procedure relies on the asymptotic normality
assumption), but compute bootstrap standard errors.73
We develop the following estimation procedure. To capture the diﬀerence in non-monetary
ﬁghting abilities, one should concentrate on “car vs. pedestrian” cases (see Subsection 2.5.2 for the
reduced form evidence). However, working with accidental “victim-defendant” combinations only,
we lose the information on non-random matches, where V and D know each other. As a result,
V ’s vindictiveness (a) cannot be identiﬁed. For this reason, we run the estimation on two diﬀerent
samples, Nall and Np.
The ﬁrst dataset, Nall, includes all types of criminal traﬃc oﬀenses for 3 regions: Sverdlovsk
Oblast (732 cases), Chelyabinsk Oblast (868 cases), and Permsky Krai (479 cases).74 These regions
are located in the same geographic area (namely, Ural) and share identical climate conditions.
73Hirano and Porter (2003) show the maximum likelihood estimator can be asymptotically ineﬃcient in models
with parameter-dependent support. It results in bigger standard errors, but does not aﬀect unbiasedness and
consistency properties. For this reason, we still ﬁnd the present MLE estimator suﬃcient; however, the procedure
must be adjusted in the future.
74Other regions will be added later.
CHAPTER 2. “VICTIM-DEFENDANT” SETTLEMENTS 150
Moreover, they display comparable socio-economic characteristics. Overall, we expect that drivers
in the given regions should have analogous behavioral patterns.
Another subsample, Np, deals with “car vs. pedestrian” accidents only. It includes 9 regions and
1055 cases in total. Also, the Np sample has a suﬃcient number of law enforcers and government
oﬃcials on both sides of the process. With this dataset, we abstract from non-random matches
and aim to estimate non-monetary ﬁghting abilities of the parties (mV and mD).75
Region Number of Number of victims Number of defendants
cases who are law enforcers or who are law enforcers or
government oﬃcials government oﬃcials
Moscow 123 0 3
Moscow Oblast 126 4 2
Permski Krai 122 2 1
Sverdlovsk Oblast 124 3 1
Tjumen Oblast 111 2 0
Omsk Oblast 74 1 0
Novosibirsk Oblast 123 2 1
Altayski Krai 123 4 3
Chabarovsk Krai 128 7 1
Total 1055 25 12
2.5.4 Estimation Results
Table 2.4 (Table 2.10) reports estimation results for the sample of all criminal traﬃc oﬀenses (“car
vs. pedestrian” matches). For both Nall and Np, the victims tend to have lower expected wealth
than the defendants, and the degree of resource imbalances (θ) is 1.7 times bigger in the Np case:76
Nall : mean
(
w¯iD
)
= 55′806.6, mean
(
w¯iV
)
= 6′056.7
θall = mean
(
w¯iD − w¯iV
maxi {w¯iD − w¯iV }
)
= .3
Np : mean
(
w¯iD
)
= 2′257.3, mean
(
w¯iV
)
= 903.9
θp = mean
(
w¯iD − w¯iV
maxi {w¯iD − w¯iV }
)
= .52
In the Nall case, wV and wD increase in age ≥ 18, i.e. on average, elder individuals are reacher.77
For “car vs. pedestrian” matches (the Np dataset), the pattern diﬀers. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd the
evidence of the inverse U -shape relationship between agej, j = {V, D} and individual wealth
(keeping other characteristics constant):
75Later on, the two identiﬁcation approaches must be incorporated.
76The distribution of w¯iV has more mass to the left of its mean (Figure 2.6.1 for Nall and Figure 2.6.3 for Np).
The distribution of w¯iD is left (right) skewed in the Nall (Np) case (Figure 2.6.2 and Figure 2.6.4, respectively).
77Individuals whose age is under 18 enter the childV = 1 group.
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argmaxageV {w¯V } ≈ 43, argmaxageD {w¯D} ≈ 35
where ageV and ageD are measured in years. In words, V ’s (D’s) wealth achieves its maximum
when the individual turns 43 (35). The diﬀerence arises from the discrepancy in V ’s and D’s age
composition. Actually, 70% of the defendants are younger than 40, and 60% of the victims turn
to be older than 30 (see Table 2.2).
Next, consider how the victim’s socio-economic status (SES) aﬀects her wealth. In case of the
Nall sample, most of the patterns are quite predictable. For example, workers, welfare recipients,
and retired individuals tend to be poorer than oﬃce employees (keeping other characteristics
constant). At the same time, victims who happen to be top-managers or budget oﬃce workers
display the lowest wealth level. The former observation goes against the intuition, although the
corresponding coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. Also, the positive impact age has on wV
can oﬀset the negative eﬀect of top-managers’ SES: on average, these individuals are elder than
their peers.78 Once we concentrate on random matches (the Np sample), top-managers display
higher wealth than the control group (unemployed individuals). Nevertheless, the magnitude of
the eﬀect is still smaller than for oﬃce workers, students or even retired individuals. The indicated
observation can be justiﬁed with a small number of top-manager victims in the sample (less than
1%, see Table 2.2). In fact, these individuals are less likely to be pedestrians and also tend to
drive expensive cars, which protect them and their passengers from serious injuries. Hence, those
top-manager victims who have entered the sample might not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from other socio-
economic groups.
D’s wealth behaves more predictably with respect to his socio-economic status. When we focus
on all criminal traﬃc oﬀenses, top-managers display higher values of wD than their peers, excluding
workers. Overall, the frequency of observing this socio-economic group on the defendants’ side is
higher: top-managers constitute more than 1% of the oﬀenders’ population (see Table 2.2). This
explains why the eﬀect of their SES on wD turns to be more intuitive than in case of wV . Students
and other individuals are the poorest oﬀenders in the sample. For the Np dataset, every SES unit
performs better than the baseline (namely, unemployed individuals). The top-manager defendants
still hold more wealth, but the magnitude of the eﬀect becomes smaller than in the Nall case.
Child victims (ageV < 18), whose resources depend on their parents’ socio-economic status,
tend to have less wealth than adults (ageV ≥ 18). Although the coeﬃcient in front of childV is
positive, its eﬀect on wV turns to be weaker than the impact ageV has on V ’s wealth. This result
holds for both samples. Remarkably, the eﬀect of gender on wV and wD is positive: on average,
female victims and defendants have more resources (keeping other characteristics constant). Also,
the impact of genderV = 1 on wV becomes weaker in the Np case. One can assume that women
78In the Nall sample, the average age of top-manager victims reaches 36.4. This value exceeds its counterpart for
most of the SES groups (except entrepreneurs, retired and unclassiﬁed individuals).
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results: All Cases (Nall)
Victim’s Wealth
Variable Coeﬃcient St. Error
Intercept 126.1∗∗∗ 36.505
SESV :
worker 75.67∗∗∗ 7.272
oﬃce worker 101.95∗∗∗ 7.326
top-manager −1.13 29.254
entrepreneur 87.94∗∗∗ 13.368
budget oﬃce worker −4.96 9.346
student 229.19∗∗∗ 20.938
welfare recipient 90.7∗∗ 41.585
retired 80.56∗∗ 31.871
other 8.43 11.885
genderV 49.93
∗∗ 23.961
childV 245.91
∗∗∗ 4.104
ageV −59.33∗∗ 28.231
age2V 4.68 10.379
Defendant’s Wealth
Intercept 2.46 4.175
SESD:
worker 101.2∗∗∗ 6.091
oﬃce worker 58.34∗∗∗ 8.566
top-manager 97.89∗∗ 40.272
entrepreneur 42.54∗∗ 20.718
budget oﬃce worker 76.14∗∗∗ 1.221
student −1.81 51.428
welfare recipient 47.4∗∗∗ 11.12
retired 54.77∗∗∗ 5.511
other −13.17 38.651
genderD 26.04 42.122
ageD 110.92
∗∗∗ 2.663
age2D 38.03
∗∗ 17.899
eduD 55.76
∗∗ 23.568
pcarD 1 None
Vindictiveness (a)
Intercept 74.87∗∗∗ 6.893
pedestrian 98.43∗∗∗ .295
related:
acquaintance 9.12 36.402
cohabitant 11.77 21.805
relative 15.2 29.053
close relative 10.24∗∗∗ 3.078
wV 1.49 3.491
Defendant’s Disutility of Punishment (b)
Intercept 22.75∗ 12.937
wD 79.92
∗∗ 36.435
Non-Monetary Fighting Abilities
Variable Coeﬃcient St.Error
Victim:
Intercept 19.04 25.808
lawenfV 19.77 47.113
Defendant:
Intercept 8.23 39.166
lawenfD 23.63 19.48
Accident and Harm
Number of
dead victims 156.26∗∗∗ 25.078
victims with 71.63∗∗∗ 5.004
serious injuries
dead minor victims 82.58∗ 44.233
minor victims with 95.48∗∗∗ 9.647
serious injuries
dead female victims 8.11∗∗ 3.247
female victims with −17.7 12.149
serious injuries
dead minor 82.24∗∗∗ 2.021
female victims
minor female victims 84.06∗∗∗ 27.923
with serious injuries
pedestrian 2.83 22.32
drunkD 38.5 29.559
drunkV 19.22
∗∗∗ 1.444
crimehistD 65.72
∗∗∗ 9.35
admhistD 89.65
∗∗ 36.907
recordD 13.7 10.002
Region-speciﬁc Yes
controls
t 325.76∗∗∗ 22.834
Underlying Distributions
σwV 54.42 39.528
σwD 29.99
∗∗∗ 6.808
σa 73.24
∗∗ 28.696
σb 16.18 32.342
σmV 26.35
∗ 15.471
σmD 120.23
∗∗∗ 20.114
σx 225.03
∗∗∗ 51.537
log(L) –3497.16
N 2079
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who happen to drive a car are richer than their male peers.79 This may be especially true in Russia
where the culture of female drivers has been developing recently.80 The fact that this gender group
forms only 9% of the defendants’ population speaks in favor of the latter argument (see Table
2.2).81 Finally, D’s who spent more years in education show higher wealth: the eﬀect of eduD is
positive on both samples and even more pronounced in the Np case.
Next, we analyze what deﬁnes V ’s expected vindictiveness (a¯) and D’s disutility of punishment
(b¯). As we hypothesized before, both a and b increase in individual wealth: the coeﬃcients in front
of wV and wD are positive, although not always statistically signiﬁcant. With these eﬀects, we
observe (a < b) with probability 1 in all the matches. Speciﬁcally, D’s disutility of punishment
exceeds V ’s vengeance beneﬁt. At the same time, the Nall sample features smaller heterogeneity
in a and b:
Nall : mean
( ∣∣a¯i − b¯i∣∣
maxi
{∣∣a¯i − b¯i∣∣}
)
= .3
Np : mean
( ∣∣a¯i − b¯i∣∣
maxi
{∣∣a¯i − b¯i∣∣}
)
= .8
The ﬁnding is driven by the fact that victims tend to have less wealth than their opponents,
and this shifts the distribution of a¯ to the left of b¯. Moreover, the resource inequality becomes
more pronounced in the Np case where cars randomly match with pedestrians. Going back to the
analysis of Section 2.4, for the given distributions of wV and wD, the defendants always prefer to
settle when they have enough money to make the optimal oﬀer S.
Given the estimation results for the Nall sample, the relation of V to D indeed shapes V ’s
preferences. In fact, strangers (pedestrians) tend to be 9.6 times more vindictive than close
relatives of the defendants. Excluding wV and wD from the speciﬁcations of a¯ and b¯ due to their
insigniﬁcance, we observe (a¯ > b¯) for the two datasets:
Nall : min (a¯) = 74.87 > 22.75 = b¯
Np : a¯ = 89.71 > 73.21
With probability .92, victims have strong preferences for revenge, and settling with oﬀenders
becomes ineﬃcient. In this case, feasible but not desirable agreements can emerge (see Proposition
2.4).82
79According to surveys conducted in Russia in 2012, a typical female driver was a top-manager or a young mother
with average or above average income. See https://www.dp.ru/a/2012/03/27/CHislo_zhenshhin_za_rulem_v_R.
80In 2012, females constituted 24% of Russian drivers, which was 1.7 times more than in 2007. See
https://www.dp.ru/a/2012/03/27/CHislo_zhenshhin_za_rulem_v_R.
81An alternative explanation of the observed defendants’ gender composition might be the diﬀerence in risk
preferences for males and females.
82Based on simulations, this scenario is not very frequent. For theNp sample, feasible but not desirable settlements
appear with probability 1.3e-4 (1e-4) in equilibrium 1 (3).
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For both samples, we do not ﬁnd the evidence that law enforcers and government oﬃcials
have better bargaining positions. This can be explained as follows. First, since law enforcers and
government oﬃcials constitute a relatively small subgroup (around 1% of victims and 2% of
defendants), one should increase the sample size to capture any systematic patterns these
individuals display. Actually, the reduced form analysis (Subsection 2.5.2) uses all the
information available and signals in favor of this argument. Another, and potentially more
problematic, concern is non-randomness of the sample. The group of law enforcers and
government oﬃcials is heterogeneous enough: it includes high-rank individuals, as well as regular
employees who perform minor tasks. The former cohort can use their non-monetary assets
(namely, connections and inﬂuence) in order to avoid the investigation stage. As a result, these
individuals do not enter the sample. The original dataset includes around 14’000 records where
oﬀenders are missing. It might be that individuals who managed to close their cases before the
investigation had started enter the given subset. Hence, those law enforcers and government
oﬃcials whom we observe may not diﬀer from other defendants much.83 Similar arguments apply
to top-managers who occupy very high positions. Thus, one must ﬁnd a way to account for this
potential selection bias and adjust the estimator
Finally, we comment on main determinants of the expected punishment. Not surprisingly, the
probability to get a real sentence increases with the number of dead / seriously injured victims, and
the former contributes the most. The eﬀect of killing or hurting a child on the expected punishment
is positive and signiﬁcantly higher compared to the case where a female victim dies. At the same
time, the probability to end up in prison decreases if the accident causes only serious bodily injuries
for a woman. Hitting a pedestrian, being drunk, and having criminal or administrative records
enlarge the harm and lead to a stricter punishment.
For the Nall sample, matching with a drunk victim increases the probability to get a real
sentence as well. Given that we consider all criminal traﬃc oﬀenses, this result has the following
interpretation. If the victim who was driving a car happened to be drunk or intoxicated, the
accident is likely to have severe consequences. As a result, the expected punishment for the
oﬀender may rise. Also, here we allow for non-random matching between victims and defendants.
Then, it becomes probable for drunk drivers to have intoxicated passengers who get hurt if the
accident happens. Hence, observing drunkV = 1 positively correlates with facing drunkD = 1,
which increases the expected punishment. In case of the Np sample, drunkV = 1 reduced D’s
probability to end up in prison. Here, being injured might refer to V ’s own fault and mitigate D’s
guilt. Thus, focusing on random matches, we isolate a positive correlation between drunkV = 1
and drunkD = 1.
83Actually, they can even be in a disadvantaged position and display the behavior similar to low-status individuals.
CHAPTER 2. “VICTIM-DEFENDANT” SETTLEMENTS 155
Further, we run the goodness-of-ﬁt tests and check whether the model replicates key observed
patterns well. Speciﬁcally, the following empirical frequencies are matched against their simulated
counterparts:
1. E(PS) – a probability to observe the settlement decision;
2. E(PC |noS) – a probability that the case ends up in court given no settlement has happened;
3. E(P (x∗ = 1) |C) – a probability that the defendant gets a real sentence if the case has
reached the court stage.
Table 2.5 reports the statistics for all cases in the Nall sample. The model replicates main stylized
facts well. Also, the Pearson’s χ2 goodness-of-ﬁt test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
simulated distribution coincides with its empirical counterpart. Then, we divide the dataset into
groups based on victim- and defendant-speciﬁc characteristics. In particular, we compute empirical
and simulated moments for individuals from diﬀerent age and socio-economic cohorts. On top of
this, we trace the defendants who have a criminal history.
Group-speciﬁc moments are summarized in Table 2.9. Generally, the model gets very close
to the empirical frequencies. Also, we do not detect any tendency towards systematic over- or
underestimation of the moments. The worst performance refers to the group of child victims. Here,
the model predicts signiﬁcantly higher probabilities to settle and face a real sentence than observed
in the data.84 With regard to defendant-speciﬁc characteristics, we underestimate (overestimate)
E(PS) (E(P (x∗ = 1) |C)) for female oﬀenders and college graduates. With all other groups, the
model performs quite well.
We repeat the same analysis for the “car vs. pedestrian” sample (Table 2.11). On average, the
model performs worse than in theNall case. It replicates the probability to face a real sentence quite
well. However, the model systematically overestimates (underestimates) E(PC |noS) (E(PS)),
although the bias is not very big. At the same time, for some groups, such as child victims or
defendants with a criminal record, the model performs better than its Nall counterpart. Overall,
increasing the sample size and controlling for a possible selection bias discussed earlier must improve
the predicting power of the model.
Finally, we use the estimates to evaluate the cost of bargaining (for settled lawsuits) and ﬁghting
(for non-settled cases) the defendants face. As it was mentioned before, the victims do not display
high vengeance beneﬁts when wV and wD enter the speciﬁcations of a¯ and b¯ (a < b with probability
1). Then, the oﬀenders always prefer to settle if they have enough resources to pay the amount
of S (see Section 2.4). To make players’ payoﬀs more comparable, we weight the disutility D
84This pattern disappears once we concentrate on “car vs. pedestrian” matches.
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Table 2.5: Goodness-of-Fit: All Cases (Nall)
Moments E(PS) E(PC |noS) E(P (x∗ = 1) |C)
Samples Data Sim. Data Sim. Data Sim.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All cases: .168 .160 .451 .435 .406 .444
(1.9e-4) (3.4e-4) (5.1e-4)
Pearson’s χ2 stat. 8.89
Critical χ23 (α = .99) 9.21
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph are taken.
This procedure is repeated 100 times.
E(PS) denotes an expected probability to settle. E(PC |noS) reﬂects an expected probability to end up in court
given no settlement. E(P (x = 1 |C)) deﬁnes an expected probability to get a real sentence once the case goes to
court. For the data, E(PS), E(PC |noS), and E(P (x = 1 |C)) correspond to a frequency of observing s = 1, c = 1,
and x∗ = 1, respectively. In case of simulations, the values are computed based on the estimated distributions.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
encounters by his monetary ﬁghting ability, wD. Let psw and pcw denote D’s relative payoﬀ when
he settles with the victim and ends up in court, respectively:
psw = − SwD
pcw = − π
∗
D
wD
where π∗D deﬁnes D’s equilibrium payoﬀ. Table 2.6 compares the average values of psw and pcw for
the two sample. If the conﬂicting parties settle, the defendant pays a much lower cost than in the
alternative scenario (–.007 against –810.78 for all cases in the Np sample). The eﬀect does not
vanish even when we focus on diﬀerent types of crime (1 dead pedestrian vs. 1 pedestrian with
serious bodily injures). One can also interpret psw and pcw as a punishment the oﬀender faces. Hence,
those defendants who did not manage to settle must suﬀer signiﬁcantly more than their peers who
committed similar crimes but had better bargaining positions. On top of resource imbalances, this
induces the inequality before the law, which may constitute an important concern for the society.
We discuss this aspect later.
Policy Experiments and the Discussion
Now, we run counterfactual experiments with the estimates obtained for the two samples. The ﬁrst
issue to address is how the ban of settlements would aﬀect the prison population. To answer this
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Table 2.6: Expected Relative Payoﬀs for Defendants in Settled and Non-Settled Cases
Payoﬀ Nall Np
Sample Sample
Expected relative payoﬀ –.008 –.007
for settled cases (4.1e-5) (8.9e-5)
(−S/wD)
with 1 dead pedestrian –.007 –.003
(1.1e-4) (1e-4)
with 1 seriously –.009 –.008
injured pedestrian (5.2e-5) (8.8e-5)
Expected relative payoﬀ –2903.89 –810.78
for non-settled cases (1.327) (.554)
(−π∗D/wD)
with 1 dead pedestrian –3107.27 –1’102.95
(3.569) (.956)
with 1 seriously –2610.12 –657.54
injured pedestrian (1.958) (.783)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph are taken.
This procedure is repeated 100 times. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
question, we eliminate the settlement stage and assume the game starts from the contest. With
probability PC , the case ends up in court, and the defendant faces the expected punishment xph.
According to our assumptions, xph turn to be a real sentence (x∗ = 1) if and only if the realization
of xph exceeds the threshold t:
x∗ = 1 ⇔ xph ≥ t
To identify imprisoned defendants with the two sources of uncertainty (namely, PC and
P (x∗ = 1 |C)), we apply the following rule:
prison = 1 ⇔ PCP (x∗ = 1 |C) ≥ ρ¯
where ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1) is a threshold value that can be non-parametrically inferred from the data. In the
beginning, we simulate the model for the Nall sample (all criminal traﬃc oﬀenses). If pre-court
agreements were forbidden, on average, 30% of the previously settled lawsuits (106 observations)
would close with the defendants being imprisoned.85 This can raise the cost of the society for two
reasons. First, solving all cases in court puts an additional pressure on prosecutors and judges
who have limited resources. Second, increasing the incarceration rate forces the society to redirect
85In the data, 353 cases (16.84% of all observations) settled.
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more money to the prison system. For instance, Russia paid e2.2 per day for one incarcerated
person in 2012. The total budget of the country’s prison system reached e5.4 billion.86 With
these numbers, the monetary cost of keeping 106 additional individuals in prison for one year
would amount to e85’118.87 If we extrapolate this result to the full dataset (56’000 cases), the
ban of “victim-defendant” settlements could increase the prison population by 2’856 inmates and
cost Russia e2.3 million per year.
Next, consider the case of randomly matched victims and defendants (the Np sample). In the
data, 172 disputes (16.3% of all observations) are solves out-of-court. The ban of settlements leads
to 69 more defendants going to prison.88 If all 69 individuals get a 1-year incarceration sentence,
the monetary cost of increasing the prison population reaches e55’407.89
Another question to investigate is how enlarging D’s resources (his monetary ﬁghting abilities)
inﬂuences the case outcome. The eﬀect is two-fold. More resources available allow the defendant
make better oﬀers and settle with stronger victims (“volume eﬀect”). Also, higher values of wD
drive the amount of S down (“price eﬀect”).90 Overall, a pre-court case resolution becomes easier
when D’s monetary ﬁghting abilities improve.
Table 2.7 (2.12) provides simulation results for the Nall (Np) sample. Here, all case-speciﬁc
characteristics, except wD, are kept the same. Particularly, a defendant with the given budget wD
is matched against the universe of victims from Nall (Np). As one can see, relaxing D’s resource
constraint indeed allows the defendant to settle more often: E (PS) steadily increases with wD.
The average oﬀer, however, tends to display an inverse U -shape: in the beginning, it grows with
wD, reaches the maximum at wD = 8´443´750 (wD = 41´653 in the Np case) and then starts
decreasing.91 This pattern has the following explanation. When D has limited resources and his
budget constraint relaxes slightly, he can aﬀord much better oﬀers and improve the settlement
probability signiﬁcantly. Here, the “volume eﬀect” dominates the “price eﬀect”, and the average
settlement oﬀer rises.92 If D holds a suﬃcient amount of resources, he is already able to reach an
agreement with many victim types. For this reason, improving D’s monetary ﬁghting ability does
not result in a pronounced “volume eﬀect”. However, it triggers the “price eﬀect” because now the
defendant can push the optimal settlement oﬀer down (see Proposition 2.3 and the discussion on
page 129 for more details). Thus, the average amount of S declines.
In Section 2.4, we showed that V and D can fail to achieve a settlement agreement even if
86The corresponding expenditures for France amounted to e98 per day and e2.4 billion, respectively. See
http://www.rbc.ru/society/11/02/2015/54db24779a794752506f1ebf.
87The cost is even higher if the sentence exceeds one year.
8840% of the previously settled cases end up with a real prison term.
89The calculation is based on e2.2 per day for one incarcerated person.
90See Proposition 2.3 and the discussion on page 129 for more details.
91The pattern is more pronounced in the Np case.
92Settling with mighty victims requires higher oﬀers.
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Table 2.7: The Eﬀects of Increasing D’s Wealth: All Cases (Nall)
Moments E(PS) NS S¯
Wealth
w1D = 13
′099 5.8e-3 12 20.6
(2.3e-5) (.05) (.13)
w2D = 261
′991 .1 200 7’187.9
(5.7e-5) (.12) (10.45)
w3D = 654
′979 .15 313 21’883.7
(6.3e-5) (.13) (28.59)
w4D = 2
′043′305 .21 445 67’156.5
(5.3e-5) (.11) (74.08)
w5D = 3
′377′500 .23 485 91’844.8
(4.7e-5) (.1) (120.89)
w6D = 5
′066′250 .24 506 105’570.7
(2.3e-5) (.05) (115.54)
w7D = 6
′755′000 .247 515 107’443
(1.6e-5) (.03) (162.87)
w8D = 8
′443′750 .25 518 102’412.9
(9.2e-5) (.02) (156.02)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph are taken.
This procedure is repeated 100 times. wiD, i = {1, ..., 8} correspond to rescaled and sorted 0, .5, and 1 quantiles of
w¯iD’s estimated distribution. w¯
i
D is measured in rubles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
the defendant has enough resources to make the optimal oﬀer S. In other words, D ﬁnds it more
attractive to enter the contest stage because the amount of S is suﬃciently high. Formally, this
requires ⎧⎨⎩π∗D > −SS ≤ wD (2.5.2)
and π∗D denotes D’s equilibrium payoﬀ. It was proven that (2.5.2) never holds if D’s resource
constraint binds or V ’s winning beneﬁt is not suﬃciently high (a < b). Otherwise, one can observe
the cases where the settlement is feasible but not desirable. Suppose wV and wD aﬀect a¯ and b¯,
respectively. Given the distributions of wV and wD, victims, who tend to have less resources than
their opponents, do not display strong preferences towards revenge, i.e. (a < b) with probability
1.93 As a result, the (π∗D > −S) condition is never satisﬁed (see Section 2.4). However, perturbing
the distribution of V ’s wealth can reshape individual settlement decisions.94
93Here, we refer to the case when the coeﬃcients in front of wV and wD in the speciﬁcations of a¯ and b¯ diﬀer
from zeros.
94Alternatively, we could vary the constant term of a¯ and get the same eﬀect on the players’ behavior.
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In the next experiment, we check how players’ preferences and behavior change when the
allocation of w¯V varies. Table 2.13 (2.14) reports the results for the Nall (Np) sample. We ﬁx all
case-speciﬁc characteristics, except wV . Particularly, a victim who holds the given amount of wV
plays against a set of potential oﬀenders. First, we compute the expected probability to observe a
pre-court case resolution for each level of wV . Then, we identify how often the (a > b) proﬁle and
feasible but not desirable settlements appear.
As expected, the increase in V ’s wealth drives vindictiveness (a) up, and at some point, players’
preferences start displaying the (a > b) pattern. However, to achieve this outcome, wV must grow
quite a lot. The probability to settle declines because higher values of a improve V ’s bargaining
position and drive the amount of S up. At the same time, the frequency of feasible but not
desirable agreements rises, although they are diﬃcult to support for the given structure of mV
and mD. Since condition (2.5.2) requires speciﬁc combinations of players’ preferences and ﬁghting
abilities, but only a was perturbed, the latter result is predictable.95 Overall, one should expect
the (a > b) pattern to appear more frequently in disputes where the two parties do not display
signiﬁcant asymmetries in wV and wD or the distortion goes in the victim’s favor.96 This happens
to be true for other types of crimes and lawsuits (for example, civil litigations where opponents
face comparable resource constraints).
With all the observations made, one can discuss “victim-defendant” settlements from the social
welfare prospective. Generally, the defendants who can make the oﬀer and want to do so are
both richer and have better connections. This also means that their victims display relatively
weak ﬁghting abilities and enjoy lower expected vengeance beneﬁts. When we look at a particular
“victim-defendant” match, the presence of settlements makes no party worse oﬀ in the proposed
theoretical setting.97 However, if the society has preferences that are more than just a sum of V ’s
and D’s utilities, the settlements may be abandoned.98
So far, we did not specify the objective the policymaker might aim to achieve. In principle,
he can have equality concerns and want defendants to face the same relative punishment for
a particular type of crime.99 Allowing for “victim-defendant” settlements, oﬀenders with better
ﬁghting abilities encounter milder sanctions (Table 2.6). On top of the income inequality, this
generates unfairness in the legal ﬁeld. Mighty defendants manage to avoid a real punishment
through the settlement channel. Also, their victims end up with a lower compensation amount
(see Proposition 2.3). Thus, the introduction of settlements can undermine equality before the
95See Section 2.4 for more details.
96As we explained earlier, in case of criminal traﬃc oﬀenses the defendants tend to be reacher than their victims.
This is especially true when one focuses on “car vs. pedestrian” accidents.
97Both V and D obtain their contest equilibrium payoﬀs at least.
98One example comes from incapacitation concerns when the society wants to keep dangerous criminals in prison.
99For example, see Fiss (1983).
CHAPTER 2. “VICTIM-DEFENDANT” SETTLEMENTS 161
law, and the policymaker may be willing to declare this institute oﬀ.
In 2011–2012, Russian government was considering a possibility to forbid “victim-defendant”
settlements for criminal traﬃc oﬀense with at least one death. The argument against the out-of-
court case resolution was exactly the inequality before the law this institute induces. However, the
discussion did not result in any changes of the Criminal code.
Further, we illustrate when “victim-defendant” settlements worsen social welfare in the presence
of fairness concerns. Suppose the policymaker assigns a value ϕ to the equality before the law,
and his preferences become:
SW = χD
N∑
i=1
uiD + χN
N∑
i=1
uiV + ϕf (GD)
where
• χi ≥ 0, i = {D, V } denotes how much player i’s utility contributes to social welfare;
• GD reﬂects the Gini coeﬃcient computed for the distribution of uiD;
• N represents a number of observed criminal traﬃc oﬀenses.
We assume f (GD) = GD and χD = χN = 1, i.e. the policymaker equally cares about both sides
of the conﬂict. Now, consider how the presence of “victim-defendant” settlements aﬀects diﬀerent
elements of SW . No private information about the victim’s characteristics allows the defendant
extract all the surplus when making a settlement oﬀer. Hence, this player obtains more utility if
the out-of-court case resolution becomes possible, and the victim is never worse oﬀ. As Table 2.6
shows, those defendants who manage to settle with the opponents face much milder punishment
than their peers in non-settled cases. Thus, the Gini coeﬃcient rises with the introduction of
“victim-defendant” agreements.
Let SWS (SWNS) denote social welfare when the two conﬂicting parties can (not) settle among
themselves. Also, deﬁne ϕ¯ as follows:100
ϕ¯ : SWS (ϕ¯) = SWNS (ϕ¯)
In words, ϕ reﬂects social preferences such that the policymaker is indiﬀerent between banning
“victim-defendant” settlements and leaving this practice unchanged. Table 2.8 reports all
elements of SW and ϕ¯ for two scenarios and various types of criminal traﬃc oﬀenses. Overall,
the introduction of “victim-defendant” settlements allows the policymaker increase
∑N
i=1 u
i
D by
15.6% (14.5%) for the Nall (Np) sample. At the same time, the Gini coeﬃcient grows by 27.9%
100Since SW is linear in ϕ, the value of ϕ must be unique.
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Table 2.8: Social Welfare with and without “Victim-Defendant” Settlements
Value All cases No deaths 1 death > 1 deaths
S NS S NS S NS S NS
All cases (Nall)∑N
i=1 u
i
D –109.2 –129.4 –59.5 –73.4 –39.9 –45.9 –9.9 –10∑N
i=1 u
i
V .265 .139 .107 .019
GD .472 .369 .483 .366 .441 .354 .361 .347
ϕ¯ –197.3 –136.6 –59.5 –1.1
Car vs. pedestrian (Np)∑N
i=1 u
i
D –.649 –.759 –.356 –.435 –.277 –.307 –.017 –.017∑N
i=1 u
i
V 3.7E–3 2.1E–3 1.6E–3 9.4E–5
GD .346 .218 .321 .164 .238 .145 .031 .031
ϕ¯ –.851 –.618 –.234 0
Note:∑N
i=1 u
i
D,
∑N
i=1 u
i
V and ϕ¯ are measured in E+10 units. The value of ϕ corresponds to SWS (ϕ¯) = SWNS (ϕ¯). In
the Np sample, we do not observe settlements for “More than one death” accidents.
(58.7%) in the Nall (Np) case. The strongest inequality corresponds to “No deaths” accidents
where the harm made is not so high and the conﬂicting parties achieve an agreement more often.
For any ϕ < ϕ < 0, the policymaker does not beneﬁt from “victim-defendant” settlements
because the cost of inequality becomes signiﬁcant.101 Otherwise, the gain in defendants’ utility
(
∑N
i=1 u
i
D) dominates.
In principle, the optimality of “victim-defendant” settlements also depends on weights the
policymaker assigns to
∑N
i=1 u
i
D and
∑N
i=1 u
i
V (namely, χD and χN). Notice that for χV ≥ χD = 0
and ϕ < 0, the society will never allow for out-of-court agreements (SWS < SWNS). Thus, when
χD is relatively low, “victim-defendant” settlements will make the policymaker worse oﬀ even for
|ϕ| small enough.
Another argument against “victim-defendant” settlements in the presence of asymmetric
bargaining positions relates to deterrence concerns. If advantaged individuals know that in case
of a norm violation their victims are likely to have worse ﬁghting abilities, the settlement
becomes cheaper. Consequently, they get stronger incentives to break the law than their less
advantaged peers. As a result, the settlements make it more problematic to sustain uniform
deterrence across diﬀerent socio-economic groups.
The deterrence concerns may be less important in case of accidental crimes, such as traﬃc
101The negative value of ϕ can reﬂect the cost of redistribution associated with growing inequality.
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oﬀenses. However, they turn to be crucial when one focuses on intentional felonies. Now, oﬀenders
can decide which victim to target. Since individuals with lower income or / and weaker connections
are easier to settle with, they are more likely to become victims. Roughly speaking, the presence
of pre-court agreements in the criminal law may create a “market” for potential victims. This
argument can also convince the policymaker against the given institution.
2.6 Conclusion
Most states use “victim-defendant” settlements to solve civil and criminal conﬂicts. This paper
explores how bargaining positions of the parties involved (namely, their preferences, non-monetary
ﬁghting abilities and resource constraints) deﬁne the case outcome. Also, we discuss the eﬀect
“victim-defendant” settlements may have on social welfare. With this approach, the previous
work devoted to out-of-court case resolution connects to the literature that focuses on resource
imbalances and the inequality before the law.
We construct a stylized theoretical model where two individuals with conﬂicting interests, the
victim and the defendant, must exert eﬀort in order to achieve / avert the court stage. The
defendant has an option to settle with the victim before the ﬁght starts, and the optimal oﬀer
decreases in his bargaining position. Reaching the agreement is always eﬃcient when the defendant
encounters suﬃciently high winning beneﬁts. If the victim displays strong preferences for revenge,
but the opponent has better ﬁghting abilities, the latter player is willing to enter the contest stage.
Hence, even feasible settlements can fail to happen.
To estimate the model, we employ the data on criminal traﬃc oﬀenses in Russia and restore
bargaining positions of the conﬂicting parties. Our theoretical framework successfully replicates
the observed case outcomes where the key states are “settled”, “in court”, and “in court & real
sentence”. On average, defendants have 10 times more resources to expend than victims. At the
same time, winning beneﬁts of both parties increase in their wealth. Victims who happen to
be close relatives of their oﬀenders have weaker preferences for revenge. Finally, to capture the
diﬀerence in non-monetary ﬁghting abilities, the estimator needs to be adjusted for non-random
selection of law enforcers and government oﬃcials into the sample.
Settling with the opponent results in much lower disutility than going to court. Hence, on
top of resource imbalances, “victim-defendant” settlements increase the inequality before the law,
which may go against the interests of the society. Our counterfactual experiments show that
forbidding “victim-defendant” settlements would add more than 2’850 prisoners and cost Russia
e2.3 million per year. Also, the frequency of feasible but not desirable agreements rises when
we change the wealth distribution for both conﬂicting parties and victims obtain a pronounced
resource advantage.
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Although we focused on criminal traﬃc oﬀenses, the model and the estimation approach
proposed in the paper turn to be very general. To push the analysis further, one must specify the
objective function of the society and concentrate on the optimal design of the justice system.
The criterion may include deterrence and incapacitation concerns, as well as equality
considerations. Without this step, it is impossible to give a precise answer when
“victim-defendant” settlements must be abandoned, and we leave it for the future.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 2.1. The equilibrium of the contest stage exists and is unique.
Proof. First, consider the unconstrained versions of players’ problems.102 First-order conditions
look as follows:
V : axph eD
(eD+eV )
2 −mV = 0
D : bxph eV
(eD+eV )
2 −mD = 0
Notice that second-order derivatives of πD (·) and πV (·) are always negative, and any eV and eD
that satisfy ﬁrst-order conditions correspond to an interior maximum. Solving the system of FOCs
delivers
e∗V =
xpha2mDb
(amD+bmV )
2 , e∗D =
xphb2mV a
(amD+bmV )
2
π∗V = amD
a2mDxp
h
(amD+bmV )
2
π∗D = − amDbxp
h
(amD+bmV )
2 (amD + 2bmV )
where asterisks denote equilibrium eﬀort levels and expected payoﬀs. By construction, this
equilibrium is unique and features pure strategies. Now, bring budget constraints back and write
down complete ﬁrst-order conditions:
V : axph eD
(eD+eV )
2 −mV − λVmV + ηV = 0
D : bxph eV
(eD+eV )
2 −mD − λDmD + ηD = 0
Here, λi ≥ 0 and ηi ≥ 0, i = {V, D} are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to {wi −miei ≥ 0}
and {ei ≥ 0}, respectively. The solution of the unconstrained problem, e∗V and e∗D, is feasible if
and only if ⎧⎨⎩wV ≥ mV
xpha2mDb
(amD+bmV )
2
wD ≥ mD xphb2mV a(amD+bmV )2
(2.6.1)
and this can be supported with λi = ηi = 0, i = {V, D}. Hence, as long as condition (2.6.1) holds,
the equilibrium of the contest stage coincides with the one of the unconstraint problem.
Next, we analyze all the cases when at least one budget constraint becomes active.
1. e∗D is not feasible, and D’s budget constraint can bind:
102This case is well-studies in the contest literature. With the given speciﬁcation of the Tullock contest success
function, the solution is interior and unique.
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xpha2mDb
(amD+bmV )
2
wD < mD
xphb2mV a
(amD+bmV )
2
(2.6.2)
Now, D’s optimization program has a corner solution, and his strategy space reduces to
eD =
{
0, wD
mD
}
. Suppose in equilibrium D plays eD = wDmD , the highest eﬀort available. Next,
assume V ’s best reply to eˆD = wDmD solves her ﬁrst-order condition. Then:
eˆV =
√
wDaxph
mDmV
− wD
mD
, eˆD =
wD
mD
λD =
bxph
mD
eˆV
(eˆV +eˆD)
2 − 1, ηD = 0
πˆV = axp
h − 2
√
wDmV axph
mD
+ mV wD
mD
πˆD = −bxph +
√
wDmV xph
mDa
b− wD
When condition (2.6.2) holds:
• λD > 0 and
• eˆV is positive and feasible (mV eˆV ≤ wV ), i.e. λV = ηV = 0.
Since πV (·) displays strict concavity, eˆV corresponds to an interior maximum of V ’s
program. If D chooses eD = 0, his equilibrium payoﬀ reaches πD (0, 0) = −bxph, and
πˆD > πD (0, 0) under condition (2.6.2).103 Thus, eD = wDmD strictly dominates eD = 0, and
(eˆV , eˆD) constitutes a unique pure strategy equilibrium of the contest stage when D’s
budget constraint binds.
2. e∗V is not feasible, and V ’s budget constraint can bind:⎧⎨⎩wV < mV
xpha2mDb
(amD+bmV )
2
wD ≥ mD xphb2mV a(amD+bmV )2
(2.6.3)
The analysis employs all the arguments developed in point 1. V has two options to choose:
eV =
wV
mV
and eV = 0. Assume in equilibrium V plays eV = wVmV , and D’s best reply comes
from his ﬁrst-order condition:
103Also, the case of λD = 0, ηD > 0 does not deliver well-deﬁned Lagrange multipliers and results in a contradiction.
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eˆV =
wV
mV
, eˆD =
√
wV bxph
mDmV
− wV
mV
λV =
axph
mV
eˆD
(eˆV +eˆD)
2 − 1, ηV = 0
πˆV =
√
wV mDxph
mV b
a− wV
πˆD = −2
√
wV mDbxph
mV
+ mDwV
mV
where λV > 0, eˆD maximizes πD (·) and satisﬁes D’s budget constraint under condition
(2.6.3). It is easy to show that πV (0, eD) < πˆV and eV = wVmV strictly dominates eV = 0.
Hence, (eˆV , eˆD) is a unique pure strategy equilibrium of the contest game.
3. Neither e∗V nor e∗D are feasible, and budget constraints of both players can bind:⎧⎨⎩wV < mV
xpha2mDb
(amD+bmV )
2
wD < mD
xphb2mV a
(amD+bmV )
2
(2.6.4)
In this case, the contestants can no longer aﬀord the solution of the unconstrained program.
Players can exert either zero eﬀort or expend all resources available, i.e. ei =
{
0, wi
mi
}
,
i = {V, D}. The ﬁrst-order conditions of contestants’ programs do not behave well if eV = 0
or / and eD = 0.104 For this reason, we work with the payoﬀ matrix directly:
D
V
eV = 0 eV =
wV
mV
eD = 0
(−bxph, axph) (−bxph, axph − wV )
eD =
wD
mD
(−wD, 0)
(
−bxphPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
− wD, axphPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
− wV
)
If D chooses {eD = 0}, V responds with {eV = 0} as well. When V plays {eV = 0}, D is
better oﬀ exerting
{
eD =
wD
mD
}
. Best replies to
{
eD =
wD
mD
}
and
{
eV =
wV
mV
}
depend on wD
and wV :
• wV < axph − mVmDwD ⇒ V prefers
{
eV =
wV
mV
}
to {eV = 0} when D plays
{
eD =
wD
mD
}
• wV < mVmD
(
bxph − wD
)⇒ D prefers {eD = wDmD} to {eD = 0} when V plays {eV = wVmV }
Now, we show that (2.6.4) implies wV < min
{
axph, mV
mD
bxph
}
− mV
mD
wD. Suppose wV ≥
axph − mV
mD
wD is compatible with (2.6.4). Then, the following set must be non-empty:[
axph − mV
mD
wD, mV
xpha2mDb
(amD + bmV )
2
)
	= Ø ⇔ wD > axphmD
mV
− xp
ha2m2Db
(amD + bmV )
2 (2.6.5)
104When eV = 0 or / and eD = 0, there do not exist well-deﬁned Lagrange multipliers that can support an interior
solution.
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Also, condition (2.6.5) deﬁnes a non-empty intersection with (2.6.4) if and only if
axph
mD
mV
− xp
ha2m2Db
(amD + bmV )
2 < mD
xphb2mV a
(amD + bmV )
2 ⇔ amD (amD + bmV ) < 0 (2.6.6)
where the latter results in a contradiction. Hence, wV ≥ axph − mVmDwD never combines
with (2.6.4), and (2.6.4) must imply wV < axph − mVmDwD. Similarly, one can prove that
wV ≥ mVmD
(
bxph − wD
)
and (2.6.4) are disjoint. Thus, under condition (2.6.4), D must have
a dominant strategy
{
eD =
wD
mD
}
. Then, the unique equilibrium is
eˆV =
wV
mV
, eˆD =
wD
mD
λV =
axph
mV
eˆD
(eˆV +eˆD)
2 − 1, λD = bxphmD
eˆV
(eˆV +eˆD)
2 − 1
ηV = ηD = 0
πˆV = axp
hPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
− wV
πˆD = −bxphPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
− wD
Under all conditions imposed on contestants’ resources, λV and λD are strictly positive and
support an interior solution.
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Proposition 2.2. Contestants’ equilibrium eﬀort, e∗i , i = {V, D} always increases in his / her
valuation of punishment and wi, decreases in mi:
∂e∗V
∂a
≥ 0, ∂e
∗
D
∂b
≥ 0, ∂e
∗
i
∂wi
≥ 0, ∂e
∗
i
∂mi
≤ 0, i = {V, D}
For a
mV
≥ b
mD
1. e∗V increases in b and e∗D decreases in a
2. e∗V decreases in mD and increases in wD
3. e∗D increases in mV and decreases in wV if and only if wV ≥ bxp
hmV
4mD
> 0. Otherwise, e∗D
strictly decreases in mV and strictly increases in wV
For a
mV
< b
mD
1. e∗V strictly decreases in b and e∗D strictly increases in a
2. e∗V increases in mD and decreases in wD if and only if wD ≥ axp
hmD
4mV
> 0. Otherwise, e∗V
strictly decreases in mD and strictly increases in wD
3. e∗D strictly decreases in mV and strictly increases in wV
Proof. To show how contestants’ eﬀort choice depends on their ﬁghting abilities and preferences,
we inspect all possible equilibrium outcomes. First, check how e∗D and e∗V change with b and a,
respectively:
UC :
∂e∗V
∂a
= 2axp
hb2mDmV
(amD+bmV )
3 > 0,
∂e∗D
∂b
= 2bxp
ha2mDmV
(amD+bmV )
3 > 0
BCD :
∂e∗V
∂a
= 1
2
√
wDxph
amDmV
> 0,
∂e∗D
∂b
= 0
BCV :
∂e∗V
∂a
= 0,
∂e∗D
∂b
= 1
2
√
wV xph
bmDmV
> 0
BCV D :
∂e∗V
∂a
=
∂e∗D
∂b
= 0
where UC denotes the unconstrained problem; BCD (BCV ) deﬁnes the situation when D’s (V ’s)
budget constraint binds; in case of BCV D the solution of UC is no longer feasible for both
contestants. Hence, players’ equilibrium eﬀort never decreases in their valuations punishment, i.e.
∂e∗V
∂a
≥ 0, ∂e∗D
∂b
≥ 0.
Second, we investigate the eﬀect of mi on e∗i and e∗j , i, j = {V, D}, i 	= j:
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UC :
∂e∗V
∂mV
= − 2a2xphb2mD
(amD+bmV )
3 < 0,
∂e∗D
∂mD
= − 2b2xpha2mV
(amD+bmV )
3 < 0
∂e∗V
∂mD
= −a2xphb(amD−bmV )
(amD+bmV )
3 ,
∂e∗D
∂mV
= b
2xpha(amD−bmV )
(amD+bmV )
3
BCD :
∂e∗V
∂mV
= − 1
2mV
√
wDaxph
mDmV
< 0,
∂e∗D
∂mD
= − wD
m2D
< 0
∂e∗V
∂mD
= − 1
2mD
√
wDaxph
mDmV
+ wD
m2D
,
∂e∗D
∂mD
= 0
BCV :
∂e∗V
∂mV
=< 0,
∂e∗D
∂mD
= − 1
2mD
√
wV bxph
mDmV
< 0
∂e∗V
∂mD
= 0,
∂e∗D
∂mV
= − 1
2mV
√
wV bxph
mDmV
+ wV
m2D
BCV D :
∂e∗V
∂mV
= − wV
m2V
,
∂e∗D
∂mD
= − wD
m2D
∂e∗V
∂mD
=
∂e∗D
∂mV
= 0
Contestants’ equilibrium eﬀort e∗i increases in mi for any preference proﬁle. The eﬀect of mj
on e∗i , i 	= j is ambiguous. Take the UC case. If amV ≥ bmD , it must be
∂e∗V
∂mD
≤ 0, ∂e∗D
∂mV
≥ 0, and
the opposite holds for a
mV
< b
mD
. Next, consider the BCD scenario, which also requires condition
(2.6.2) from the proof of Proposition 1. The derivative ∂e
∗
V
∂mD
is non-negative if and only if
∂e∗V
∂mD
≥ 0 ⇔ wD ≥ axp
hmD
4mV
(2.6.7)
Otherwise, ∂e
∗
V
∂mD
< 0 holds. The inequality (2.6.7) deﬁnes a non-empty intersection with (2.6.2) if
and only if a
mV
< b
mD
. Otherwise, e∗V decreases in mD. In the BCV case, e∗D (weakly) increases in
mV if and only if
∂e∗D
∂mV
≥ 0 ⇔ wV ≥ bxp
hmV
4mD
(2.6.8)
Condition (2.6.3) supports the BCV scenario. It has a non-empty intersection with (2.6.8) if
and only if a
mV
≥ b
mD
. Combining the results obtained for diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes and
“preferences–ﬁghting abilities” proﬁles, we get the eﬀects of mi on e∗i and e∗j , i 	= j as stated in the
proposition.
Finally, compute the derivatives of e∗i with respect to wi and wj, i 	= j:
UC :
∂e∗i
∂wi
=
∂e∗i
∂wj
= 0, i, j = {V, D} , i 	= j
BCD :
∂e∗V
∂wV
= 0,
∂e∗D
∂wD
= 1
mD
> 0
∂e∗V
∂wD
= 1
2
√
axph
mDmV wD
− 1
mD
,
∂e∗D
∂wV
= 0
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BCV :
∂e∗V
∂wV
= 1
mV
> 0,
∂e∗D
∂wD
= 0
∂e∗V
∂wD
= 0,
∂e∗D
∂wV
= 1
2
√
bxph
mDmV wV
− 1
mV
BCV D :
∂e∗V
∂wV
= 1
wV
,
∂e∗D
∂wD
= 1
wD
∂e∗V
∂wD
=
∂e∗D
∂wV
= 0
The UC equilibrium eﬀort levels display no response to wV and wD because the constraints do not
bite. Look at the BCD case. V ’s equilibrium eﬀort strictly increases in wD if and only if
∂e∗V
∂wD
> 0 ⇔ wD < axp
hmD
4mV
(2.6.9)
When a
mV
≥ b
mD
, condition (2.6.2) implies (2.6.9), and e∗V always increases in wD under the BCD
scenario. Otherwise, ∂e
∗
V
∂wD
≤ 0 holds for any wD ≥ axphmD4mV . Next, turn to the BCV case. The eﬀort
D exerts in equilibrium strictly increases in wV if and only if
∂e∗D
∂wV
> 0 ⇔ wV < bxp
hmV
4mD
(2.6.10)
and this is always satisﬁed for a
mV
< b
mD
in the BCV scenario. If amV ≥ bmD , we observe
∂e∗D
∂wV
≤ 0
for any wV ≥ bxphmV4mD . Putting things together, the eﬀect of wi and wj on e∗i , i 	= j follows.
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Proposition 2.3. The optimal settlement oﬀer S always decreases (increases) in D’s (V ’s)
willingness to win b (a) and his ﬁghting abilities. S always increases in V ’s non-monetary ﬁghting
ability. S increases in wV if and only if wV is suﬃciently small (wV ∈ [0, w˜V ], w˜V > 0).
Proof. To prove the claim, recall Lemma 1, which states that the optimal settlement oﬀer S equals
to V ’s equilibrium payoﬀ π∗V . Hence, π∗V ’s comparative statics coincide with those of S. Consider
all possible equilibrium outcomes. First, take the case when contestants’ budget constraints do
not bind and V ’s equilibrium payoﬀ reaches
π∗V = amD
a2mDxp
h
(amD + bmV )
2
π∗V ≡ S responds to changes in players’ willingness to win and ﬁghting abilities as follows:
∂π∗V
∂a
= a
2mDxp
h
(amD+bmV )
3 (amD + 3bmV ) > 0,
∂π∗V
∂b
= −2a3m2DmV xph
(amD+bmV )
3 < 0
∂π∗V
∂mV
= − 2a3m2Dbxph
(amD+bmV )
3 < 0,
∂π∗V
∂mD
= 2a
3mDmV bxp
h
(amD+bmV )
3 > 0
∂π∗V
∂wV
=
∂π∗V
∂wD
= 0
where non-binding budget constraints imply no eﬀect of wi, i = {V, D} on π∗V .
Next, we investigate the equilibrium where D plays eD = wDmD and V ’s best reply comes from
her ﬁrst-order condition:
π∗V = axp
h − 2
√
wDmV axph
mD
+ mV wD
mD
∂π∗V
∂a
= xph −
√
wDmV xph
amD
,
∂π∗V
∂b
= 0
∂π∗V
∂mV
= wD
mD
−
√
wDaxph
mDmV
,
∂π∗V
∂mD
= −mV wD
m2D
+ 1
mD
√
wDmV axph
mD
∂π∗V
∂wV
= 0,
∂π∗V
∂wD
= mV
mD
−
√
mV axph
mDwD
and the signs of these derivatives are deﬁned by
wD <
axphmD
mV
(2.6.11)
The given equilibrium outcomes requires condition (2.6.2) from the proof of Proposition 2.1, and
(2.6.2) implies (2.6.11). Hence, the eﬀects of a, mV , mD, and wD on π∗V become unambiguous:
∂π∗V
∂a
> 0,
∂π∗V
∂mV
< 0,
∂π∗V
∂mD
> 0,
∂π∗V
∂wD
< 0
When V ’s budget constraint binds, but D still has enough resources, the victim obtains
π∗V =
√
wVmDxph
mV b
a− wV
The eﬀects of interest are
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∂π∗V
∂a
=
√
wV mDxph
mV b
> 0,
∂π∗V
∂b
= − a
2b
√
wV mDxph
mV b
< 0
∂π∗V
∂mV
= − a
2mV
√
wV mDxph
mV b
< 0,
∂π∗V
∂mD
= −a
2
√
wV xph
mDmV b
> 0
∂π∗V
∂wV
= a
2
√
mDxph
wV mV b
− 1 > 0 ⇔ wV < a2xphmD4bmV ,
∂π∗V
∂wD
= 0
To support this equilibrium conﬁguration, condition (2.6.3) from the proof of Proposition 2.1 is
necessary. If a
mV
≥ b
mD
, (2.6.3) implies wV < a
2xphmD
4bmV
, and ∂π
∗
V
∂wV
> 0 always holds. Otherwise,
∂π∗V
∂wV
> 0 for wV < a
2xphmD
4bmV
and ∂π
∗
V
∂wV
≤ 0 for wV ∈
[
a2xphmD
4bmV
, mV
xpha2mDb
(amD+bmV )
2
)
. Take
w˜V = min
{
a2xphmD
4bmV
, mV
xpha2mDb
(amD + bmV )
2
}
and the claim of the proposition follows.
Finally, we study the case when both contestants face tight budget constraints (condition (2.6.4)
from the proof of Proposition 2.1):
π∗V = axp
hPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
− wV
∂π∗V
∂a
= xphPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
> 0,
∂π∗V
∂b
= 0
∂π∗V
∂mV
= −axph wV wDmD
(wV mD+wDmV )
2 < 0,
∂π∗V
∂mD
= axph wDwV mV
(wV mD+wDmV )
2 > 0
∂π∗V
∂wV
= axph wDmV mD
(wV mD+wDmV )
2 − 1 > 0 ⇔
∑2
i=1
wi
mi
<
√
axphwD
mV mD
∂π∗V
∂wD
= −axph wV mDmV
(wV mD+wDmV )
2 < 0
Deﬁne w˜V = min
{√
axphwD
mV mD
mV − mVmDwD, mV
xpha2mDb
(amD+bmV )
2
}
and get the statement of the
proposition.
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Proposition 2.4. There exist non-empty sets of “preference–abilities” proﬁles YS¯ ⊂ Ya>b and
YS ⊂ Ya>b such that
• For any y ∈ YS¯ the defendant has enough resources to settle but is not willing to do so:⎧⎨⎩−xphPC (e∗V , e∗D) (a− b) +mV e∗V +mDe∗D < 0axphPC (e∗V , eD)−mV e∗V ≤ wD 	= Ø
• For any y ∈ YS the defendant has enough resources to settle and is willing to do so:⎧⎨⎩−xphPC (e∗V , e∗D) (a− b) +mV e∗V +mDe∗D ≥ 0axphPC (e∗V , eD)−mV e∗V ≤ wD 	= Ø
Proof. To prove the proposition, we analyze all equilibrium outcomes separately. Deﬁne w˜D =
mD
xphb2amV
(amD+bmV )
2 and w˜V = m xp
ha2eb
(ae+bm)2
. First, take the case when contestants’ budget constraints do
not bind. Condition (2.6.1) from the proof of Proposition 2.1 supports this scenario. In equilibrium,
players obtain
π∗V = amD
a2mDxp
h
(amD+bmV )
2
π∗D = − amDbxp
h
(amD+bmV )
2 (amD + 2bmV )
The optimal settlement oﬀer is S = π∗V (Lemma 1). The game does not proceed to the contest
stage if and only if ⎧⎨⎩π∗D ≤ −SS ≤ wD ⇔
⎧⎨⎩mV ≥
amD(a−b)
2b2
= mˆV
wD ≥ a
3m2Dxp
h
(amD+bmV )
2
The latter inequality always deﬁnes a non-empty intersection with condition (2.6.1). Taking mV ∈
[0, mˆV ) and wD ≥ max
{
w˜D,
a3m2Dxp
h
(amD+bmV )
2
}
, one gets the case when the settlement is feasible, but
D strictly prefers to ﬁght:
Y 1S¯ =
{
y ∈ Ya>b : mV ∈ [0, mˆV ) , wV ≥ w˜V , wD ≥ max
{
w˜D,
a3m2Dxp
h
(amD + bmV )
2
}}
where YS¯ ⊂ Ya>b. A set of “preference–abilities” proﬁles such that the settlement indeed happens
looks as follows:
Y 1S =
{
y ∈ Ya>b : mV ≥ mˆV , wV ≥ w˜V , wD ≥ max
{
w˜D,
a3m2Dxp
h
(amD + bmV )
2
}}
Next, consider the equilibrium where D’s budget constraint binds (condition (2.6.2) from the
proof of Proposition 2.1 is needed):
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π∗V = axp
h − 2
√
wDmV axph
mD
+ mV wD
mD
π∗D = −bxph +
√
wDmV xph
mDa
b− wD
D makes a settlement oﬀer if and only if⎧⎨⎩π∗D ≤ −SS ≤ wD ⇔
⎧⎨⎩π∗V ≤ bxph −
√
wDmV xph
mDa
b+ wD
π∗V ≤ wD
When condition (2.6.2) holds, it must be
{
xph −
√
wDmV xph
mDa
> 0
}
. Then, {S ≤ wD} implies
{π∗D ≤ −S}, i.e. a feasible settlement is always desirable by D. The {S ≤ wD} condition holds if
and only if
wD
(
mD −mV
mD
)
+ 2
√
wD
√
mV axph
mD
− axph ≥ 0
Solving the underlying equation for
√
wD delivers two real roots, r1 and r2:
r1, 2 =
mD
(
±
√
axph −
√
mV axph
mD
)
mD −mV
Depending on mD and mV , diﬀerent cases emerge:
• mD > mV ⇒ r1 > 0, r2 < 0, and the settlement oﬀer requires wD ≥ r21, and this deﬁnes a
non-empty intersection with condition (2.6.2) if and only if
⎧⎨⎩wD ≥ r21wD < mD xphb2amV(amD+bmV )2 	= Ø ⇔ r
2
1 < mD
xphb2amV
(amD + bmV )
2 ⇔ mV >
a2mD
b2
With a > b, the last inequality contradicts mD > mV , and no settlement oﬀer is made.
• mD < mV ⇒ r1 < 0, r2 > 0, and the oﬀer appears under wD ≤ r22. Hence, V and D settle if
and only if wD < min {r22, w˜D}:
Y 2S =
{
y ∈ Ya>b : mV > mD, wV ≥ w˜V , wD < min
{
r22, w˜D
}}
Further, we analyze the case when only V ’s budget constraint binds (condition (2.6.3) from the
proof of Proposition 2.1):
π∗V =
√
wV mDxph
mV b
a− wV
π∗D = −2
√
wV mDbxph
mV
+ mDwV
mV
It is optimal to settle if and only if
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⎧⎨⎩
√
wV
(mD−mV )
mV
≤
√
mDxph
mV b
(2b− a)√
wV mDxph
mV b
a− wV ≤ wD
If D has enough wealth (wD ≥ wˆD = max
{
w˜D,
√
wV mV xph
mDb
a− wV
}
), the second inequality always
holds, i.e. the settlement is feasible. However, the willingness to settle (π∗D ≤ −S) strongly depends
on players’ preferences and ﬁghting abilities:
• mD > mV (V has an advantage in non-monetary ﬁghting abilities) ⇒ two cases emerge:
– a ≥ 2b (V is vindictive enough) ⇒ D never wants to settle:
√
wV ≤
√
mDxph
mV b
(2b− a)mV
(mD −mV ) < 0, a contradiction
Y 2S¯ = {y ∈ Ya>b : mD > mV , a ≥ 2b, wV < w˜V , wD ≥ wˆD}
– a ∈ (b, 2b) ⇒ D is willing to settle if and only if
wV < wˆV = min
{
mD
mV xp
h (2b− a)2
b (mD −mV )2
, w˜V
}
When mV < mˆV , it must be
min
{
mV
mDxp
h (2b− a)2
b (mD −mV )2
, w˜V
}
= mV
mDxp
h (2b− a)2
b (mD −mV )2
≡ w¯V
Then, one can specify non-empty subsets of YS¯ and YS:
Y 3S¯ = {y ∈ Ya>b : mD > mV , mV < mˆV , a ∈ (b, 2b) , wV ∈ [wˆV , w˜V ) , wD ≥ wˆD}
Y 3S = {y ∈ Ya>b : mD > mV , mV < mˆV , a ∈ (b, 2b) , wV < wˆV , wD ≥ wˆD}
Y 4S = {y ∈ Ya>b : mD > mV , mV ≥ mˆV , a ∈ (b, 2b) , wV < wˆV , wD ≥ wˆD}
• mD < mV (D has an advantage in non-monetary ﬁghting abilities) :
– a ≥ 2b (V is vindictive enough) ⇒ D makes an oﬀer if and only if
wV ∈ (w¯V , w˜V )
and this set is non-empty if and only if mV > mˆV . With this result, non-empty subsets
of YS¯ and YS are
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Y 4S¯ = {y ∈ Ya>b : mD < mV , mV ≤ mˆV , a ≥ 2b, wV < w˜V , wD ≥ wˆD}
Y 5S¯ = {y ∈ Ya>b : mD < mV , mV > mˆV , a ≥ 2b, wV ≤ w¯V , wD ≥ wˆD}
Y 5S = {y ∈ Ya>b : mD < mV , mV > mˆV , a ≥ 2b, wV ∈ (w¯V , w˜V ) , wD ≥ wˆD}
– If V does not get suﬃcient beneﬁts from D being punished (a ∈ (b, 2b)), the defendant
always prefers to settle:
Y 6S = {y ∈ Ya>b : mD < mV , a ∈ (b, 2b) , wV < w˜V , wD ≥ wˆD}
Finally, check the equilibrium where both contestants face binding budget constraints
(condition (2.6.4) from the proof of Proposition 2.1):
π∗V = axp
hPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
− wV
π∗D = −bxphPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
− wD
The settlement requires⎧⎨⎩π∗D ≤ −SS ≤ wD ⇔
⎧⎨⎩axp
hPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
− wV ≤ bxphPC
(
wV
m
, wD
e
)
+ wD
axphPC
(
wV
mV
, wD
mD
)
− wV ≤ wD
where the latter inequality implies the former one. Thus, if the settlement is feasible, D does not
want to move to the contest stage. One can reduce the second condition to
w2VmD +
(
wD (mD +mV )− axphmD
)
wV + w
2
DmV ≥ 0 (2.6.12)
If (2.6.4) holds, it must be
{
wD (mD +mV )− axph < 0
}
, and (2.6.12) may be violated. When we
solve (2.6.12) with respect to wV , two possibilities appear:
• The discriminant of the underlying square equation is non-negative ⇒ there are two real
roots, r˜1 and r˜2, 0 < r˜1 ≤ r˜2. Then, (2.6.12) is satisﬁed for any wV ∈ [0, r˜1] ∪ [r˜2, ∞), and
we can deﬁne a non-empty subset of YS:
Y 6S = {y ∈ Ya>b : wV < min {r˜1, w˜V } , wD < w˜D}
• The discriminant of the underlying square equation is negative ⇒ (2.6.12) always holds:
Y 7S = {y ∈ Ya>b : wV < w˜V , wD < w˜D}
Finally, deﬁne YS¯ and YS as follows:
YS¯ = ∪5i=1Y iS¯, YS = ∪7i=1Y iS
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Appendix B: Tables and Figures
Figure 2.6.1: The Distribution of V ’s Expected Wealth (w¯iV ): All Cases (Nall)
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Table 2.9: Goodness-of-Fit: All Cases and Diﬀerent Group (Nall)
Moments E(PS) E(PC |noS) E(P (x∗ = 1) |C)
Samples Data Sim. Data Sim. Data Sim.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Groups by victim-specific characteristics
Female victim .196 .15 .444 .444 .382 .432
(2.9e-4) (6.1e-4) (6.8e-4)
Child victim .161 .385 .398 0.32 .413 0.54
(5.9e-4) (1.6e-3) (1.7e-3)
Unemployed victim .148 .166 .454 .424 .457 .447
(2.8e-4) (5.7e-4) (8.3e-4)
Victim of age 30–49 .168 .102 .463 .442 .415 .436
(3.4e-4) (6.8e-4) (8.9e-4)
Groups by defendant-specific characteristics
Female defendant .214 .164 .437 .436 .187 .393
(5.3e-4) (1.2e-3) (1.9e-3)
Defendant of age 25–29 .21 .128 .485 .462 .418 .438
(3.2e-4) (7.4e-4) (1.2e-3)
Defendant of age 30–39 .156 .156 .508 .434 .4 .452
(3.8e-4) (6.9e-4) (9.9e-4)
Defendant is a law enforcer or .143 .172 .5 .448 .5 .424
a government oﬃcial
(2.1e-3) (4.1e-3) (6.8e-3)
Defendant holds a college degree .245 .175 .432 .418 .316 .424
(4.8e-4) (1.04e-3) (1.4e-3)
Defendant holds a high school .104 .156 .535 .439 .487 .442
degree
(3.1e-4) (5.9e-4) (9.4e-4)
Defendant has a criminal record .132 .139 .454 .442 .444 .513
(3.7e-4) (5.7e-4) (9.6e-4)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph are taken.
This procedure is repeated 100 times.
E(PS) denotes an expected probability to settle. E(PC |noS) reﬂects an expected probability to end up in court
given no settlement. E(P (x = 1 |C)) deﬁnes an expected probability to get a real sentence once the case goes to
court. For the data, E(PS), E(PC |noS), and E(P (x = 1 |C)) correspond to a frequency of observing s = 1, c = 1,
and x∗ = 1, respectively. In case of simulations, the values are computed based on the estimated distributions.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.10: Estimation Results: “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (Np)
Victim’s Wealth
Variable Coeﬃcient St. Error
Intercept 88.62 87.484
SESV :
worker 21.31∗∗∗ 2.348
oﬃce worker 88.14∗∗∗ 1.157
top-manager 44.49∗∗∗ 2.849
entrepreneur −12.02∗∗∗ .074
budget oﬃce worker 92.03∗∗∗ 8.033
student 82.34∗∗ 32.502
welfare recipient −3.21 4.265
retired 88.52∗∗∗ 0.534
other 90.67∗∗∗ 26.314
genderV 27.72
∗∗∗ 1.573
childV 137.05
∗∗ 2.058
ageV 45.71
∗∗∗ 1.629
age2V −0.53∗∗ .267
Defendant’s Wealth
Intercept 22.72 25.329
SESD:
worker 66.19∗∗ 25.753
oﬃce worker 87.37∗∗∗ .163
top-manager 36.3∗ 21.161
entrepreneur 88.59∗∗∗ 1.474
budget oﬃce worker 96.7∗∗∗ 3.779
student 105.1∗∗∗ 1.396
welfare recipient 25.8∗∗∗ .408
retired 66.5∗∗∗ .9
other 25.66 23.324
genderD 21.34
∗∗∗ 1.279
ageD 57.36
∗∗∗ .326
age2D −0.81∗∗∗ .113
eduD 104.18
∗∗∗ 15.686
pcarD 1 None
Vindictiveness (a)
Intercept 89.71∗∗∗ 24.232
wV 0.19 30.175
Defendant’s Disutility of Punishment (b)
Intercept 73.21∗∗∗ 0.185
wD 18.72 18.612
N 1055
Non-Monetary Fighting Abilities
Variable Coeﬃcient St.Error
Victim:
Intercept 56.87∗∗∗ 2.119
lawenfV 56.55
∗∗ 23.13
Defendant:
Intercept 8.81∗∗∗ 2.02
lawenfD 12.57 19.829
Accident and Harm
Number of
dead victims 154.81∗∗∗ 26.143
victims with 11.18 15.245
serious injuries
dead minor victims 82.52∗∗∗ 1.604
minor victims with 166.56∗∗∗ 16.826
serious injuries
dead female victims 90.19∗∗∗ 1.903
female victims with −1.25∗∗∗ 4.739
serious injuries
dead minor 28.28∗∗∗ 3.352
female victims
minor female victims 12.69 27.234
with serious injuries
drunkD 173.7
∗∗∗ .332
drunkV −34.22∗∗∗ .378
crimehistD 89.06
∗∗∗ .631
admhistD 37.89
∗∗∗ .832
recordD 81.42
∗∗∗ 27.426
Region-speciﬁc Yes
controls
t 291.18∗∗∗ .436
Underlying Distributions
σwV 12.91
∗∗∗ .246
σwD 10.61
∗∗∗ 1.977
σa 11.07
∗∗∗ .528
σb 4.1
∗∗∗ .189
σmV 7.75
∗∗∗ .239
σmD 67.83
∗∗∗ .331
σx 158.87
∗∗∗ 12.441
log(L) –1501.21
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Table 2.11: Goodness-of-Fit: “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (Np)
Moments E(PS) E(PC |noS) E(P (x∗ = 1) |C)
Samples Data Sim. Data Sim. Data Sim.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All cases: .163 .123 .399 .495 .406 .453
(2.7e-4) (1.3e-3) (6.7e-4)
Pearson’s χ2 stat. 38.78
Critical χ23 (α = .99) 9.21
Groups by victim-specific characteristics
Female victim .173 .12 .392 .5 .41 .462
(4.3e-4) (1.7e-3) (9.8e-4)
Child victim .187 .17 .356 .418 .46 .598
(8.8e-4) (2.9e-3) (2.2e-3)
Unemployed victim .16 .12 .384 .507 .435 .476
(4.1e-4) (1.7e-3) (1.1e-3)
Victim of age 30–49 .13 .112 .38 .515 .39 .423
(6e-4) (2.3e-3) (1.3e-3)
Groups by defendant-specific characteristics
Female defendant .179 .156 .344 .446 .12 .329
(1.01e-3) (4.3e-3) (2.5e-3)
Defendant of age 25–29 .206 .126 .398 .491 .391 .459
(6.3e-4) (2.6e-3) (1.5e-3)
Defendant of age 30–39 .151 .123 .4 .495 .51 .499
(5.3e-4) (1.9e-3) (1.5e-3)
Defendant is a law enforcer or .167 .1 .5 .571 .6 .551
a government oﬃcial
(2.7e-3) (6e-3) (6.8e-3)
Defendant holds a college degree .195 .15 .28 .461 .283 .4
(6.8e-4) (2.8e-3) (1.8e-3)
Defendant holds a high school .07 .1 .463 .514 .513 .455
degree
(4.6e-4) (2e-3) (1.1e-3)
Defendant has a criminal record .162 .08 .446 .548 .419 .577
(6.1e-4) (2.1e-3) (1.5e-3)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph are taken.
This procedure is repeated 100 times.
E(PS) denotes an expected probability to settle. E(PC |noS) reﬂects an expected probability to end up in court
given no settlement. E(P (x = 1 |C)) deﬁnes an expected probability to get a real sentence once the case goes to
court. For the data, E(PS), E(PC |noS), and E(P (x = 1 |C)) correspond to a frequency of observing s = 1, c = 1,
and x∗ = 1, respectively. In case of simulations, the values are computed based on the estimated distributions.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.12: The Eﬀects of Increasing D’s Wealth: “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (Np)
Moments E(PS) NS S¯
Wealth
w1D = 728 .01 10 1.28
(5.2e-5) (.055) (.012)
w2D = 2
′082 .026 28 11
(6.8e-5) (.072) (.063)
w3D = 2
′250 .028 30 12.87
(8.2e-5) (.087) (.055)
w4D = 2
′444 .03 32 15.3
(8.3e-5) (.088) (.079)
w5D = 2
′816 .035 37 20.49
(5.1e-5) (.053) (.075)
w6D = 7
′283 .084 89 138.73
(1.3e-4) (.139) (.348)
w7D = 19
′405 .178 187 702.79
(9.5e-5) (.1) (.788)
w8D = 20
′826 .185 195 765.45
(1e-4) (.114) (1.425)
w9D = 22
′506 .192 203 834.1
(9.7e-5) (.103) (1.639)
w10D = 27
′145 .21 221 993.45
(9.2e-5) (.097) (1.569)
w11D = 28
′166 .213 224 1’020.51
(7.6e-5) (.08) (1.543)
w12D = 41
′653 .237 250 1’190.61
(5e-5) (.053) (1.864)
w13D = 45
′013 .241 253 1’183.92
(4.8e-5) (.05) (1.839)
w14D = 48
′891 .243 256 1’162.33
(3.7e-5) (.039) (2.149)
w15D = 56
′333 .246 260 1’084.4
(2.3e-5) (.024) (2.065)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph are taken.
This procedure is repeated 100 times. w1D–w
5
D correspond to 0, .25, .5, .75, and 1 quantiles of w¯
i
D’s estimated
distribution; w6D–w
10
D and w
11
D –w
15
D reﬂect w
1
D–w
5
D multiplied by 10 and 20, respectively. wD is measured in rubles.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.13: The Eﬀects of Increasing V ’s Wealth: All Cases (Nall)
Moments E(PS) P (a > b) P (S ∈ (−π∗D, wD] )
Wealth
w1V = 13
′099 4.2e-3 0 0
(2e-5) (–) (–)
w2V = 51
′082 1.1e-3 0 0
(1.3e-5) (–) (–)
w3V = 130
′995 4.6e-4 0 0
(6.5e-6) (–) (–)
w4V = 168
′875 3.6e-4 0 0
(7.2e-6) (–) (–)
w5V = 261
′991 2.3e-4 0 0
(5.1e-6) (–) (–)
w6V = 392
′987 1.6e-4 0 0
(4.4e-6) (–) (–)
w7V = 510
′826 1.2e-4 0 0
(3.8e-6) (–) (–)
w8V = 523
′983 1.2e-4 0 0
(3.9e-6) (–) (–)
w9V = 1
′021′652 6.2e-5 .23 4.8e-8
(2.5e-6) (–) (6.9e-8)
w10V = 1
′532′479 4.1e-5 .23 5.3e-7
(2e-6) (–) (2.3e-7)
w11V = 1
′688′750 3.7e-5 .39 5.3e-7
(2.2e-6) (5.1e-5) (2.4e-7)
w12V = 2
′043′305 3e-5 .46 7.2e-7
(2.1e-6) (–) (2.7e-7)
w13V = 3
′377′500 1.7e-5 .72 1.2e-6
(1.1e-6) (–) (3.7e-7)
w14V = 5
′066′250 1e-5 .86 1.3e-6
(9.5e-7) (–) (3.2e-7)
w15V = 6
′755′000 6.9e-6 .95 1.4e-6
(9.4e-7) (–) (4.1e-7)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph are taken.
This procedure is repeated 100 times. wiV , i = {1, ..., 15} correspond to rescaled and sorted 0, .5, and 1 quantiles
of w¯iV ’s estimated distribution (scaling factors are located between 1 and 40). w¯
i
V is measured in rubles. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
CHAPTER 2. “VICTIM-DEFENDANT” SETTLEMENTS 187
Table 2.14: The Eﬀects of Increasing V ’s Wealth: “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (Np)
Moments E(PS) P (a > b) P (S ∈ (−π∗D, wD] )
Wealth
w1V = 14
′567 1e-3 0 0
(1.9e-5) (–) (–)
w2V = 21
′850 6.9e-4 0 0
(1.5e-5) (–) (–)
w3V = 29
′134 5.2e-4 0 0
(7.4e-6) (–) (–)
w4V = 36
′417 4.3e-4 0 0
(1e-5) (–) (–)
w5D = 45
′013 3.6e-4 0 0
(6.4e-6) (–) (–)
w6D = 56
′333 2.9e-4 0 0
(8.4e-6) (–) (–)
w7D = 67
′520 2.4e-4 3.1e-5 0
(5.9e-6) (6.4e-6) (–)
w8D = 84
′500 1.9e-4 1 0
(8.7e-6) (–) (–)
w9D = 90
′026 1.8e-4 1 0
(7.5e-6) (–) (–)
w10D = 112
′533 1.4e-4 1 1.4e-6
(3.4e-6) (–) (4.9e-7)
w11D = 112
′667 1.3e-4 1 1.5e-6
(6e-6) (–) (5.3e-7)
w12D = 140
′834 1e-4 1 8.3e-6
(3.5e-6) (–) (1.2e-6)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of wV , wD, a, b, mV , mD, and xph are taken.
This procedure is repeated 100 times. D’s wealth is ﬁxed at wiD = mini
{
w¯iD
}
. wiV , i = {1, ..., 14} correspond to
rescaled and sorted 0, .5, and 1 quantiles of w¯iV ’s estimated distribution (scaling factors are located between 1 and
50). w¯iV is measured in rubles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 2.6.2: The Distribution of D’s Expected Wealth (w¯iD): All Cases (Nall)
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Figure 2.6.3: The Distribution of V ’s Expected Wealth (w¯iV ): “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (Np)
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Figure 2.6.4: The Distribution of D’s Expected Wealth (w¯iD): “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (Np)
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